Hazara Nation

AT
Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD) Chairman Wang Jin-pyng announced that Dr. Sima Samar, Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and founder of the Shuhada Organization, has been selected as the winner of the 2008 Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award (ADHRA).

Dr. Samar is recognized for her contributions to advancing human rights and especially women’s rights and welfare in Afghanistan. She will formally receive the Award sculpture and a grant of US$100,000 at a ceremony in Taipei on December 10th, International Human Rights Day.

Dr. Samar was the first Hazara woman to earn a medical degree from Kabul University. She fled to Pakistan in 1984 and remained in exile for 17 years, during which she founded the Shuhada Organization in 1989 to provide medical care and educational opportunities to Afghan women and children. Since 2002, she has served as the Chairperson of the newly established Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, laying the institutional groundwork for human rights protections in Afghanistan.


“Dr. Samar has devoted her life to fighting for freedom and democracy in Afghanistan, putting her life in immense risk and overcoming numerous obstacles,” said Chairman Wang, noting that the ADHRA and other awards which Samar has received not only represent international recognition of her contributions, but also help protect her personal safety in Afghanistan.

Dr. Samar was chosen from a pool of 30 candidates representing 18 countries, after a rigorous two-stage review process. Chairman Wang pointed out that since the ADHRA was established in 2006, it is especially noteworthy that the second and third annual Awards were both awarded to women. Last year’s (2007) ADHRA was presented to Burmese doctor Cynthia Maung, founder of the Mae Tao Clinic on the Thai-Burmese border.

Liao Dachi, member of the ADHRA preliminary review board and professor of political science at National Sun Yat-Sen University, commented on the harsh environment in which Samar has worked for Afghan women’s rights and welfare. Afghanistan faces a dire lack of medical and educational resources, and women lived under severe oppression during the Taliban’s rule.

Even today, life expectancy for women is only 43 years, and rates of adult female illiteracy remain extremely high. Samar has had to argue before international organizations such as the United Nations that mistreatment of Afghan women and children should be judged according to basic human rights principles, rather than characterized as traditional cultural practices, said Liao.

The Taiwan Foundation for Democracy established the annual Asia Democracy and Human Rights Award in 2006 to support individuals or organizations that have actively promoted democratic development or advocated human rights through peaceful means in Asia.

International members of the 2008 ADHRA final review board included: Dr. Nisuke Ando, former Chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee and Director of the Kyoto Human Rights Institute; Dr. Alex Boraine, Chairperson of the International Center for Transitional Justice and former Deputy Chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Ms. Asma Jahangir, Chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief; Mr. Alejandro Toledo, former President of Peru; and Dr. Cynthia Maung, founder of the Mae Tao Clinic and winner of the 2007 ADHRA.

The Shuhada Organization aims to provide Afghan women and children with medical care and educational opportunities. It is the oldest Afghan non-governmental organization and the largest woman-led NGO in the region. Under Samar’s leadership, Shuhada now operates 12 clinics and 4 hospitals in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as 71 schools in Afghanistan and 3 schools for Afghan refugees in Quetta, Pakistan, educating over 48,000 girls and boys.

Dr. Samar is the recipient of numerous international awards, including the 1994 Community Leadership Award from the Roman Magsaysay Foundation in the Philippines, the 2001 John Humphrey Freedom Award from Rights and Democracy in Canada, and the 2004 Eleanor Roosevelt Award from the Feminist Majority Foundation in the United States.
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Author:Greg Bruno
Introduction

In the hunt for a new strategy in Afghanistan, U.S. military commanders are studying the feasibility of recruiting Afghan tribesmen (LAT) to target Taliban and al-Qaeda elements. Taking a page from the so-called "Sunni Awakening" in Iraq, which turned Sunni tribesmen against militants first in Anbar Province and then beyond, the strategic about-face in Afghanistan would seek to extend power from Kabul to the country's myriad tribal militias. Gen. David Petraeus, the former top commander in Iraq who now heads U.S. Central Command, has talked openly of this ground-up approach, telling the New York Times that "in certain areas local reconciliation initiatives hold some potential." But other military leaders and regional analysts warn that while reliance on Afghan tribes could prove effective in some regions, the strategy is also fraught with pitfalls that have the potential to further destabilize the country.

"There's always concerns that it has to be done correctly," Gen. David D. McKiernan, the current commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, said in October 2008, "or you get back into the problems of armed militias, of support to warlords, of corrupt practices."

A New Strategy?

Gen. Petraeus has ordered a formal review (WashPost) of U.S. strategy for Afghanistan that will focus on at least two themes: possible government reconciliation with the Taliban; and cooperation with neighboring countries, including Pakistan and Iran. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, speaking on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Budapest in October 2008, said he favored some form of reconciliation in Afghanistan, though he acknowledged not knowing "how it would evolve." A week later, during a speech at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington, Gates was unequivocal in his support of bringing tribal elements into the fold. "At the end of the day the only solution in Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders in terms of trying to create a backlash ... against the Taliban," the defense secretary said.

"At the end of the day the only solution in Afghanistan is to work with the tribes and provincial leaders in terms of trying to create a backlash...against the Taliban." —Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates

If U.S. commanders do turn to Afghanistan's tribes-a similar strategy is already being employed by Pakistan in that country's tribal regions-it would amount to a significant reversal for Washington and for the war's planners. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown suggested in December 2007 that international forces should "increase our support for community defense initiatives" such as the Afghan arbakai-networks of tribal militias that serve as voluntary village defense forces in the country's southeast. But the idea was initially given little credence by Brown's American counterparts. In January 2008, for instance, U.S. Gen. Dan McNeill, McKiernan's predecessor as commander of NATO forces, told the Financial Times that the British proposal was potentially disastrous. "What we should not do is take actions that will reintroduce militias of the former power brokers," McNeill said. As recently as September 2008 U.S. military commanders maintained that relying on tribes was a bad idea, according to a report (PDF) from the Congressional Research Service. Now, Seth G. Jones, an analyst at the RAND Corporation, says bringing Afghan tribes into the mix may be the only way to restore stability, though he and other experts stress a tribal strategy would be only part of a potential solution.

Afghanistan's recent history has been dominated by war and central control. But this pattern is relatively recent. For instance, during the reigns of Mohammed Zahir Shah (1933-1973), and the Taliban (1996-2001), central authorities ceded significant power to tribal leaders. "Part of the recipe for stability [during Zahir Shah's tenure] was a competent, legitimate central government that had the ability to establish order in urban areas of the country ... and a tacit agreement with local tribes, subtribes, and clans in rural areas of the country," Jones says. "Finding some medium between the two is what has kept Afghanistan stable in its stable periods."

Kabul Takes the Lead

The rise in violence that began in 2006 has led U.S. commanders to explore a ground-up approach, but details on how a tribal reconciliation program might work are still being hammered out. About the only certainty, experts say, is that any reconciliation program must be managed and implemented by the Afghan government. "This needs to be an Afghan-led effort on how to engage the tribes and what the incentives are and how to use the traditional tribal authorities to help with community security and community assistance," Gen. McKiernan told reporters in October 2008. Kabul is already showing leadership on alternate strategies; it pledged alongside Pakistani officials to begin talks with Taliban groups, another strategy Washington was slow to endorse.

What we should not do is take actions that will reintroduce militias of the former power brokers." —Gen. Dan McNeill, former NATO commander in Afghanistan

Yet some observers have been critical of the Afghan-led approach in the past. In June 2006 President Hamid Karzai authorized arming arbakai in southern and eastern Afghanistan to secure the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The region is predominantly Pashtun-the major ethnolinguistic group that dominates the country's south and east. Afghan Defense Minister Rahim Wardak said at the time that the initiative was aimed at recruiting local militiamen into the national police force (RFE/RL). The minister said the program would not undermine international disarmament efforts, such as the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programs. But Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, said at the time that Karzai's move was a "complete reversal" of efforts to strengthen the central government, and predicted that arming Pashtun militias in the south would renew tribal rivalries that had been dormant for years; some analysts believe that has happened.

Similar concerns were raised in October 2008, as talk of a U.S.-backed effort intensified. General Nur-al Haq Olumi, a member of parliament from Kandahar Province, told the Kabul-based daily Payman, according to a translation by the BBC, that distributing guns in the south while simultaneously supporting national efforts to disband and disarm militias was contradictory and potentially destructive. The Afghan paper Hasht-e Sobh, also translated by the BBC, underscored the point in an editorial: "The fact that these forces may become new warlords is not mere speculation. It is an irrefutable truth." Others fear that by arming Pashtun tribes, rivalries could be reignited; they point to unresolved conflict between the Hazara minority and nomads in central Afghanistan as a possible source of friction. Aware of the risks, Karzai has relocated warlords to stem regional violence. One example: He appointed as minister of energy the veteran mujahedeen commander Ismail Khan, who once controlled a sizeable portion of the country from his northwestern base of operations in Herat Province.

Leveraging Ancient Support

Framing these regional power struggles-and any new ground-up strategy-are a complex and baffling array of tribal actors. Pashtuns are represented by dozens of major tribal groups (though two "super tribes," the Durrani and Ghilzai, have historically been among the most influential) with hundreds of subtribes. The most sought-after partnership discussed in any potential U.S.-NATO-Afghan tribal cooperation would involve the arbakai. Akin to local police and courted by the Karzai government, the arbakai defend communities and enforce the decisions of tribal councils, or jirgas. A September 2004 report (PDF) by the International Legal Foundation describes their traditional duties: "In ancient Aryan tribes, the Arbakai led groups of warriors in wartime and maintained law and order in peacetime. Today, they take orders from a commander. They are given considerable immunity in their communities and cannot be harmed or disobeyed. Those who flout these rules are subject to the punishments set by the Arbakai organization." More recently, these self-regulating militias have been especially adept (Economist) at keeping the Taliban at bay in areas where tribal structures are strongest. Pashtun tribes adhere to an ancient code of honor and revenge known as Pashtunwali; the Taliban have struggled to promote their vision of sharia law in Pashtunwali regions, the Economist notes. But experts say it would be premature to assume Pashtun militias would be open to cooperating with international forces: Pashtun disdain for outsiders is not discriminatory.

