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FACTBOX-Possible Afghan presidential candidates

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Afghanistan on Thursday announced presidential elections for Aug. 20, hoping a U.S. troop surge will improve security at a time when violence is at the highest levels since the overthrow of the Taliban.

Below are facts on five candidates expected to run in the presidential election. [For full story on election, click on ID:nISL383254].

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's first elected president, since 2004:

* The 51-year-old Karzai, is an ethnic Pashtun from the same tribe as the Afghan royal family. He received a masters degree in Political Science in India in 1983 and then joined a small monarchist faction of the anti-Soviet mujahideen in Pakistan.

He served as deputy foreign minister after the fall of the Soviet-backed government in 1992.

At first supporting the Taliban, Karzai later worked from pakistan to overthrow the austere Islamists, returning to Afghanistan in late 2001 where he was appointed president of the country's interim government.

Karzai became the first democratically elected leader of Afghanistan in 2004. Endemic government corruption, slow development and civilian casualties caused by foreign forces, have eroded his public support. Karzai has hinted at running in the election, saying he has "a job to complete".

Ali Ahmad Jalali, former interior minister, 2003 to 2005:

* The 68-year-old Jalali, an ethnic Pashtun, received a masters degree in Military Science in Kabul in 1966. Jalali was a top military planner with the Afghan resistance after the Soviet invasion, and a colonel in the Afghan army.

He became a U.S. citizen in 1987 and apart from the years he served in Karzai's government, has lived in the U.S. where he is a professor at the National Defense University, Washington.

Dr. Ramazan Bashardost, member of parliament and planning minister, 2004 to 2005:

* The 43-year-old Bashardost is an ethnic Hazara who spent more than 20 years in France, where he received masters degrees in Law, Diplomacy and Political Science and a PhD in Law.

Openly criticising the government and accusing ministers of corruption, Bashardost has modelled himself as a man of the people. While briefly serving as planning minister, Bashardost was critical of the role of aid agencies in Afghanistan and later resigned under government and foreign pressure.

Bashardost is the only person who has said openly he will stand in the election and runs his campaign from a tent opposite parliament.

Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institute and finance minister, 2002-2004:

* The 59-year-old Ahmadzai, an ethnic Pashtun, received a PhD in Anthropology from Columbia University. Ahmadzai has spent more than two decades outside Afghanistan where he worked at different universities and the World Bank.

In 2002, he served as special adviser to the United Nations and later as finance minister under Karzai. In 2005, Ahmadzai founded the Institute of State Effectiveness in the United States aimed at promoting effective government. Ahmadzai lives in the United States but visits Afghanistan regularly.

Dr. Abdullah, Afghan foreign minister, 2001-2006:

* The 48-year-old Abdullah obtained a medical degree from Kabul University and worked as an ophthalmologist until 1985. A year later he joined the Panjshir Resistance Front against the Soviets and served as an adviser to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud.

Abdullah was foreign minister of the Northern Alliance from 1998 onwards, and after Massoud's assassination in 2001, became a dominant figure in the alliance. He was appointed foreign minister under Karzai's interim government, a position he held until 2006. He is seen as a prominent leader of the northern ethnic Tajiks, but himself is half Pashtun.
reuters(Reporting by Jonathon Burch; Editing by David Fox) Read the full story

Pakistan: Sectarian attacks spark violent protests

Wednesday 0 comments

adn By Syed Saleem Shahzad

Simmering sectarian violence once again erupted in Pakistan on Monday. Violent protests took place in Quetta, capital of gas-rich western Balochistan province after the slaying there of a Shia Muslim politician. And at least five people died in a bombing outside the town hall in Dera Ismail Khan, in restive, Pashtun dominated Northwest Frontier province.

The banned Sunni extremist group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has claimed responsibility for the drive-by slaying in Quetta of Hussain Ali Yousufi. A prominent Shia figure and ethnic Hazara, he led the Hazara Democratic Party.

Ethnic Hazaras form a sizeable population (around 90,000) in Balochistan province, which borders Afghanistan and Iran - the country from which they originally migrated to Pakistan.

Clashes between the Taliban and Hazara in Afghanistan have in recent years damaged previously peaceful relations between Sunni Pashtun and Baloch tribesmen.

Hazara Shias have been a frequent target of Sunni extremist groups in Pakistani Balochistan. The Hazara community originally comes from the Afghan province of Bamyan.

