Why is Talking With the Taliban so Difficult?
MT
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has offered to provide security for the Taliban's reclusive leader, Mullah Omar, if he agrees to peace talks. Karzai made the offer despite the multi-million dollar bounty offered for the militant leader's capture by the United States. However, this offer was almost immediately rejected by the Taliban whose spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid said they felt secure in Afghanistan and did not need the protection offered by Karzai.
Many Afghan officials speak confidently about the practicality of the talks with the Taliban, ignoring the fact that Taliban don't easily compromise their radical religious values for political aims
Inside the Taliban
For most urban political movements talking and negotiating are important tools in the political process. The Taliban however is no urban political faction; they started as a rural movement, motivated by rather simple yet inflexible religious and tribal traditions. Nevertheless, shortly after their formation, the influence of Pakistan's Intelligence Service, the ISI, and foreign militants' political Islamist ideology significantly manipulated the Taliban's belief system and added to the complexity of the group's structure and national composition.
The assumption that the Taliban can be persuaded through "political concessions" to desist from violence, appears both logical and practical. But the assumption ignores the Taliban's radically different conceptualization of what is commonly regarded as "violence, insurgency or terrorism." To the Taliban these simply constitute "jihad," a defining and incontrovertible feature of their worldview.
During the Taliban rule, the international community vehemently opposed the regime's implementation of its interpretation of Sharia laws which included public execution in stadiums, stoning to death, amputation of limbs and flogging. But their most vociferous response to such global condemnation took the form of comments from their then foreign minister, Mullah Wakil Ahmed Motawakel, that those disagreeing with a publicly enforced penal code were welcome to make donations toward a purpose-built "Islamic punishment facility."
The Taliban repeatedly displayed indifference to strong international criticism, including the condemnation of their destruction of Bamyan's historic statues of Buddha, which the Taliban believed to be un-Islamic. In addition, after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden to the United States, while according to Mullah Abdel Salam Zaief, the Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan, they were confident that for this "America will destroy them."
This rigid attitude toward the international community occurred at a time when the Taliban's "Islamic emirate" was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Proposal for Talks or Demand for Surrender?
The approach of the Afghan government to proposals for talks too, is confusing. Karzai, while offering protection to Omar, rejected the Taliban's condition of withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. In addition, insisting on the condition of "accepting the constitution and ending armed resistance" has been the overall stance of the Afghan officials (including Karzai) towards the Taliban.
However, this is not a new offer. The Afghan government had declared the same stance shortly after the fall of the Taliban; and in practical terms the government has been trying to persuade Taliban members to lay down their arms, accept the rule of law and join the peace process. In fact the main objective of the Afghan Commission for Promoting Peace, led by Sebghatullah Mojaddadi, speaker of the Afghan senate and a former president of the Mujahedin government, has been to convince the Taliban to comply with this requirement.
Therefore, in reality the Taliban could always have given up resistance, accepted the constitution and returned to normal life or even participated in legitimate political activities, as in the case of Mullah Abdel Salam Zaeif, formerly Taliban ambassador to Pakistan and his colleague Motawakel, ex-foreign minister, together with many other members of this group.
In other words, the Afghan government's stipulation to "lay down arms and accept the constitution" would seem, rather than an apparent prerequisite for talks with the Taliban, to be instead a merely re-phrased demand for surrender.
Position of Strength
It would seem that the Taliban view such repeated requests as inconsequential. Even the government's offer to protect Omar was immediately rejected, while they proclaimed their renewed resolve to wage "jihad" against both Afghan and foreign forces.
Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Afghan foreign minister, has on a number of occasions spoken of the government's "position of strength" in regard to talks with the Taliban. But considering the struggle of at least 150,000 members of the foreign and Afghan armies to fight the insurgency, it seems more likely to be the Taliban who enjoy this advantage.
It is very unlikely that the Taliban are going to engage in negotiations with the Afghan government at a time when international military commanders pronounce on the "un-winnable war against the Taliban." Afghan officials frequently ask the Taliban for talks while offering protection to their leader and the West is sinking deeper into an economic crisis which threatens to divert their attention from the problem of Afghanistan.
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