"This needs to be an Afghan-led effort on how to engage the tribes and what the incentives are and how to use the traditional tribal authorities to help with community security and community assistance." —Gen. David McKiernan, commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan

Non-Pashtun tribes and warlords dominating northeastern and western regions of the country are even more of a wild card, analysts say. Jake Sherman, a former UN official in Afghanistan, writes in a 2005 assessment of Afghan warlords that Badakhshan and Takhar Provinces in the country's northeast have historically been hotbeds for unofficial militias (PDF). The center of Soviet resistance in the 1980s, these mountainous provinces have been home to tens of thousands of militants, many led by independent commanders with little regard for local and central governmental structures. Jones, the RAND analyst, says one issue Western commanders will have to reconcile is that a bottom-up approach, by design, will empower local actors "at the expense of the central government." That shouldn't be a deal breaker, however. "That's just the way Afghanistan has historically worked, including in its periods of peace," Jones says.

Complex Tribal System

NATO commander Gen. McKiernan says turning to tribes will not be fast or easy; many have been engaged in isolated struggles for decades, and arming the wrong ones could return Afghanistan's warlords to power. "What I find in Afghanistan ... is a degree of complexity in the tribal system which is much greater than what I found in Iraq years ago," he said. "I would not want ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] military commanders to be trying to decide which tribe should they support without letting the Afghan government do that. It's simple as that."

Part of the reluctance for a heavy U.S. hand is perception: the United States and its allies do not want to be seen as meddling in the affairs of tribes and clans that have historically opposed outsiders. But beyond perception is sheer complexity; Western commanders may need Afghan expertise. Maps of Afghan tribal divisions in the south (PDF) and east (PDF) illustrate the intermingling factions within Afghan society. Jones says coercing tribes to side with coalition forces will require manipulating regional allegiances and tribal motivations, a strategy the Taliban employed with acumen during their rise to power in the late 1990s.

And still, Afghan experts dispute whether reliance on such networks can succeed. Peter Bergen, a terrorism analyst and a fellow at the New America Foundation, says he sees potential positives with employing a strategy similar to the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. "Ordinary Afghans tend to trust their tribal shuras [councils] to solve their problems, and these 'Sons of Afghanistan' could fill the security void (PDF) until the Afghan army and police grew in size and ability so as to be able to secure the country-a process likely to take many years," Bergen writes. But Bergen shares the concern that a reckless approach could fuel a return to warlordism. CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey sees another reason for caution. He says as tempting as it may be to transfer successful strategies from one war to another, Afghanistan is not Iraq. "It falls into the question of hierarchical versus egalitarian social structure," Markey says, comparing Iraq with Afghanistan. "What does bribing somebody get you? If you bribe a person in an egalitarian structure ... even if he seems to be a tribal elder, you may get almost nothing" in return.
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Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland;
By Sana Haroon; Hurst & Company London 2007;
Pp254;
Price £25;
Special Price £15.95;
Available at bookstores in Pakistan

Syed Ahmad Shaheed of Rai Bareilly has finally won his battle in 2008, albeit at the cost of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embraced the Deobandis in the hope of making itself acceptable but to no avail

Sana Haroon has written an excellent book that will help us understand the killing fields of the Tribal Areas of Pakistan today. This month (April 2008) the local Al Qaeda warlord and alleged killer of Ms Benazir Bhutto, Baitullah Mehsud of Wana, convened a big conference of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Aurakzai Agency near the tomb of Haji Turangzai to proclaim that his emirate had come to stay. He was himself not there for fear of being killed by an American drone but his deputy representing Bajaur was there as were warriors from all other tribal areas including Malakand in the NWFP.

The book explains the role of the local mullah in Pakhtun society and traces his journey from mystical faith to the hardline Deobandi one which was actually more suited to the stark highlander’s life of challenges rather than the quietism of the sufi from the plains. Haji Turangzai actually stands at the axis of change in the spirituality of the Tribal Areas and his war against British Raj fits him for the homage of those who are fighting the global hegemony of America and punishing with suicide-bombing such American allies as Pakistan.

Historically the Pakhtun of the Tribal Areas were ruled by their tribal code Pakhtunwali intertwined with faith through the agency of their mullahs. The mullahs were mostly a part of the chain (silsila) of mystics — mostly Qadiriya — who decided the matters of sharia in the light of their jurisprudence and in deference to the tribal code. Gradually the mullahs all changed to the Mujaddadiya chain of mysticism, which meant they became militant rather than quiescent in the qadiri tradition. We at least have one evidence about when the change actually began.

Ahmed Shah Abdali had induced descendants of Mujaddid Alf Sani to move to Kabul after his raid of Delhi in 1748. On their arrival, and with patronage from the court of Ahmed Shah, and later Timur Shah (1772-93) and Shah Zama (1793-1800), they gained pre-eminence at the Afghan court. The were also granted lands in Kabul, Kohistan, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat where the influence of the Naqshbandiya-Mujaddidiya line grew to its strongest (p.41). It is Alf Sani’s majuddadi militancy that informs the Pakhtun personality.

The piri-muridi tradition was strong among the Pakhtuns till another great man in the tradition of Naqshbandiya-Mujaddadiya chain became their patron in chief, Shah Waliullah. The big tradition of the warlord mullah in the Tribal Areas must begin with Abdul Ghafur (1793-1878) of upper Swat who got his early education at Hazrat Ji of the Mujaddadiya silsila in Peshawar who found him in violation of the tariqa, after which he joined a Qadiri-Suhrawardiya-Chistiya teacher of a multiple order. Ghafur became the akhund whose line was to be the owners of Swat because he fought on the side of Amir Dost of Afghanistan against Ranjit Singh and won for his Yusufzai followers the lands of Swat and Mardan. The ‘Miangul’ descendants of Ghafur were first known as akhund but were later called wali.

Akhund Ghafur set up the throne of Swat and in 1849 put Syed Akbar Shah on it as Amir of Swat, the Syed being a former secretary of Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly, but after his death took the throne himself. He kept his line with the Mujaddadi chief mullah of Kabul open and derived a lot of power from the Kabul throne through the mystic silsila. His military might was respected in the region surrounding Swat, but his authority spread far and wide when he accepted, as murid, Mullah Najmuddin of Hadda, a khalifa or appointed deputy of Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly. (Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly had come to the Frontier from Delhi to defeat the Sikhs and establish an Islamic state, but was killed at Balakot in today’s Hazara district in 1831.)

The new Mujaddadi wave rolled back the earlier maverick mysticism fitfully represented by such ‘heretic’ saints as Pir Roshan Bayazid Ansari (1525-1560) who united the Pakhtuns against the Mughals and remained true to the reputation of warrior mystics. The Mujaddadis rejected Pir Roshan’s cutting down of the namaz and other central tenets in the tradition of Mansur Hallaj. (Former cricket captain Majid Khan’s son cricketer Bazid Khan is named after the Pir-e-Roshan.) The great tradition that came to Swat was given in the hands of the Hadda Mullah of Mohmand. He came to Swat and proclaimed an eclectic silsila led by the Mujaddadi school.

Hadda Mullah fought Amir Abdur Rehman Khan of Kabul on the one hand and battled the British on the other. As a pupil of Syed Ahmad Shaheed of Rai Bareilly who fought South India’s most immaculate jihad in the Frontier, Hadda Mullah created a stronghold in 1897 when he saw his follower from Kabul Sadullah Khan Sartor Faqir fighting the British at Malakand. The Miangul line of Akhund Ghafur was soon disenchanted by the politically suicidal but heroic strategies of Hadda Mullah and broke from their family silsila to go to the less warlike school of Manki Sharif.

But the Akhund Ghafur-Hadda Mullah legacy was moved forward by one Fazl Wahid Haji Sahib of Turangzai (1842-1937), which was really the teachings of Mujaddid Alf Sani and Shah Waliullah. Turangzai is supposed to have gone to Deoband in India’s Saharanpur to learn the Quran where he saw the most militant of all clerics Maulana Mahmudul Hasan preparing a group of pupils to go to Hijaz in Saudi Arabia. He insisted on going to haj with Maulana Mahmudul Hasan and seemed to have repeated the experience of Shah Waliullah himself when he came under the Wahabi influence of Haji Imdadullah in Makka. Haji Turangzai’s first bayt was with Imdadullah, the one he took at the hand of Hadda Mullah was his second.

Although the descendants of Akhund Ghafur like Miangul Aurangzeb the Wali of Swat greatly revered the great Mujaddadi tradition their rule in Swat was less stringent than in Mohmand and Bajaur where Haji Turangzai left behind a strong Deobandi-Wahhabi influence that was to coalesce with the Arabs who arrived in the region with Al Qaeda. Baitullah Mehsud is claiming from the Mianguls the legacy of Akhund Ghafur while the family of the Wali is keen to take the governance of Swat away from Peshawar and reactivate the soft shariat of the Wali. The Pakistan army could therefore be facing the tradition of the Wali and the larger challenge of Haji Turangzai legacy represented by Baitullah Mehsud.

But if the Pakistan army loses, the next rout will be that of the representatives of the Wali who are in the habit of quickly leaving Swat after indirectly supporting Maulana Fazlullah of TNSM. The legacy of Haji Turangzai is in the ascendant. Syed Ahmad Shaheed of Rai Bareilly has finally won his battle in 2008, albeit at the cost of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embraced the Deobandis in the hope of making itself acceptable but to no avail. Read the full story

From BAMYAN OFFICIAL WEBSITE

Afghanistan and the history of Bamiyan:

Afghanistan‘s history can be traced back to when the land was once called “Ariana”.

Afghanistan was influenced by different cultures and civilizations. Situated at a crossroad of civilizations, Afghanistan’s unique culture was born from a mixture of indigenous and foreign elements.