Angry Hazara youths ransacked the main commercial centre in Quetta after Yousufi's killing on Monday. They pelted passing vehicles with stones, set other vehicles alight and smashed the windows of a bank in the city's main boulevard.

The Hazara Democratic Party meanwhile announced a strike in the city on Tuesday and a 40-day period of mourning for Yousufi.

HDP secretary general Abdul Khaliq Hazara strongly condemned the government and police for the inadequate protection given to ethnic Hazaras targeted by extremists.

No one immediately claimed responsibility for the blast in Dera Ismail Khan, which reportedly occurred minutes before the parliamentary affairs minister, Khalifa Qayyum, had passed through the area.

Prime minister Yousaf Raza Gillani condemned the bombing and vowed to bring to justice those responsible. Other politicians also condemned the attack as a barbaric act of terrorism. Read the full story

Troops deployed after Shiite politician killed in Pakistan

AFP Paramilitary troops were Monday deployed in Pakistan's southwestern city of Quetta to quell violent protests against the killing of a Shiite Muslim politician, police said.

Gunmen riding on a motorbike shot dead Ghulam Hassan Yousufi, a prominent Shiite figure, in an attack claimed by a banned Sunni extremist group.

"The Frontier Corps (FC) has been called to assist local police control the law and order situation," senior police official Wazir Khan Nasir told AFP.

He said police were questioning at least 18 people arrested for suspected links to the assassins following the second sectarian attack in Quetta in less than two weeks.

The FC fanned out across the city centre after hundreds of protesters took to the streets and turned violent, setting ablaze vehicles and smashing the windows of a bank in the main boulevard where Yousufi was killed.

"Police launched tear gas shells and baton-charged the protesters in a bid to prevent any untoward incident and disperse them," Nasir said.

At least 12 people were wounded, seven when protesters in the crowd opened fire, Nasir said.

"They are ordinary people injured from firing by the protesters," he said.

Residents said the situation was returning to normal as dusk fell. Shops remained closed, however, and traffic was thin in the city.

Monday's drive-by shooting took place on Jinnah road in Quetta, the capital of gas-rich Baluchistan province, which borders Afghanistan and Iran.

Yousufi, who led the Hazara Democratic Party, a predominantly Shiite movement, was shot as he got out of his car outside a travel agency and died on the way to hospital.

Hundreds of people blocked Jinnah road and burnt tyres to protest against the killing, an AFP photographer said.

The banned Sunni extremist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) claimed responsibility for the killing in a telephone call to the local press club.

"We claim responsibility for this attack," said the caller, who identified himself as Ali Haider, an LJ spokesman.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has been blamed for the killings of hundreds of Shiite Muslims since its emergence in the early 1990s.

Monday's shooting followed a sectarian attack on January 14, when unknown gunmen killed four policemen, three of them Shiites, on the outskirts of the city, sparking street protests.

Aside from the sectarian attacks involving Sunni and Shiite Muslim extremists, the province has been gripped by insurgency for four years.

Hundreds of people have died in insurgent violence in Baluchistan since late 2004, when rebels rose up demanding political autonomy and a greater share of profits from the region's natural resources.

The province has also been hit by attacks blamed on Taliban militants.

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Indonesian Smugglers In Court

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JG At least six Indonesians charged with people smuggling are undergoing trials in Perth, Western Australia, the Indonesian Consulate in the state capital said on Thursday.

Consular official Ricky Suhendar said Abdul Hamid, 35, and Amos Ndolo, 58, are awaiting sentences after pleading guilty to people smuggling. The charge carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years in jail.

Abdul, of Dompu, Bima, West Nusa Tenggara Province, was arrested by Australian police near Ashmore Reef in the Indian Ocean between Indonesia and Australia, on Sept. 29, 2008. He was caught attempting to smuggle 12 asylum seekers from Iran and Afghanistan into Australia.

Amos Ndolo, a resident of Rote Island, Flores, East Nusa Tenggara Province, was arrested after he was found with 14 refugees aboard his boat on Oct. 6, 2008.

“The [sentencing] of Amos Ndolo and Abdul Hamid is expected next month,” Ricky said.

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Afghanistan: Obama's Vietnam?

Afghanistan threatens to destroy Barack Obama's presidency. Lost in the Inauguration euphoria this week is that our celebrity-in-chief is poised to commit a massive strategic military blunder - one that will squander American blood and treasure, and perhaps mark the end of our superpower status. The United States is sleepwalking toward disaster.

Mr. Obama vows to transfer troops from Iraq into southern Afghanistan. Facing a resurgent Taliban, he wants to replicate the successful "surge" in Iraq by infusing 20,000 to 30,000 additional soldiers. In particular, Mr. Obama seeks to bolster NATO forces around Kandahar, and stem the growing tide of guerrilla attacks.

The centerpiece of his foreign policy - and that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton - is that Iraq was "the wrong war, at the wrong time, in the wrong place." He believes Afghanistan is the central front in the war on terrorism: It is in that mountainous, unruly land that America's enemies must be vanquished. Mr. Obama is convinced that, by crushing the Taliban insurgents, a decisive victory can be won against Islamist extremism. He is wrong. Sending more troops will only perpetuate mistaken Bush administration policies.

The decision to topple the Taliban regime was the right one: It provided a safe haven for al Qaeda, which enabled the terror group to launch the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The U.S. intervention dismantled its training camps. Countless terrorists were killed or captured. Al Qaeda's senior leadership was decapitated. Moreover, for years, jihadists had struck American targets with impunity - the 1979 kidnapping of U.S. diplomats held as hostages in Iran, the mass murder of 241 U.S. service personnel in Beirut, the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, the 2000 suicide strikes on the USS Cole. By invading Afghanistan, President Bush sent a necessary message around the world: America would hit back - and hit back hard. Also, Washington dislodged a medieval theocratic state, where homosexuals were routinely executed and women enslaved, and replaced it with a pro-American democracy. Mr. Bush liberated 23 million Muslims from tyranny.

By 2005, America had achieved all its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Yet, instead of declaring mission accomplished and slowly pulling out American forces, Mr. Bush did the very opposite. He embarked upon nation-building. Washington sought to rebuild Afghanistan's economy, resuscitate its agriculture, destroy its flourishing heroin trade, entrench women's rights and establish an independent judiciary and the rule of law.

Most foolishly, the administration helped to transform the country into a centralized unitary state, where power is consolidated in the hands of a strong president and a vigorous executive branch. The result has been a violent backlash among numerous tribal chiefs and religious leaders.

From its creation in the 18th century, Afghanistan has been an ethnic and linguistic patchwork - more of a fractious collection of bickering warlords and Muslim clerics than a coherent nation. The only form of government suitable to it is a loose federation where economic, cultural and political authority is devolved to its diverse tribal regions and provinces.

The absence of a decentralized power structure is now fueling the insurgency. The country's ethnic Pashtuns, who form more than 42 percent of the population, are seething that the Bush administration decided to prop up President Hamid Karzai's corrupt and inefficient government. Rather than fostering a power-sharing arrangement among the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara Shi'ites, the United States has put all its political eggs in one basket - Mr. Karzai. But he is not Afghanistan's George Washington. Instead, Mr. Karzai is an incompetent thug. He possesses no national constituency and has failed to impose central-government control over most of its territory. The administrative bureaucracy is a giant parasite, sucking billions in foreign aid - where large chunks are being stolen and siphoned off by greedy apparatchiks - while doing little to build modern roads, schools and hospitals. The Afghan army and police forces are corrupt and ineffective, reluctant to fight the insurgents.

The key to success is not an infusion of American troops; it is the recognition that local warlords - like in Iraq - must be co-opted and given a real stake in Afghanistan's future. The Taliban are hated by too many Afghans to return to power. In fact, a large segment of the Taliban is not even anti-American. They are Pashtun nationalists, who feel marginalized by Mr. Karzai's regime.

Nation-building is not the answer. It is the problem. America has embraced an open-ended, impossible mission. Washington's primary national interest is not to plant modern institutions on Afghanistan's stony soil, but to prevent it from becoming a haven again for Islamist training bases. For this, nimble special forces are sufficient, provided they are nearby and ready to strike.

Mr. Obama, however, promises to Americanize the war - with no end in sight. He will pour even more troops into a bloody quagmire, while the Afghan military sits on the sidelines. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires; it humiliated the mighty Soviet Red Army and brought the British to their knees.

The establishment media have cast Mr. Obama as the 21st-century version of President John F. Kennedy - a sophisticated internationalist, whose inspirational leadership and soaring rhetoric will restore liberalism both at home and abroad. They have no idea how accurate their comparison is. Kennedy was not only inexperienced but reckless. He brought the world to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. More importantly, it was Kennedy who gave us Vietnam, a military disaster from which America has never truly recovered.