Bamiyan means “the place of shining light”. The rolling hills of the Bamiyan valley are lined in variegated colors. The central valley of Bamiyan is located at 2,500 meters above sea level. Two rivers flow into the valley from sources in the Kuhe-e-Baba: The Kakrak River to the east, and the Foladi River to the west. The principle archaeological sites are located in the long east-west central valley of Bamiyan and in the Kakrak and Foladi river valleys.



Bamiyan’s central cultural monuments were the two Buddha statues carved at the eastern and western ends of a high cliff facing the central valley. Some thousand caves are also cut into the cliff face and decorated with a rich variety of murals. The Buddhist art of Bamiyan, which enjoyed a renaissance in central Afghanistan after the collapse of the earlier Gandharan culture, spread to and influenced various countries along the Silk Road.
Cultural and Archaeological Values of Bamiyan:

The Cultural Landscape and Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley was inscribed on the “List of World Heritage in Danger” and the World Heritage List at the 27th session of the World Heritage Committee in 2003. The property is in a fragile state of conservation having suffered from neglect, military action, and dynamite explosions. In 2003, the major dangers included: risk of imminent collapse of the Buddha niches with the remaining fragments of the statues, further deterioration of still existing mural paintings in the caves, looting and illicit excavation.





4-7th centuries , Bamyuan seen by Xuan Zang

The name Bamyan first appeared in historical records around the late 4th century . The first detailed description of the region did not appear until around the year 630 , when a Chinese monk named Xuan Zang visited Bamyan for about 15 days , on this way to India , In this travel record ,Da Tang Xi Yu Ji he mentions the kingdom "is situated in the midst of the Snowy Mountains . The people inhabit towns either in the mountains or the valleys , according to circumstances ."The description reveals that the people of Bamyan probably loved in caves dug into the cliffs . Xuan Zanf also mentioned that the Bamyan kingdom "produces wheat and few flowers of fruits . Its suitable for cattle ,and affords pasture for many sheep and horses ." Thus , by the seventh century , the landscape of Bamyan consisted of thousands of caves dug into the Great Cliff and large grain field in the flat land below.

Two statues of Buddha were also reported in details in Xuan Zanag's , Da Tang Xi Yu Ji . He notes that the West Buddha's "golden hues sparkle in every side , and its precious ornaments dazzle the eyes by their brightness ." This indicates that the statues of Buddha were lavishly decorated .Furthermore , Xuan Zang's description mentioned that there were 50 to 60 Buddhist temples with several thousand monks. When hs visited Bamyan in the early seventh century , Bamyan was at its speak as a Buddhist religious center, with the sratues of Buddha and numerous cave-temples.

Xuan Zang also wrotes that "the people remain faithful to the three Treasures (Buddha , law and Priesthood ) at the top , down to various gods and respect them most sincerely ", which suggests that different religions besides Buddhism were also practiced in Bamyan . When Xuan Zang visited Bamyan the area was very prosperous as a transportation crossroad , connecting many different areas of Afghanistan and beyond.

Between the 8-9th centuries :

The Islamic period

In the early eight century , the Silla monk Hui Chao visited Bamyan , and described it as an area where Buddhism flourished . At the same time , he wrote that the area was not subject to any other countries and not been invaded , thanks to Bamyan's strong army . Not long after Hui Chao left Bamyan , however , the king of Bamyan surrendered to the abbasid caliphate . After this time Islam gradually spread over . The latest scientific analysis has revealed that some of the Buddhist mural paintings of Bamyan date back to the early fifth century . At least until this period , Buddhism , Islam and other religions coexisted in the region . During the late ninth century , the Saffarid dynasty (861-910) demolished many Buddhist temples and statues and statues / From that time, Buddhist cultural in bamyan gradually declined.

After the Saffarid period , Bamyan was ruled by various Islamic dynasties including the Samanids , the Ghaznavids and the Ghurids . According to the Arabic and Persian historical texts , Bamyan remained a major city with a fortress under Islamic rule. The prosperity of Bamyan came to an end in 1221 when the Mongol armies , lead by Chinggis Khan invaded . During the battle in Bamyan , the Mongols destroyed the strong fortress completely . The ruins of the fortress are now known as shahr-I Gholghola . After the Mongol destruction of the fortress , Bamyan rarely appeared in historical texts until the 198th century


19-20centuries

In the 19th century , Bamyan reappeares in the historical record . Many expeditions entered the region . In the early 19th Century . Alexendar Burnes and Charles Masson visited Bamyan and sketched the statues of Buddha . In the late 19th century based in Xuan Zang's Da Tang Xi Yu Ji scholars such as Talbot ,Simpson , and Mailtland investigated the Bamyan area.

In the early 20th century , the Delegation Archeologique Francaise en Afghanistan DAFA began the first full-scale archaeological investigation of Bamyan.

Under the supervision of Alfred Foucher , Andre Godard and Josef Hackin , DAFA researched the mural painting and architecture of Bamyan in great detail , and published two comprehensive reports and several articles.

In the late 20th century , Japanese teams from Nagoya ,Kyoto and Seijo Universities visited the area with Zemaryalai Tarzi of the Institute of Archaeology in Afghanistan . In addition to archaeological and art history investigations ,conservation and restoration of the Bamyan site was carried out by the Archaeological Survey of India.

Owing to such long-term international investigations and research , Bamyan became known as the crossroad of civilizations from India, Persia and Central Asia. After 1979 , the country descended into a state of the war , which contributed to preventing further academic research at the site . In 1997 , the Taliban regime took over the Bamyan valley and threatened to demolish the site.


2001 t0 the Present in Bamyan

The demolishment and the illegal exportation of cultural heritage

In march 2001 , the eyes of the world were on Bamyan as the Taliban dynamited its monumental Buddha statues. They were destroyed following decree proclaimed by Mullah Omar in February 2001 ordering the destruction of all non-Islamic statues and tombs considered offensive to Islam.

When Mullah Omar announced this decree ,UNESCO immediately issued appeals to Taliban leaders through the international press , exhorting them to preserve Afghan cultural heritage . The Director- General addressed a personal letter to the Taliban leader on 28 February . He also obtained the full support of many Islamic countries for UNESCO's activities to save the Afghan cultural heritage.

On 1 march a Special Representative of the Director –General left for Islamabad ,Kandahar ,Kabul , the united Arab emirates , Qatar and Saudi Arabia . A number of Muslim religious leaders from Egypt ,Iraq and Pakistan intervened at the request of UNESCO , issuing "fatwas" against the Taliban's order. The Director-General personally contacted the Presidents of the Egypt and Pakistan ,as well as of the Organization of the Islamic Conference , all of whom tried to use the Taliban to cancel the order.

Following these interventions , a delegation of 11 international Muslim leaders went to Kandahar to try convince the Taliban that the Koran does not prescribe the destruction of statues . Nevertheless , all these political and religious interventions proved to be in vain , and the Taliban destroyed not only the statues of Buddha at Bamyan , but also a large number of statues throughout Afghanistan.

After the destruction , in December 2001 , an international conference of "Ulema" , Islamic religious leaders , was jointly organized by UNESCO . The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) , The Islamic Scientific ,Educational and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) and the Arab League Educational , Scientific and Cultural Organization (ALESCO) , to examine the position of the Muslim world towards the preservation of Islamic and non Islamic heritage. This conference resulted in a clear declaration of principles in favor of the protection of cultural heritage, including statues , that can be appealed to in the future.



UNESCO Safeguarding Project-1:

UNESCO responds firmly to the challenge of rehabilitating Afghanistan’s endangered cultural heritage. The safeguarding of all aspects of cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, including museums, monuments, archaeological sites, music, art, and traditional crafts, is of particular significance in terms of strengthening cultural identity and a sense of national integrity.

Entrusted by the Afghan Government to coordinate all international efforts aiming to safeguard Afghanistan’s cultural heritage, the organization established an International Coordination Committee (ICC) in 2003. Chaired by the Afghan Minister of Information and Culture, it consists of Afghan and international specialists. The aim is to raise funds and to issue concrete recommendations to allow the efficient coordination of actions to safeguard Afghanistan’s heritage to the highest international standards in key areas, such as the development of a long-term strategy, capacity building, the implementation of the Conventions for World Heritage, and Preventing the illicit Traffic of Cultural Property, national inventories and documentation, as well as the rehabilitation of the National Museum in Kabul, and the safeguarding of the sites of Jam, Herat and Bamiyan.

Much Discussion has taken place in Afghanistan and all over the world about the future of this site, revolving around the question of whether the two statues of Buddha should be reconstructed. The 107 Participants at the First International Seminar on the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan’s Cultural Heritage, organized by UNESCO in March 2002, as well as the ICC, clearly recognized that the first emergency priority is to stabilize the cliff face with its niches and caves. Noting that the decision whether to engage in the reconstruction of the Buddha statues is a matter to be settled by the government and people of Afghanistan, it was agreed that reconstruction is not a priority as long as humanitarian aid for the Afghan people is urgently needed. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the authenticity, integrity, and historical importance of this great site need to be memorialized in an appropriate way, and that reconstruction of the statues therefore requires further careful consideration.

The Preservation of the Bamiyan site is one of the most important UNESCO projects in Afghanistan, for which more that $1.8 million have been generously donated by the Government of Japan. The following activities have been undertaken within this project.


UNESCO Safeguarding Project-II


Preparation of Preliminary Master Plan:

It was considered essential to develop a Master Plan to ensure the overall preservation of this large site. National Research Institute for Cultural Properties , Tokyo (NRICP), has carried out archaeological soundings and explorations of the Bamiyan valley and its surroundings in order to specify the archaeological zone and the cultural area to be protected from settlements, agriculture and town development and so on. As a next step, it is essential to develop the Master Plan on the bases of NRICP’s input and in incorporating it into national legislation. The German University of Aachen cooperates in this field under funding provided by the Government of Germany through ICOMOS.