Mr. Obama is now following Kennedy's footsteps. Afghanistan will be his Vietnam. And when the body bags of dead American soldiers start coming home, Mr. Obama's liberal base will turn against the war - just as they did in the 1960s. This will split his party and break his presidency. He lacks the stomach for a protracted campaign. He will cut Afghanistan loose - just as the liberals cut Vietnam loose.

The result will be not only another major defeat. It will mean the loss of U.S. prestige and credibility on the world stage, the moment America becomes a paper tiger - a toothless great power unable and unwilling to win its wars. This is the real "change" that awaits us.

Jeffrey T. Kuhner is a columnist at The Washington Times.

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President Obama Honors Warlord, Snubs Karzai

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Gul Agha Sherzai (whose name is completely made up to make himself sound cool), is a man with a sketchy past: he was one of the main warlords controlling Kandahar in the early 90s who did such a great job running the city that the Taliban either murdered or chased out of town all the men he was associated with to uproarious cheers. Since then, he’s moved north and east, netting himself a province with a truly remarkable agricultural sector—Nangarhar is either one of the most poppy-ridden, or most poppy-free, of Afghanistan provinces, depending on the previous wheat harvest and the performance of Sherzai’s own poppy farms in Kandahar—and become Afghanistan’s Man of the Year. According to local accounts, Sherzai is either “better then those who don’t do nothin for the people n alwayz think for their pocket,” or making himself rich by organizing some of the bribe checkpoints truck drives going through the Khyber (when it’s open) must transit.

There are other stories: he’s either great for building roads and trying to fix the police, or he’s corrupt for being too “usy with musicians, dancing boys, handsome musician are all around him, parties, bribery, collecting money.” He’s a mixed bag, in other words. So guess who Barack Obama invited to his inauguration? Certainly not Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai. No, according to Baktash Siawash he invited Sherzai.

Obama select four Afghan politicians to participate in his ceremony which Gula Agha Sherzai, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Dr. Ali Ahmad Jalali are the invited persons.

To build off Christian’s good rumination on Afghanistan’s forthcoming Presidential election, these men are likely to run in the election. Contrasted with Seth Jones’ rather shallow defense of US-backed puppets, these names might represent the new power elite in Afghanistan, at least as far as America is concerned. It might even be a good thing, since Karzai has not yet shown himself to be an effective enough leader to break the hold of corruption and narcotics on the country (his brother probably doesn’t help).

But my big question is: how are these other men any better? Sherzai has obvious shortcomings; Abdullah Abdullah is a Tajik and was a close advisor to Ahmed Shah Massou and this not too attractive to the Hazaras and many Pashtuns; Ashraf Ghani kinda sorta broke Afghanistan the last time he tried to assert a role in its affairs (as a participant in the Bonn process); Ahmad Jalali is a wonderful scholar (he cowrote The Other Side of the Mountain with Les Grau), but who knows what his leadership skills are, or how popular he is in Afghanistan itself as compared to the American classroom?

Indeed, and Christian said this in his post, it is a practical impossibility to find an Afghan without some kind of crazy problem that probably should preclude him from assuming office. Then again, American politicians have the same sorts of problems… just, they usually have fewer bodies in their wakes. Regardless, as Baktash notes, it is indeed remarkable that these men had the honor of attending Barack Obama’s inauguration, and not the current president (and supposed front-runner) Hamid Karzai. That in and of itself is a pretty remarkable statement of faith.

So, where does that part about strengthening the central government of Afghanistan come into play again?

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Insecurity dogs voter registration in south Afghan

AlertNet Voter registration in parts of Afghanistan's violence-ridden south will not take place until Afghan security forces can protect registration offices from insurgent attacks, a senior electoral official said on Thursday. Voter registration in south Afghanistan's most dangerous provinces started on Monday, but civilians in four districts of Helmand province will not be able to register their vote for the upcoming presidential elections because of inadequate security.

"There are four districts in Helmand ... where we are not able to start voter registration because the government has no physical presence there," said Daoud Ali Najafi, chief electoral officer at the Independent Election Commission (IEC).