Preservation of Mural Paintings:

Professors Akira Miayaji and Kosaku Maeda, who made the full inventory of these important Buddhist paintings in the 1970s, participated in the preparation mission in October 2002. Their analysis was that 80 to 85 of the paintings have disappeared during the war, through neglect, theft, and voluntary destruction. NRICP has documented and recorded the remaining mural paintings in the Buddhist caves. All fragments of paintings scattered on the floors have been collected, inventoried, and conserved. The access to 25 selected important caves has been banned and the caves closed with walls and locked doors. Armed guards have been hired to protect the site. It is important to note that since these measures were taken no further thefts took place. Further analyses of the fragments are required to develop a plan for their long-term conservation.


Consolidation of Cliffs and Niches:

Due to the imminent risk of collapse of the upper Eastern part of the small Buddha niche and the overall instability of both niches, the consolidation of the cliffs and niches was a priority task, as they shape the general appearance of the site and contain the original staircases and several caves. The backs of the two niches still include remains of the Buddha such as arms and shoulders. No scaffolding could be placed in front of the small Buddha niche, due to the slope and the loose ground. It was therefore decided to work with mountain climbers. In autumn 2003 and spring 2004, the Italian firm RODIO successfully implemented the first phase of emergency consolidation. The emergency stabilization of the remaining areas at both niches now has to be ensured.


Conservation of Fragments:

One particular difficulty in conserving the fragments of the Buddha is the large size of some of the fragments and the steep slope in front of the small Buddha. Two ICOMOS expert missions organized by Aachen University of a total of four months were dispatched to Bamiyan in June and October 2004. A protective shelter for the conservation of the fragments of the large Buddha statue was constructed. The experts started to clear the niches of the fragments and to store them in the shelters. Bearing in mind that the stone material, which holds important information on the history of the Buddha statues, is decaying rapidly it is essential to continue the conservation of fragments during the coming years.


Topographical Map and 3-Dimensional Model of Bamiyan:

The Japanese company PASCO has successfully produced a map and a 3 dimensional relief model of the site. All experts involved in the Bamiyan project appreciated its high quality.


What's the world heritage? World heritage sites are places of outstanding universal value to humanity and are part of the heritage of all humankind. Responsibility for future generations.

As of April 2005, 788 sites have been identified and inscribed on the World Heritage List. They are protected by the cooperative efforts of the international community in the framework provided by an international treaty, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage , which was adopted by UNESCO in 1972.

The Cultural Landscape of the Bamyan Valley

A cultural landscape is links nature and culture. Cultural landscapes can be included in the World Heritage List when interactions between people and natural environment are evaluated as being of outstanding universal value.

"The cultural landscape and archaeological remains of the Bamyan Valley" represent the artistic and religious developments which from the 1st to the 13th centuries characterized ancient Bactria . Integrating various cultural influences into the Gandhara school of Buddhist art .The area contains numerous Buddhist monastic ensembles and sanctuaries, as well as fortified edifices from the Islamic period.

Protecting of the Bamyan Valley

Undue haste in the pursuit of the development of the valley will result in the irreparable loss of its natural and cultural value. Current efforts to protect the cultural heritage of the valley are of utmost importance for future generations. The valley's protection can be achieved only by the cooperative efforts of all partners concerned , including people living iv Bamyan , with support from the international community.

Justification for Inscription on the World Heritage List

Criterion (i)

The Buddha statues and the cave art in Bamyan Valley are an outstanding representation of the Ganharan school in Buddhist art in the central Asian region.

Criterion (ii)

The artistic and architectural remains of Bamyan Valley , and important Buddhist centre on the Silk Road , are an exceptional testimony to the interchange of Indian , Hellenistic ,Roman, Sasanian influences as the basis for the development of a particular artist expression in the Gandharan school. To this can be added the Islamic influence in a later period.

Criterion (iii)

The Bamyan Valley bears an exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition in the Central Asian region , which has disappeared .

Criterion (iv)

The Bamyan Valley is an outstanding example of a cultural landscape which illustrates a significant period in Buddhism.

Criterion (vi)

The Bamyan Valley is the most monumental expression of the western Buddhism . It was an important centre of pilgrimage over many centuries . Due to their symbolic values , the monuments have suffered at different times of their existence , including the deliberate destruction in 2001 , which shook the whole world. Read the full story

Prof. Marc W. Herold, February 21, 2008
Eleven people were killed in the air strike including seven members of one family – a woman, 2 children, and 4 men.
Late Sunday, February 3/4, 2008 in a compound in Bakwa district, Shagay area of Farah Province. NATO occupation and Afghan forces carried out an air and ground assault upon a home where allegedly a Taliban commander was present. Eleven people were killed in the air strike including seven members of one family – a woman, 2 children, and 4 men. The raiders also abducted seven family members to a fate unknown. The photo from Iran’s Alalam News shows relatives mourning the dead.As usual the news wire service headlines were revealing:

“Air Strike Kills 7 Civilians in Afghanistan,” Reuters (Feb 4, 2008, 11:51 AM GMT)
“Afghan Air Strike Kills Eight,” Reuters (Feb, 2008 at 5:50 GMT)
“Ten Civilians Killed in Airstrike in Afghanistan,” DPA (Feb 4, 2008, 10:11 GMT)
“Women, Children Killed in Afghan Raid: Local Officials,” Agence France Presse (Feb 4, 2008)
“Afghan, NATO Troops Kill 10 Civilians,” Press TV (Iran) (Feb 4, 2008 at 13:54:56)
“Occupiers Kill Afghan Civilians,” Prensa Latina (Cuba) (Feb 4, 2008)
“19 Dead in Raids, Clashes in Afghanistan,” Associated Press (Feb 4, 2008)
“Provincial Official Says Civilians Killed in Afghan West Operation,” Afghan Islamic Press printed by BBC Worldwide Monitoring (February 12, 2008)

Noor Khan, Associated Press reporter based in Kandahar, omits all reference to civilians dying and no mention is made of air strikes. The Associated Press heeds the Pentagon and official U.S. preference, neglecting or burying the sensitive issue of civilian causalities caused by the US/NATO occupation forces’ actions.

Eleven days after the deadly attack, a report by the private Pakistan-based news service, Afghan Islamic Press news agency provided further shocking details, which I quote:

Herat, 12 February: The chairman of the Provincial Council of Farah [western Afghanistan] says those killed in Farah are not Taleban, but civilians, including three women. Speaking to Afghan Islamic Press [AIP] this morning, the chairmanof Farah Provincial Council, Abdol Qader Daqiq, said: "The 11 people killed by foreigners in an operation duringthe night in the Shagay area of Bakwa District some days ago were not Taleban, but civilians, who also included three women."

Mr Daqiq said: "Foreign forces directly went to this area from Kandahar and killed whoever they saw there. They even killed people in their blankets." Mr Daqiq who seemed quite disturbed by the incident told AIP: "There was not even a single Taleb in the area and pilgrims were guests there and even one of the pilgrims was also martyred inthe attack who had come from the pilgrimage only 14 days ago."

Mr Daqiq said: "I am not saying this, but after the incident, 100 elders and leaders of Bakwa, Golestan and Delaram Districts came to the Provincial Council and said all of those killed were civilians. These elders and leadersalso visited the governor, National Security Department and the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] and told them the whole story. They said that foreign forces had killed civilians." Mr Daqiq also said: "This incident has disturbed people a great deal and they are not happy. If such operations continue, people may migrate to another country or move to the mountains. This will also help the Taleban conduct their propaganda."

Asked what they demanded of the government, the chairman of Farah Provincial Council said: "No-one apologized for killing these people nor did they assist and sympathize with them. This is not fair. They should apologize for killing these people and assist and sympathize with them. Such operations should not be carried out in future, so that the gap between the government and the nation does not widen."
In memory of and sympathy for

Faiz Mohammad, 79
Mauladad, son of Bismallah
Allahdad, 10, child of Bismallah
Shah Wali, son of Noor Mohammad
Ahmad Shah, 14, child of Gul Baran
Haji Saleh, son of Haji Qalander
Malok, child of Mohammad Masoom
3 women killed
Gul Baran, son of Noor Mohammad, injured
Janan, 11, son of Masoom, injured
Mohammad Wali, 7, son of Shah Wali, injured
Khara, 5, son of Mauladad, injured
A woman injured
7 family members abducted (to a fate unknown) Read the full story

Shafaq has had other bad news as well: He will not be able to marry his girlfriend back in Waras. "I love her and she loved me," Shafaq says, but "when I sent my mother to ask for her hand from her father, he refused. Because I am a Hazara."

And so, Shafaq is alone, back in Hazarajat, teaching at Bamian University, where all the other teachers are also Hazaras. Like their students, they are earnest, motivated, intelligent—and a bit fearful. Since reopening in 2004, the university has grown.Beyond the entrance is a dusty courtyard where groups of smartly dressed male and female students, books in hand, make their way to class. The sign on the front of the school is written in three languages—in English and in Dari, the most common language in Afghanistan, and then in Pashtu, the language of the Pashtuns, in the largest script.

Shafaq teaches the history of Afghanistan during the enlightenment and the industrial revolution, expounding on John Locke and Abraham Lincoln, on liberty and democracy. His salary is 2,000 afghanis a month, about $40.

After so much hope, so many promises, the Hazaras are feeling ignored by the new government—led as it is by a Pashtun president. Across Hazarajat, the question echoes: Why has there not been more development and more interest in an area that is safe, where the population supports the government, where corruption is not widespread, where women play a role in public life, where poppies are not proliferating? It's not uncommon to hear farmers muse about growing poppies to sell on the heroin market, maybe even causing a little violence, because they think that might draw the government's attention.

Construction is not easy in this terrain, granted, but Hazarajat could be a model of what's possible when a region buys into the nation-building process. Yet so much time has passed. Already, the resurgence of the Tali-ban, who recently have targeted Hazara leaders in several districts abutting their southern strongholds, is stirring difficult memories. "Anytime we hear news of the Taliban on the radio, our bones turn to water," says Mohsin Moisafid in Kata Khona.