Washington is planning to send up to 20,000 extra troops to southern Afghanistan this year to help secure the elections and strengthen some 18,000 mainly British, Canadian and Dutch troops, who have struggled to contain the Taliban insurgency. Najafi said the IEC were pressing the Ministry of Defence to get Afghan security forces to the districts -- Sangin, Kajaki, Garmsir and Baghran -- in Helmand, where mainly British troops are deployed. The IEC says it has completed three phases of voter registration so far, covering north, central and east Afghanistan, but even in those regions, their teams could not reach three districts because of poor security. Almost all fighting in Afghanistan takes place in the south and east, which are populated mainly by Pashtuns, the traditionally dominant ethnic group.

Many Pashtuns are angry at their perceived exclusion from power and alleged abuses by foreign troops. Najafi dismissed as rumours the suggestion that north Afghanistan, which is populated mainly by ethnic Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks, would have a disproportionate share of votes in the presidential elections, compared with the mainly Pashtun south. Access to funding and insecurity were the main obstacles preventing the IEC from gaining access to remote areas.

Donors pledged $47 million to prepare for the presidential elections, a date for which has not been fixed but is likely to be in September, at a meeting on Monday, Najafi said, adding he did not know when the IEC would receive the money. "We cannot announce the date of elections, they depend on security and financial problems and we don't have the solutions for those yet," Najafi told a news conference. So far 3,606 people have registered to vote in Helmand since Monday, and the IEC hopes the process of registering voters in the provinces of Nimroz, Uruzgan and Kandahar will take about one month. Read the full story

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Eight Afghan boat people granted asylum

Thursday 0 comments

TheAge EIGHT Afghan asylum seekers rescued by the navy from a sinking boat off Western Australia last year will be flown to the mainland after the Immigration Department found they would face persecution or death if returned to their homeland.

The decision to grant the permanent protection visas comes less than a week after 28 Afghan and Iranian asylum seekers — the first group to be processed on Christmas Island under the Rudd Government — were also found to be refugees.

One of the eight Afghans, a medical doctor and human rights activist, told The Age from Christmas Island he was forced to flee his homeland after being shot twice.

"I have the scars of these bullets on my body," he said through a Dari interpreter.

The man, who asked that his name not be used until he reached the mainland, said he was from the Hazara ethnic minority group, which was targeted by the Taliban.

"Eighty-five per cent of Afghanistan is now covered by people of al-Qaeda and the Taliban," he said.

The man, who practised as a GP in Afghanistan, said one of his "deepest desires" was to become a cardiologist to "pay back the good deeds of the Australian people".

"I want to convey my deepest appreciation to the Government of Australia and the people of Australia," he said.

The eight Afghan adults and two children, who are already in Adelaide, were rescued by HMAS Ararat on November 19, after Coastwatch spotted their sinking ship — which had a broken engine and hole in the hull — about 150 kilometres from Ashmore Island.

Their lawyer David Manne, from the Refugee and Immigration Legal Centre, welcomed the Government's "prompt and efficient processing of the claims".

"This represents a vast improvement on past practice of prolonged processing, which caused such unnecessary and huge human and financial cost," he said.

Mr Manne said the Afghans were the direct victims of a vicious and unrelenting pattern of human rights abuse targeting minorities.

"They fled from brutality and terror inflicted by the Taliban and other extremists — exactly the same elements which Australia and other Western countries have been battling against," he said.

The decision to grant the men visas comes as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, this week told the Security Council the number of refugees world-wide had increased to more than 11 million over the past two years.

Mr Guterres said 3 million Afghans remained in exile in Pakistan and Iran.

Eight boats of mostly Afghan, Iranian and Sri Lankan asylum seekers have been intercepted in Australian waters in the past four months, with the most recent arriving off the coast of Western Australia last Sunday.

Although the number of unauthorised arrivals rose only slightly in 2008 to 164, compared with 148 the previous year, the Government's border protection scheme has come under intense scrutiny.

While human rights activists and immigration lawyers have applauded the scrapping of temporary protection visas and faster processing times, the Opposition has claimed this has made Australia a "soft target" for people smugglers. Read the full story

The Others

Sunday 0 comments

The Taliban are shifting strategy in response to heavy losses fighting foreign troops. The Taliban has not been able to come up with a counterstrategy for the smart bomb and UAVs, which give foreign troops an unassailable advantage in battles. The word has gotten around, and Afghans are demanding more money to take up arms and join a bunch of Taliban. The Taliban still need these large groups of armed men. Just threatening Afghans about their girls schools, video and music stores, and not having a beard, does not work unless you can show up once in a while with a large bunch of armed friends, and punish those who defy you. But over 5,000 Taliban fighters were killed last year, and about as many badly wounded or arrested. Some of these were actually working for drug gangs, who employ a lot of the groups of armed men prowling the countryside. But both the drug gangs and Taliban are united in their desire to keep Afghan and foreign troops out of southern Afghanistan, and often collaborate in that effort. They share information, and the wealthier drug lords often subsidize the Taliban payroll (Holy War or not, the Taliban have to live and that takes cash).