Perhaps a new generation of Afghan leaders will emerge to finally lead people beyond the mindset of war and warlords and jihad. Much depends on whether the Taliban will continue to grow, whether the international community will lose interest, whether the tensions between the U.S. and Iran, fellow Shiites, will adversely affect the Hazaras. Whatever happens, much more than the fate of the Hazara people is at stake. As Dan Terry, an American aid worker who has lived in Afghanistan for 30 years, puts it: What happens to the Hazaras is "not just the story of this people. It's the story of the whole country. It's everybody's story."

Phil Zabriskie has reported extensively in Afghanistan for Time magazine. Steve McCurry has shot for National Geographic for over 20 years and is the best known for his 1985 cover photo of an Afghan girl. Read the full story

The first job of the day is from a man who needs 20 bags of plaster moved to a work site. Pahlawan has wandered off, so Baba and Assadullah load the bags, 77 pounds each. Both men grasp the cart's bar, pulling roughly 1,500 pounds as cars and buses honk and spit fumes. Seven minutes and several hundred yards later, they turn into the mud-walled warrens of Kabul's backstreets. Breathing heavily, sweating profusely, they reach the site. They'll have to carry the bags the last 30 feet. Baba throws a bag over his shoulder and walks stooped over, head down, holding the bag with one hand, white powder spilling on his clothes. Another ten minutes and they're done. Baba and Assadullah get $1.20, to split."You see our situation, at my age," says Baba, turning his head so I see his good eye. He pulls out a snuff tin, puts a handful in his mouth before heading back to see if another job comes.

Some observers believe the discrimination Hazaras face in Kabul could be fueling a long-elusive sense of unity—and a desire for democracy. "I think there is a greater degree of Hazara nationalism in Kabul as compared with rural Hazarajat because people are experiencing this disparity between Hazara and non-Hazara in their day-to-day lives," says Ibrahimi. The director of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Sima Samar, agrees: "The Hazaras are more adaptable to democracy, because they feel the pain more than the others. They feel the discrimination. They really want equality and social justice."

Were the Buddhas still standing last May, they would have gazed down on a young man walking Bamian's main street, a bumpy unpaved tract with shops on both sides selling cooking oil, medicines, and building materials. A large billboard depicting Mazari, the martyred Hazara leader, stands on a hillside.

Musa Shafaq is back in the Hazara heartland. He did not get the job at Kabul University he wanted. "If I am going to live in Afghanistan, it should be in Kabul," he says. His stellar academic record should have made that possible. "He was one of the brightest students. He should have been recruited," says Issa Rezai, an adviser at the Ministry of Higher Education. But prejudice against Hazaras remains high at the university. Fundamentalist Pashtun professors still predominate, including some hard-core fundamentalists who led factions accused of atrocities against Hazara civilians. Sayed Askar Mousavi, author of The Hazaras of Afghanistan, says such discrimination underscores how little has fundamentally changed. In Bamian, he says, "there are two changes. There were two Buddhas, and now there are none."
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Scores of schools have been built in Hazarajat in recent years, mainly by aid agencies and the Bamian-based Provincial Reconstruction Team operated by New Zealand. In Daykundi's provincial capital, a group of teenagers said young people are refusing to marry until they finish school. Hazara high schoolers make up more than a third of those who take the university entrance exam, and the number—including the number of girls—is rising. Hazarajat is a deeply conservative place, but it is far from fundamentalist. Women here "go to school, they have their own pursuits, and they have their freedom," says Ryhana Azad, a female district council member in Daykundi.In time, perhaps, these seeds will bear fruit the whole society can sample, but for now families must address immediate concerns. Often that means going where the work is. In village after village you see women—wearing long skirts, blouses, and head scarves in greens, reds, and sky blues—shoveling snow off their roofs or harvesting fields by themselves, because the men are working as day laborers in Pakistan or Iran or Herat or Kabul. It's hard on those who go and hard on those who stay behind. But sometimes adapting to the landscape means finding a new one.

For many that new place is Kabul, where some 40 percent of the population is now Hazara. On neighborhood streets in the western part of the city, you see Hazara children in uniform going to school, Hazara vegetable vendors setting up their carts, and Hazara shop owners and tailors opening stores. Hossein Yasa, the editor of the Daily Outlook newspaper, notes that there are Hazara-owned television stations, Hazara-owned newspapers, and a huge Shiite madrassa and mosque complex under construction. "The middle class of Hazaras is growing very fast," Yasa says.

Watching from the sidelines, however, is a huge Hazara underclass made up of manual laborers living in west Kabul neighborhoods—Dasht-e Barchi, Kart-e She, and Chindawul—that have neither electricity nor clean water. "You are talking about ghettos," says Niamatullah Ibrahimi, a fellow with the London School of Economics.

Every day, the Hazara cart pullers are out on the main road of Dasht-e Barchi, wondering if they'll get any work. Sunup, sundown, winter, spring, summer, fall, they wait, hoping someone will hire them to use their carts to transport lumber, building materials, bags of wheat, cans of cooking oil, panes of glass, window frames, dishes for wedding receptions—something, anything—from one place to another.

Pahlawan, Baba, and Assadullah are three of many men doing this because they must, because it's all they know. They think themselves invisible, unseen, but in many ways they're the public face of Hazaras in Kabul, doing the jobs no one else wants. On a good day they'll earn 200 or 250 afghanis, four or five dollars. But they can never count on a good day. Pahlawan, "the wrestler," is the strongest, in his mid-30s, working since he was seven. "Every day we sit with our carts from morning to evening," he says. Zulfiqar Azimi is "Baba," 67, with a glass eye and missing fingers on one hand. "I have never had a moment of comfort in this life," he says. Assadullah is the youngest, quiet, handsome under all the dust. He recently returned from Iran. He is lean but moves stiffly. In his 20s, he says he used to be an expert martial artist. "Now," he says, "I have this cart."
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A Hazarajat winter, once it arrives, stays for six months. The snow renders roads impassable even with four-wheel drive and tire chains, and closes the high mountain passes that separate districts. Despite promises, years ago, by the government and international donors to pave the roads from Kabul to Bamian and Bamian to Yakawlang, most are still glorified mule tracks. In winter greater numbers of women die in childbirth because they can't get help in time. Even in the best of weather, farmers can't get crops to market. "We tried taking melons and peaches to Kabul, and it was juice by the time we got there," says Chris Eaton, CEO of the Aga Khan Foundation's Afghanistan office.Mohammed Akbar is a Hazara farmer with gray-blue eyes that match his tightly wound turban and an elfin face ringed by a white beard. He lives in Lorcha, a speck of a place in western Yakawlang. On a bluff above a narrow stream, mud-walled homes cling together in tightly packed clusters. These houses are among those the Taliban burned down in 2001. Every man in Lorcha can point to the mountain his family fled to and describe arduous journeys through thick snow lugging whatever they could carry. Today most damaged homes have been rebuilt. The villagers donated funds for a new mosque too. Money is short, but the village elder has persuaded farmers to resist the temptation to grow poppies. "It is haram," says Akbar, forbidden by Islam.

As the snow began melting last spring, some areas suffered deadly flooding. But Akbar—all of Hazarajat, really—hoped the runoff signaled the end of a punishing drought that had limited crop yields and forced many families to sell animals in recent years. On a mild, late spring day, Akbar irrigated a small plot of wheat just outside the village. The surrounding valley was a patchwork of similar fields filled with potatoes, hay, and wheat in early stages of growth. The nearest road was on the other side of the stream. A footbridge leading to the road had washed away when the stream swelled with runoff from melting snow. Three logs had been laid over the water, and parents piggybacked their children across on their way to school.

In this tiny hamlet and throughout Hazarajat, education is a priority. Even if the school is a tent or a building with no doors or windows, even if the teacher has only a few years of schooling, parents want their kids to study, far more so than elsewhere in the country. Hussain Ali lives in a cave in Bamian, where his family sleeps on thin bedrolls and the walls are blackened with soot. His children could bring in extra income, but he wants them in school. "I'm old, my time has passed," he says, "but my children should learn something."
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Local leaders got permission to bury the bodies. The frozen corpses had to be separated with boiling water. Two weeks later, the fighting started anew. According to Human Rights Watch, Taliban forces burned down more than 4,000 homes, shops, and public buildings. They destroyed entire towns in western Bamian Province. Villagers fled into the mountains, then looked down and watched their homes burn.Many took sanctuary in Waras, where Shafaq's family—mother, father, and seven siblings—were struggling to find food. Shafaq stopped studying and started teaching—Hazarajat schools today are full of teachers who didn't finish grade school. But his dreams were fading. "I was not very hopeful because I was thinking the Taliban will stay for another 10 or 20 years," he says.

The Taliban's onslaught was at its peak when planes crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It was a deus ex machina, says Michael Semple, who documented, at great personal risk, the 2001 Yakawlang massacre. After U.S. forces drove the Taliban from power, expectations rose. The Hazaras, in particular, thought deliverance was at hand. "I've operated in the days when Hazaras felt they were virtually faced with an apartheid system," Semple says. "Now it's a totally different kettle of fish."

But it is hard for Hazaras like Shafaq to trust this moment. "I would like to see a place where the dreams of young people are attainable," he says, "where there is a church and a Hindu temple, where other religions can exist. That is the aim of pluralism." He dreams of the teaching job at Kabul University and of marrying a woman back home. She is the daughter of family friends, a Sayed Shiite who traces her lineage to the prophet Muhammad. Sayed families do not customarily let their daughters marry Hazara men. But in this new era, maybe it is possible.

From the sky, Hazarajat is a slide show of stunning landscapes: The purple-hued canyonlands around Bamian, the deep blue waters of Band-e Amir Lake, cloud-piercing peaks rising from mountain passes near Waras. On the ground, it's a different story. For those who live here, this is a hard land with a hard history, from which they must wring a life.
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Accounts of the Hazaras' dark history have been passed down through generations, a cultural inheritance of sorts. "It was an embarrassment for Hazara people to show their ethnicity," recalls Habiba Sarobi, Bamian's governor. Mohammed Mohaqeq, the former Hazara commander who received the most votes in the 2005 parliamentary elections, says, "We were like donkeys, good for carrying things from one place to another."Shafaq was in tenth grade when the Taliban rose to power in 1996, promising security to a populace tired of the bitter conflict among ethnic warlords, including Hazara factions. A year earlier, the Taliban had brutally murdered Abdul Ali Mazari—a charismatic leader sometimes called the father of the Hazara people—who had helped found "the party of unity," or Hezb i Wahdat, in an effort to stop the infighting among Hazaras. After his death, the party splintered, and Taliban forces soon spread across Hazarajat.