U.S. troops have been operating in Afghanistan for eight years now, and have established special training courses back in the United States to prepare troops for the unique combat situations they will encounter. Over 100,000 U.S. soldiers and marines have served in Afghanistan, and these are usually the instructors for these preparation courses. Most of these troops have also served in Iraq, and they know they must warn Iraq veterans to forget about some skills and tactics that worked in Iraq, but won't in Afghanistan. There are also special courses for commanders, who must be prepared to deal with tribal politics in Afghanistan, which is somewhat different than it is in Iraq. The U.S. Army has collected so much information on troops dealing with Afghans that it has created an online simulation (it looks like a video game) where players can realistically interact with Afghans in a wide variety of situations. This helps to eliminate a lot of opportunities for misunderstandings because of cultural differences.

At the same time, the troops in Afghanistan now are trying out new tactics for taking down the Taliban and drug gangs. The U.S. is expanding its intelligence operations in Afghanistan, bringing in a lot of the equipment, and specialists, who were so useful in Iraq. The U.S. Army has developed intelligence tactics that provide "information dominance" that makes it difficult for the enemy to carry out attacks (without the U.S. knowing about it), and more vulnerable to American raids and sweeps. The information based tactics concentrate on capturing or killing the enemy leadership and specialists (mostly technical, but religious leaders and media experts are often valuable targets as well). The Australian commandos have specialized in this approach, and made themselves much feared by the Taliban (who will make an extra effort to avoid dealing with the Australians). The U.S. and NATO commanders know that the Taliban leadership is in trouble, with a new generation of leaders only recently shoving the older guys (veterans of the 1980s war with Russia) out of the way, and introducing more vicious tactics (more terrorism against reluctant civilians). This is backfiring, as it did in Iraq, and the Taliban leadership is not having an easy time trying to come up with a new strategy. One strategy that is working is making a big deal whenever foreign troops kill Afghan civilians (about 80 percent of civilian deaths are caused by the Taliban, but that has successfully been played down, a real spin victory for the Islamic radicals). This has caused NATO commanders to issue increasingly restrictive rules of engagement to their troops, which the Taliban eagerly exploit to save their butts in combat.

The U.S. cultural training for troops concentrates on the Pushtun minority, which has created the Taliban (mostly from a few tribes around Kandahar) and most of the violence (over 80 percent of the Afghan heroin and opium is produced by Pushtun tribes, and lot of "Taliban" violence is actually drug related). The Pushtun account for about 40 percent of the Afghan population (12 out of 30 million), and have 25 million more Pushtun just across the border in Pakistan. There are also some Pushtun in eastern Iran, but the Iranians are trying for force all these refugees from the 1980s war with Russia, to move back to Afghanistan. The Pushtun have long (we're talking thousands of years) dominated the region. Not as rulers, the Pushtuns are constantly fighting each other, but as a force that will unite if anyone else tries to dominate them. Modern Afghanistan (only a few centuries old) came about when non-Pushtun tribes to the north (Uzbek, Hazara, Tajik) agreed to become allies with the Pushtuns in order to keep foreigners (Russians, Iranians, British) out of their little piece of the world. Although the Pushtuns were the minority, they were the largest minority, and it was understood that the Pushtuns would take the lead. So the king of Afghanistan, has almost always been a Pushtun. So is the current president of Afghanistan. But the Pushtuns believe that president Karzai is too generous to the "lesser (non-Pushtun) tribes" who backed Karzai in the elections (and political bargaining) in becoming president. The Pushtun resent the presence of foreign troops because these heavily armed outlanders threaten Pushtun domination of the northern tribes. In many ways, the current war in Afghanistan is a struggle between the northern (non-Pushtun) tribes and the Pushtun. Many of the Afghan soldiers and police are from the north, and very few of the foreign troops are of Pushtun ancestry. The Taliban is further weakened by the fact that most Pushtun tribes do not back the Taliban (on most days, such attitudes seem to change with the weather in Afghanistan.)