"I was working with my father in the field when my sister ran to us and said, 'The Taliban are everywhere,'" Shafaq says. Villagers fashioned white flags from bags of fertilizer. Local leaders struck deals to appease the Taliban. Shafaq hid his books.

It was an ugly war. In Bamian Province, Wahdat fighters hoped to prevent the Taliban from taking the few parts of the country they'd yet to conquer. Schools closed. Crops lay unattended. Families fled for Iran or for the hills. The Taliban imposed a blockade on Hazarajat, prompting food shortages in a region already suffering from drought. In Bamian, the bazaar was torched and scores of families sought sanctuary in the caves near the Buddhas.

In early 2001, in the coldest days of a brutal Hazarajat winter, the horror came to the district of Yakawlang. On January 8, the Taliban rounded up young Hazara men in Nayak, the district center. "People were thinking they would be taken to court," recalls Sayed Jawhar Amal, a teacher in the nearby village of Kata Khona. "But at 8 a.m. they were killed. All of them." The men were lined up and shot in public view. When elders from Kata Khona inquired about young men from their community, they were also killed. In all, Human Rights Watch concluded, more than 170 were exe-cuted in four days. "Because we were Shia. That was the only reason," says Mohsin Moisafid, 55, of Kata Khona, who lost two brothers that day.
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"The Hazaras are producing the most enthusiastic, educated, forward-looking youth, who are seizing the opportunities provided by the new situation," says Michael Semple, a red-bearded Irishman who serves as the deputy to the special representative of the European Union in Afghanistan. Shafaq helped found the Center for Dialogue, a Hazara student organization with 150 members.The group publishes its own magazine, holds events promoting "humanism and pluralism," and works with human rights organizations to monitor elections. Semple deems the group part of an emerging political consciousness among Hazara youth.

"We have a window of opportunity," Shafaq says, "but we are not sure how long it will remain open." This son of Hazarajat is the proverbial country boy who came to the big city and made good. Shafaq's father farmed in their village, Haft Gody, in Waras, a district in southern Bamian, and ran a restaurant in the district center. Children in Waras customarily marry young, stay close to home, and tend the potato fields. But Shafaq wanted something more. When he wasn't helping his father, he read voraciously—novels, history, philosophy, translations of Abraham Lincoln, John Locke, and Albert Camus.

Growing up, Shafaq heard the stories of where his people came from, why they looked different from Pashtuns and Tajiks. He and his fellow Hazaras, the story goes, are the descendants of Genghis Khan's Mongolian soldiers, who marched into central Afghanistan in the 13th century, built a garrison, and conquered the inhabitants—a varied mix of peoples not uncommon along the Silk Road. When the locals rose up and killed Genghis's son, the conqueror retaliated by leveling Bamian and wiping out most of its residents. Those who survived intermarried with the Mongolian invaders and became the Hazaras—a genetic collaboration evident in the diversity of facial features among the region's people today.

In recent times a minority of Hazaras have embraced the Genghis connection as a point of pride, but more often the outsider lineage has been used against them. For many the modern-day narrative starts in the 1890s, when King Abdur Rahman, a Pashtun, launched bloody anti-Hazara pogroms in and around Hazarajat. Fueled by chauvinism, armed with fatwas from Sunni mullahs who declared the Hazaras infidels, Rahman's forces killed many thousands and took slaves from among the survivors. Throngs of Hazaras were driven from lowland farms up into the central highlands. Later rulers used force, law, and manipulation to keep the Hazaras confined, physically and psychologically, to those highlands.
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The ruling Taliban—mostly fundamentalist Sunni, ethnic Pashtuns—saw Hazaras as infidels, animals, other. They didn't look the way Afghans should look and didn't worship the way Muslims should worship. A Taliban saying about Afghanistan's non-Pashtun ethnic groups went: "Tajiks to Tajikistan, Uzbeks to Uzbekistan, and Hazaras to goristan," the graveyard. And in fact, when the Buddhas fell,Taliban forces were besieging Hazarajat, burning down villages to render the region uninhabitable. As autumn began, the people of Hazarajat wondered if they'd survive winter. Then came September 11, a tragedy elsewhere that appeared to deliver salvation to the Hazara people.

Six years after the Taliban fell, scars remain in the highlands of the Hazara homeland, but there is a sense of possibility unthinkable a decade ago. Today the region is one of the safest in Afghanistan, mostly free of the poppy fields that dominate other regions. A new political order reigns in Kabul, seat of President Hamid Karzai's central government. Hazaras have new access to universities, civil service jobs, and other avenues of advancement long denied them. One of the country's vice presidents is Hazara, as is parliament's leading vote getter, and a Hazara woman is the first and only female governor in the country. The best-selling American novel The Kite Runner—now a feature film—depicted a fictional Hazara character, and a real Hazara won the first Afghan Star, an American Idol-like program.

As the country struggles to rebuild itself after decades of civil war, many believe that Hazarajat could be a model of what's possible not just for Hazaras but for all Afghans. But that optimism is tempered by past memories and present frustrations—over roads not built, a resurgent Taliban, and rising tides of Sunni extremism.

A project is now under way to gather thousands of stone fragments and rebuild the Buddhas. Something similar is occurring among Hazaras as they try to repair their fractured past, with one notable difference: There are pictures of the destroyed Buddhas. The Hazaras have no such blueprint, no sense of what a future free from persecution is supposed to look like.

Musa Shafaq wants to live in that future. He is 28, with shoulder-length black hair and typical Hazara features, not unlike those of the Buddhas. He stands at the gate of Kabul University in a red sweater, black jeans, and tinted prescription glasses. Classes are out for the day. In two months, he will graduate, a notable achievement for any Afghan given the country's instability. Because he is Hazara, his success signals a new era. Shafaq is poised to finish at the top of his class, which should guarantee him the job he most wants, a teaching post at Kabul University.
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Set apart by geography and beliefs, oppressed by the Taliban, the Hazara people could be Afghanistan's best hope.
By Phil Zabriskie
National Geographic magazine

At the heart of Afghanistan is an empty space, a striking absence, where the larger of the colossal Bamian Buddhas once stood. In March 2001 the Taliban fired rockets at the statues for days on end, then planted and detonated explosives inside them. The Buddhas had looked out over Bamian for some 1,500 years. Silk Road traders and missionaries of several faiths came and went.Emissaries of empires passed through—Mongols, Safavids, Moguls, British, Soviets—often leaving bloody footprints. A country called Afghanistan took shape. Regimes rose and collapsed or were overthrown. The statues stood through it all. But the Taliban saw the Buddhas simply as non-Islamic idols, heresies carved in stone. They did not mind being thought brutish. They did not fear further isolation. Destroying the statues was a pious assertion of their brand of faith over history and culture.

It was also a projection of power over the people living under the Buddhas' gaze: the Hazaras, residents of an isolated region in Afghanistan's central highlands known as Hazarajat—their heartland, if not entirely by choice. Accounting for up to one-fifth of Afghanistan's population, Hazaras have long been branded outsiders. They are largely Shiite Muslims in an overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim country. They have a reputation for industriousness yet work the least desirable jobs. Their Asian features—narrow eyes, flat noses, broad cheeks—have set them apart in a de facto lower caste, reminded so often of their inferiority that some accept it as truth.
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This report documents the massacre of civilians and other serious breaches of international humanitarian law committed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in August, 1998. The incident, which occurred in Mazar-i Sharif, a city in northern Afghanistan, represents one of the single worst examples of civilian killings in Afghanistan's twenty-year war where At least 8000 Hazaras were singled out and massacred by the Taliban regime. No foreigners or press were allowed in the city or its environs at the time. Human Rights Watch was the first international human rights organization to interview survivors who have reached Pakistan in the weeks following the massacre.Human Rights Watch conducted the interviews for this report in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta, Pakistan. The eyewitnesses they spoke to included residents of Mazar-i Sharif who were Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara. The witnesses had lived in different neighborhoods of the city. Some had stayed in the city for several weeks after the Taliban takeover; others had left within a few days. Most had arrived in Pakistan after several weeks of travel inside Afghanistan.

Their testimonies about the events in Mazar-i Sharif from August 8 through early September are consistent in the depiction of the patterns of attack by the advancing Taliban troops, the systematic nature of the search operations, the sorting of prisoners at the jail, and the transport of prisoners. All of those who remained in the city after the first day separately witnessed summary executions of men and boys as they were being taken from their homes or while being transported to the jail. All of them also heard one or more of Governor Niazi's speeches that, while they varied somewhat in content, reflected consistent themes of anti-Shi'ism and revenge for the 1997 killings.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed sources in nongovernmental organizations and in the diplomatic community who have monitored and documented the events in Mazar. Information provided by these sources is consistent with the patterns described by eyewitnesses

Abductions and Rape of Women:

Human Rights Watch has also received persistent reports that women and girls, particularly in certain Hazara neighborhoods of Mazar-i Sharif, including Saidabad, Karte Ariana, and Ali Chopan were raped and abducted during the Taliban takeover of the city and that their whereabouts remain unknown.

A witness living in Kamaz camp stated that some of the Taliban took young women from the camp at the same time that they were arresting men. She knew of four or five girls who were taken from the camp, all in their early twenties. A witness from the neighborhood of Karte Ariana told Human Rights Watch that she had seen teen-age girls in the area being pushed into the Taliban's Pijaro cars and taken to an unknown destination.

A male medical student who worked and lived in one of the city hospitals for twenty days straight after the takeover stated that he saw one rape case during that time. A Hazara woman, who was a nurse, and her sister had walked to the hospital from Ali Chopan.