The northern tribes remember that, when September 11, 2001 happened, they were still fighting the Taliban government that had not yet gained control over all of Afghanistan (the "Northern Alliance" of non-Pushtun tribes was still holding out). The United States sent in a few hundred Special Forces and CIA operators, a hundred million dollars in cash and a few thousand smart bombs to help the Northern Alliance out, and the Taliban were broken and fleeing the country within two months. The northern tribes don't mind Pushtuns getting the top jobs in the government, but are no longer willing to meekly follow the Pushtun lead blindly. The Pushtun see it differently, claiming (with some truth) that they did most of the fighting against the Russians in the 1980s, and that many of the northern tribes cut deals with the Russians (as did some Pushtun tribes, something the Pushtuns don't like to talk about). That had more to do with Afghan politics, (the northern and southern tribes disagreed on how to deal with Russia and modernization) than with anything else. Then came the Taliban (a cynical invention of the Pakistanis, created from Pushtun refugees convinced that a Holy War would bring peace to Afghanistan). Meanwhile, the heroin trade (growing poppies and using a chemical process to turn the sap from these plants into opium and heroin) moved from Pakistan (where the government saw it as a curse) to Afghanistan. Many of the same tribes that produced the refugees who became the Taliban, also produced the most successful drug lords. The Pushtun are many things, including well organized and ambitious.

Now both the Taliban and the drug gangs are under attack, and the Pushtun blame the northern tribes and their foreign allies. Outsiders don't see it this way, but most Afghans do. To the Pushtuns, anyone who is not Pushtun is "them." Same deal with the northern tribes, who are weakened by their lack of ethnic and tribal unity (the Uzbeks are Turks, the Hazara are Mongols and the Tajiks are, like the Pushtuns, cousins to the Iranians and Indians). Thus no matter how successful the Taliban might be in the south, among their fellow Pushtun (many of them anti-Taliban), they still have to face the northern tribes, who now have powerful foreign allies that proved invincible in 2001, and can do so again if called on.

The Taliban are trying to adopt the Iraq "bombs not bullets" strategy against the unbeatable foreign troops. The use of roadside and suicide bombings are up. But these tactics don't kill enough foreign troops to make a difference, unless the foreign media can be manipulated into declaring the bombing losses as proof that the war in Afghanistan is hopeless. The Taliban are having some success from that, but victory is elusive. That's because the foreign troops themselves know that the Taliban are playing a weak hand and this story keeps getting out to confuse a public accustomed to all the gloom and doom reporting about Afghanistan. The British and Dutch have recently conducted successful "anti-leadership" campaigns, which disrupted Taliban operations by capturing or killing leaders and destroying bases (caches of weapons, food and equipment) and destroying buildings used by the Taliban (if it was determined that the owners had willingly rented space to the terrorists). When it is known that the Taliban are forcing the locals to provide aid, the troops just go after the Taliban, and win points with the locals for chasing out these nasty "outsiders."

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Afghan soldiers pick up US weapons

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Having already fought against the Taliban in his two years in the Afghan army, Gul Mohammad has little trouble picking up the tricks of his new American-issue automatic weapon.

What concerns the young soldier is whether he will be able to rely on the weapon when it counts, as he has done so often before with its Russian equivalent, a Kalashnikov AK-47, favoured in central Asia for decades.

"The worst thing for a soldier would be if his gun were to fail in the middle of a battle," says Mohammad, speaking during a break in weapons training at the base of his 205 Atal (Hero) army corps in southern Kandahar province.

The corps numbers about 20,000 soldiers drawn from across the country to fight the fierce Taliban in their heartland -- the four provinces of the rugged south, one of the most intense battlefields of the extremist insurgency.

In a hangar at Camp Hero, 50-60 troops have been split into small groups, each with a former US Marine or army soldier introducing them to M-16 rifles and M-249 light machine guns, standard-issue weapons in most NATO countries.

After driving out the Taliban regime in late 2001, the United States started to build Afghanistan a new army to replace the illegal militia forces loyal to regional warlords who were ruling the country from different power bases.

The country's previous army had been formed during the 1979-89 Soviet occupation into a force of around 200,000 men.

But it was destroyed in the 1992-96 civil war when various ethnic-based factions -- armed and funded by the United States, Pakistan and other nations to fight the Soviets -- turned on each other.

The new Afghan army brings together young men of the country's seven ethnicities in a test of national unity.

With mainly US funding and training it now numbers roughly 80,000 men with plans for its expansion to 134,000 by 2012 -- a priority in efforts to beat the Taliban insurgency that last year was at its most intense yet.