"The nurse was in a very bad shape, she had sharp stomach pains. I could not examine her because the hospital was full of Talibs. This was a day before they segregated the hospital and put women in the children's building. I just asked a few questions and finally she said that she was raped by the Talibs. She did not say which ones. We could not talk long with the Talibs watching. I could not do much, I just gave her analgesics."

Another witness tells this story, "An acquaintance of ours came to our house seven or eight days after the takeover. She became ill in our house because she had taken over twenty pills to kill herself, I don't know what kind. We called doctors from the neighborhood who gave her something to wash out her stomach. She lived in Ali Chopan, but her family was staying elsewhere, and she had gone back to check on the house when she was picked up by the Taliban. At first she did not want to tell us anything, but then she said that when she went to their house, the Talibs abducted her and locked her up in a house with twenty to twenty-five other young girls and women. They were raped every night. They were all Hazaras. She was the only one released. One Talib told her that now they are halal [sanctified], and she should go to his parents in Qandahar and wait for him to come and marry her. He gave her a pass and his own identity card and told her to go to the Taliban's headquarters and from there to Qandahar, but instead she escaped."

The difficulties inherent in documenting such attacks on women are many. The refugees from Mazar-i Sharif are scattered throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. The where abouts of abducted women and girls remain unknown. Rape victims are unlikely to seek medical attention unless their injuries are severe. They are often reluctant to report their assaults because of the shame and stigma that they may bear as a result, and Afghan women coping with upheaval and the loss of family members in particular may fear the added worry of being identified as rape victims. Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch received consistent and reliable reports of abuses against women and thus underscored the need for an investigation that is prepared to examine the full range of reported violations, including sexual violence.

Attacks on Civilians fleeing Mazar:

A source interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that there were most likely BM-21 Grad (Hail) multiplerocket launchers, commonly known as Katyushas used in the taking of Mazar. An unknown number of civilians on the road were also killed when they were bombed by Taliban airplanes; witnesses stated that the bombs scattered hundreds of grenade-sized munitions over a wide area on the road.

In one such incident, witnesses said that rockets hit an area called Tangi Shadyan on the southern outskirts of the city at about 12:00 p.m., killing at least fifty. Cars and trucks carrying people were struck, and one witness stated that "people were in pieces" along the road. A witness who left immediately when the Taliban arrived told Human Rights Watch that he and his family carried with them nine bodies of a family that had been killed in a rocket attack on the road, including two women, three men, and four small children, and buried them in farmland on the way to the mountains.

Eye Witness Testimonies : [2]

A witness whose testimony is described as "extremely reliable" by aid officials said most of the victims had been shot in the head, the chest and the testicles. Others had been slaughtered in what he called "the halal way" - by having their throats slit.

One housewife, who has since fled to Pakistan, said the Taliban entered her house and shot her husband and her two brothers dead. Then they cut the men's throats in front of the woman and her children.

Another piece of testimony explained why one Taliban was "very worried he might be excluded from heaven". He had personally shot people in nearly 30 houses, opting to kill them as soon as they opened the door. After killing the men in two homes, he learnt that they were not Hazara but Pashtun. "That he had killed people in 28 Hazara households seemed not to cause him any concern at all," the witness said.

The Human Rights Watch report and other statements identify three Taliban leaders who appear to be guilty of incitement to kill victims purely because of their ethnic origin. They are:

Mullah Manon Niazi, the new Taliban governor of Mazar-e-Sharif - Numerous witnesses heard him make speeches at mosques and on radio inciting hatred of Hazaras. "Wherever you go we will catch you," he said. "If you go up, we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below we will pull you up by your hair." One witness testified that Niazi personally selected prisoners to be consigned to the death containers.

Mullah Musa, the so-called director of public health - A witness said Musa toured a public hospital looking for Hazara patients to mark out for death. Later that day, the witness heard from a doctor that Musa had taken a group of gunmen to the army hospital, where they had murdered all 20 or so patients, and relatives who had been visiting them.

Maulawi Mohammed Hanif - a Taliban commander who announced to a crowd of 300 people summoned to a mosque that the policy of the Taliban was to "exterminate" the Hazaras.

International aid workers fear the killings are continuing following the recent fall of the central Afghan town of Bamiyan. They have said thousands of people remain unaccounted for
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February 1993
Location: Afshar and Karteh Sahe, West Kabul. Majority of Hazara residents. (central Afghanistan - Hazarajat).

Victims: Innocent Hazara residents of Afshar and Karteh Sahe and members of the Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party) who defended the Hazara people and fought for equal rights.

Perpetrators: Then former President Rabbani, his chief military commander and son-in-law, the so-called "lion of Panjshir" Ahmad Shah Massoud (both from Jamiat-i-Islami political group who participated in the murders) and Abdul Rasul with his political party, Ittehad-i-Islami.

* "...hundreds of its Hazara residents were massacred by government forces, under the direct order of President Rabbani and his cheif commander, Massoud.""At one o'clock on the morning of 11 February, while the inhabitants of Afshar lay asleep in their beds, the Institute of Social Sciences was attacked from three sides: from the west by Sayyaf's Ittehad-e-Islami forces, and from the north and south, by Rabbani's forces, helped by traitors within the Party, who had already been bought off."

"Following this withdrawal, forces loyal to Sayyaf and Ahmad Shah Massoud raided the area. For the next 24 hours they killed, raped, set fire to homes, and took young boys and girls as captives. By the time the news was broadcast in Kabul and internationally the following day, some 700 people were estimated to have been killed or to have disappeared. One year later, when parts of the district were retaken by Hezb-e-Wahdat forces, several mass graves were unearthed containing a further 58 bodies..."
(S.A. Mousavi: The Hazaras of Afghanistan )

Hence, Human Rights Watch reported that civilians had their throats slit and leg or arm cut off. More than 1,000 were killed and/or disappeared.


Leaders of the Massacre
"Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a current U.S. ally, was among the mujahedeen leaders in power in Afghanistan- the ones who welcomed Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996 from Sudan, where he had been forced to leave under U.S. pressure. Sayyaf, whose men carried out brutal atrocities during the mujahedeen’s rule, was a close ally of Ahmed Shah Massoud, on the rights in this photograph, whose men also carried out brutal acts."



An Afghan woman recounts how her husband was killed in Afshar, west of Kabul. Hundreds of innocent people from Hazara minority were massacred by forces of Sayyaf and Ahmad Shah Massoud in this area in 1993


Headline:
* According to The Guardian, November 16, 2001:

* According to Los Angeles Times (Apr.26,1999) "In one terrible incident in 1993, documented by the State Department, Masoud's troops rampaged through a rival neighborhood, raping, looting and killing as many as a thousand people."

* "nternational responsibility for human rights disaster", (AI, 1995) In March 1995 Shura-e-Nezar forces reportedly carried out raids on hundreds of civilian homes in Kabul's south-western district of Karte She, killing or beating whole families, looting property and raping Hazara women. One family, interviewed by a foreign journalist in Kabul, said President Rabbani's soldiers had told them they wanted to "drink the blood of the Hazaras". Medical workers in the area confirmed at the time at least six incidents of rape and two attempted rapes, but believed the actual number was much higher.

* Human Rights Watch, (October 10, 2001)"In March 1995, Massoud [Defence Minister at that time] forces were responsible for rape and looting after they seized control of Kabul's predominantly Hazara neighborhood of Karte Seh.
On the night of Feb. 11, 1993, the Massoud and Sayyaf forces conducted a raid in west Kabul, killing Hazara civilians and committing widespread rape. Estimates of fatalities range from 70 to more than 100.
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Following this success, exorbitant taxes, and general oppression were once again the rule in Hazaristan. Added to this, the area became a center for the slave trade, and for the first time, the government introduced special taxes for slave trading. Hazara slaves were being offered so cheaply, that a slave could bought for 10 seers of wheat or barley (Faiz, 1912 vol.3:863). Furthermore, the inability to pay exorbitant government fines and taxes soon forced many Hazaras to sell their own wives and children as slavesBribery and looting of Hazara property by Pashtun officials had become regular and expected, and had reached a point where the government in Kabul decided to take steps to curb these excesses. In certain instances, such as the case of Mir Ata Khan, who had received 163,260 rupees in bribes and had stolen its equivalent in animas and goods, the charged official was forced to pay the major portion of that into the state treasury. Mir Ata Khan was in turn allowed to keep 11,280 rupees, some land and 18 and 18 female slaves (ibid:853-855). Massacres, slavery, heavy taxes amid general destruction had reached such a level in Hazaristan that the very existence of the Hazara peoples were endangered, a threat acknowledged even by one of the government’s own high ranking officials (ibid:855)

In January 1893, Abdur Rahman ordered all his Afghan commanders in Hazaristan to collect and dispatch to Kabul, the names of all Hazara Mirs, Sayids, Khans, Begs, and religious and non-religious leaders, along with the names of members of their families, regardless of whether they had taken part in the uprisings or not (ibid:862). This aroused once again the anger and hatred of the Hazaras towards the pasthuns. Disobeying orders, Pashtun officials instead either dispatched number of Hazaras to Kabul or tortured and executed them.

This upsurge in violence once again incited and ignited the flames of rebellion. Although the grounds for the uprising of 1893 had already been laid in the autumn of 1892, the events of early 1893 mobilized rebellion. The rebellion first began amongst the Day Zangi, Behsud, and Day Kundi people and soon spread to most parts of Hazaristan, finally reaching Kabul from where it spread to Daulat Yar, Bamiyan, Ghour, Ajaristan and Mazar-e Sharif.

The reasons for this second rebellion are clearly stated in a letter to Abdur Rahman by the leader of the rebellion: the unjust treatment of the Hazaras by Afghan commanders and soldiers; exorbitant and numerous unwarranted taxes; assaults on Hazara women; the massacre of innocent Hazaras; the looting and pillaging of homes; enslavement of Hazara children, women and men; abuses of religious and social leaders, and the accusation against Shi’a Hazaras of godlessness, and the replacement of Shi’a Mullahs by their Sunni counterparts. The letter also clearly maintains that even those Hazaras who surrendered without resistance and others who fought as loyal soldiers on the side of the regime, such as many of the Behsud, Day Zangi, Day Kundi, and Gouri clans, were not spared this treatment either. The letter concludes that, in order to survive and free themselves from slavery, the Hazara people were forced to take up armed rebellion and resistance against the government (ibid:891). The letter clearly demonstrates that despite all the massacres and oppression of their people in 1892, the Hazaras remained resistant to slavery and oppression.

The Amir of Kabul, taken by surprise at the response of the Hazaras, showed no initial reaction. Consequently, the rebel Hazaras were soon able to expand their territory and to gain ever-increasing control over Hazaristan through successive and successful offensives on government garrisons and the recovery of needed arms. The emergency forces sent from Bamiyan were also soon defeated. Once again government officials were forced to abandon their posts in Hazaristan and take refuge in Kabul. Soon, all strategic roads to Kabul fell under the control of the rebels, who dug trenches all along the route and prepared to launch their assault on Kabul. The rebellion had once again spread throughout Hazaristan.

In response, Abdur Rahman published a notice, entitled “A call to the Hazara People”, with which he intended to drive a rift between the leaders of the rebellion. This he succeeded in achieving; soon disagreement arose over whether or not armed rebellion was the right course of action. Some leaders, such as Mohammad Riza Beg, believed that armed rebellion risked total annihilation of their tribe and so was dangerous. He subsequently changed sides and fought alongside government forces against the rebels. (Temirkhanov, 1980:160).

Using this weakness in the enemy camp, Abdur Rahman began his offensive in April 1893. After suffering heavy losses, government forces finally broke through the rebel blockade of road and valleys and entered Hazaristan. The Hazaras resisted fiercely and totally destroyed some government battalions, while others, such as the battalion from Herat, lost as much as 85 percent of its men (ibid:163). Fresh government reinforcements, however, were soon brought in and the war and its atrocities heightened. According to Faiz Mohammad, hundreds of decapitated Hazara heads were sent to Bamyan and other cities daily (Faiz, 1912, Vol.3.898).

The war continued in this manner for months, during which time the Hazaras fought determinedly and fiercely, and succeeded in inflicting enormous damage on Abdur Rahman’s forces. The end came in the summer of 1893, when Abdur Rahman recalled his forces from Hazaristan and was forced to concede to the rebel’s demands, and grant Hazaristan special privileges (Temirkhanov, 1980:166). At the same time, faced with shortages of food and the prospect of famine, poverty, and the cost of and losses of the war, the Hazaras also began considering negotiation. After a long meeting, representatives were dispatched to Kabul to negotiate with Abdur Rahman; members of several Pashtun families were kept as hostages should Abdur Rahman stop negotiation and detain the representatives. After much discussion, and recognition on the part of the government of the rights of the Hazaras, the latter pledged allegiance to the Amir. thus the final Hazara uprising was settled.

"Those captured I had blown from the guns. The total number punished in this way, during three years of the rebellion, amounted to 5,000. Those killed by my army were about 10,000" (Abdur Rahman, in his biography. )

According to Temirkhanov, after the end of the war, the Hazaras divided into 3 groups:

1. Mirs who accepted the conditions of the Amir of Kabul, numbering some 10,000 families.
2. Hazaras who had no faith in the Amir’s promises and did not trust him, but who were not strong enough to resist. These numbered some 15,000 families, and they chose to migrate to neighboring countries, such as Iran and British India, Pakistan today.
3. Hazaras who neither trusted the Amir nor wanted to leave and so carried on their resistance to the Amir(ibid:167)

As a result of the stand taken by this third group, fighting continued until November 1893. The outcome, however, had long ago become clear. Finally, as those rebels who had continued their resistance laid down their arms at the end of 1893, the uprising came to a conclusive end.
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In order protect themselves and to gain promotion, the Amirs commanders committed ever more and worse atrocities. They openly abused Hazara religious leaders and tortured or incarcerated Hazara Mirs and elders; even those Hazara leaders who supported the government were not spared, but sent to Kabul or imprisoned under false pretexts (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:733,740). At the height of this policy, Abdul Qodos was commanded from Kabul to gather and send to Kabul all Sayyeds, Mullahs, and Mirs from the newly-conquered areas. From amongst these, those known for their support and loyalty to the Amir were placed in positions of power; those who were considered neutral were sent in to exile in other parts of Afghanistan, and those under suspicion were kept in Kabul in order to prevent any chances of an uprising (Ibid:761)In order to speed up the depopulation of Hazaristan and its repopulation by Pashtun nomads, Abdul Qodos arrested and sent to Kabul the Mirs of the Day Kundi, Day Zangi and other clans, where they were tried for obstructing the law. Arable Hazara land was retaxed:

“There were no laws and regulations regarding the amount and method of collection of taxes. Land tax would be collected in wheat [100 kherwar=100 seer, seer=7.066 kg] from one family one day...The next day oil would be added on, then 100 sheep, then straw, followed by barley and so on. Government officials would take all this on a whim and by force as they pleased” (Orazgani, 1913:81)

Those who refused to pay these taxes, such as members of the Day Chopan clan, were massacred by the hundred, including women and children. The rest of the population was totally disarmed, a process accompanied by random looting, destruction and assault on Hazara women (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:733).

Thousands of documents can be produced and hundreds of pages written, on the inhuman policies and activities of Abdur Rahman. the aim of giving these examples here is to provide a background to the period preceding the uprisings. it was the culmination of these conditions which provided the basis for the major uprising by the Hazaras. The actual trigger for the first rebellion was the assault by 33 Pashtun soldiers on the wife of a Pahlawan Hazara. The soldiers, who had entered the house under the pretext of searching for arms, tied the man up and assaulted his wife in front of him. The families of both the man and his wife, deciding that death was one hundred times better than such humiliation, killed the soldiers involved and attacked the local garrison, from whence they recovered their confiscated arms.

And so the major Hazara uprisings of April 1892 began in the occupied Hazaristan. Interestingly, the rebellion first began in parts of Hazaristan where the Amir enjoyed much support. Following the success of the above mentioned attack on government forces, the Orazgani Hazaras also took arms and joined the uprising. Of all the Afghan forces in the area., only Muhammadullah Khan and his men were able to flee and defend themselves. As the uprising spread and neared Kabul, the rebels were joined by Kabuli Hazaras and even some dissatisfied government officials.

"...The top half of his head was covered with dough shaped like a bowl and boiling oil poured into it. This was done until the hot oil pierced through and the soldier lost consciousness ...until he eventually died" method for getting a soldier to confess

Although the uprising had begun as a popular rebellion by ordinary Hazaras, it was soon joined by prominent Hazara leaders, the first of whom was Mohammad Azim Beg, the Day Zangi Mir. Muhammad Azim Beg had been amongst the first Mirs to pledge allegiance to the Amir in Kabul in 1887 and so had been given the title of Sardar by Abdur Rahman. Indeed, according to Orazgani, it had been Muhammad Azim Beg who had planned Abdur Rahman’s invasion of the originally unoccupied Hazaras such as Orazgan, Chorah, and Arjistan (Orazgani,1913:76), and had consequently been made Viceroy of Hazaristan (sultan, 1980, vol.1:280). However, when the time came, Azim Beg joined the Hazara uprising and attempted to organize and to give it clear direction. In order to do this wrote all Hazara Mirs and invited them all to a general meeting. It was this meeting, which was to be known as the famous Jirga-e Au Qool, that the Hazaras officially declared war on Abdur Rahman (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:800).

The major difference between this uprising and the Sheikh Ali uprising (1888-1890) was that, while the latter had had specific aims such as reduction of taxes, etc., the Jirga-e Au Qool had as its declared intention, the overthrow of the Amir of Kabul. It was also for this reason that the uprising attracted a number of Maimana Uzbaks, along with government and Afghan officials (Temirkhanov, 1980:1370). Thus, the rebellion spread throughout Hazaristan, attracting Hazara officers and soldiers in the service of the Amir. Soon the rebels took over government food stores in Hazaristan and closed off strategic roads into the region (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:800).

To begin with, Abdur Rahman did not view the matter as particularly serious and attempted to quash the rebellion by dispatching small forces to assist Abdul Qodos. Soon, however, Abdul Qodos was defeated by Mir Azim Beg, as was General Shir Mohammad Khan, leader of Abdur Rahman’s dispatched force. As well as victory over these forces, the Hazaras also gained access to a supply of arms and ammunitions.

It was at this point that Abdur Rahman became aware of the extent and seriousness of the uprising, and called upon Sunni religious leaders to conduct a ‘religious crusade’ against the ‘godless’ Shi’a Hazaras, promising those who took part in the crusade, Hazara land, wealth, women and children as reward. An enormous force was put together: some 30,000-40,000 government troops, 10,000 mounted government troops, and some 100,000 civilians (Faiz, 1912,vol.3:781-2,809,812; sultan 1980, vol.1:283). Also volunteering to join the crusade Pashtun nomads(kochi’s) who had long pleaded with the Amir to fight the Hazaras (sultan 1980, vol.1:283). A state of emergency was declared in all cities. Even the British government offered the assistance of British military advisers to Abdur Rahman (Temirkhanov, 1980:143).

Government and voluntary forces, along with the Afghan nomads, led by Abdul Qodos, General Gholam Heydar Khan and General Shir Mohammad Khan, surrounded all the areas where the rebellion was taking place. The first resistance came from the Day Zangi area where, despite a valiant effort, the Day Zangi were defeated and their leaders killed or captured. By June 1892, all out bloody war reigned throughout Hazaristan.

Despite impressive successes, by August 1892, the major forces of rebellion had been defeated, and Azim Beg, the principal leader of the rebellion was captured and later executed in Kabul. Soon, Orazgan, the main center of the fighting was captured and totally destroyed; thousands of Hazara men, women, and children were sold as slaves in the markets of Kabul and Qandahar, while numerous towers of human heads were made from the defeated rebels as a warning to others who might challenge the rule of the Amir
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