The US military has regularly praised the progress of the new Afghan army, although critics question the loyalty of the troops, a significant AWOL rate and the lack of quality leadership.

The army started leading some anti-insurgent military operations early last year, but US and NATO troops still control most of the action.

"Leading independent operations indicate that we have improved," says the commander of 205 Atal, General Sher Mohammad Zazai.

"Our enemies are no longer able to confront us face-to-face. When we go into an area, the enemy leaves that area. If he chooses to fight us, they suffer casualties."

A programme launched in late 2007 aims to replace the AK-47s with US-made rifles and machine guns, and supply the Afghan forces with Humvees, the main vehicle used by the US military.

This means the Afghan army will get around 104,000 M-16 rifles, 4,300 machine guns, 2,250 grenade launchers, 4,000 armoured Humvees and 660 Humvee ambulances, says Lieutenant Colonel Christian Kubik, spokesman for the US military training programme.

Most of the M-16s are refurbished Marine Corps weapons and about 2,200 were donated by the Canadian government, he says.

The total cost for these weapons alone is about 60 million dollars, with the Humvees costing about 760 million dollars, he says.

The Afghan government had requested the M-16s, which are considered more accurate and reliable than the AK-47s, Kubik says.

The M-16 "provides a well-trained Afghan soldier a distinct advantage over an insurgent with an AK-47 of dubious origination," he says.

This news should reassure Mohammad, the soldier getting the hang of his new weapon, who says he takes pride in being part of the developing army.

"I have fought countless battles with Taliban," says the ethnic Hazara at Camp Hero, which is in a Pashtun area.

"They are good fighters, but we are even better," he says.

"I think I'm doing the right thing, defending my people and my country."

Read the full story

ANALYSIS-Ethnic tension, insecurity casts doubt on Afghan vote

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AlertNet The legitimacy of Afghan elections this year could be jeopardised if dominant ethnic Pashtuns fail to vote due to poor security and disenchantment with President Hamid Karzai, raising the prospect of even worse violence.

Fighting is already at its heaviest since U.S.-led forces toppled the Taliban in 2001, but almost all battles are in the south and east; areas populated by Pashtuns, many of them angry at their perceived exclusion from power and alleged abuses by foreign troops.

If Pashtuns feel more disenfranchised after the polls due in September, the impoverished and traumatised country could be polarised further still and violence could reach new peaks.

"Pashtuns are less likely to participate in elections because of bad security and yet they represent the largest part of the Afghan population," said Wahid Mojdah, a political analyst and expert on the Taliban.
"For 150 years the Pashtuns have been in government in Afghanistan, in every phase that Pashtuns have been out of power there has been war in Afghanistan," he said.

Recognising that Pashtun participation is key to ensuring success in the presidential election, the United States is to deploy most of its planned 20,000 to 30,000 extra troops to secure the south.
"With the introduction of two additional brigades, the regional commander in the south should have sufficient manpower to ensure successful elections," said one U.S. defence official at the Pentagon, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Karzai, a Pashtun from the southern province of Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, has lost a good deal of public support due to his failure to improve security and clean up endemic official corruption since he was elected in 2004. "There's a clear sense that people haven't been given what they were promised.
It was implied there would be stability and democracy and I don't think that has happened at all," said an international analyst in Afghanistan, who declined to be named. Many Pashtuns also feel Karzai has given too much power to northerners who helped U.S. troops oust the Taliban. NORTH AND SOUTH In a country where even voting for the Afghan equivalent of Pop Idol was clearly split along ethnic lines, the next presidential election is likely to be similar to the last when results closely mirrored the country's ethnic divisions.

The first hurdle is the registration of voters which begins in the southern Pashtun heartlands in eight days time. A senior electoral official said if security did not improve in the south, voter registration would be low. In Ghazni province, southwest of Kabul, the Taliban have made great inroads in the last two years, but it is still more secure than the volatile southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Even so, election officials were not able to reach large parts of heavily populated, but remote Pashtun districts of Ghazni because of the strength of the Taliban there, Habib Rahman, head of the provincial council, told Reuters.

By contrast, voter registration in the mainly ethnic Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek provinces of the north has already been completed without major incident. "It's completely different from the south, we could provide security for the voters even with just one or two policemen, but you cannot do the same in the south," said Mohammad Omar Sulaimani, governor of Kunduz province in the north. A possible rival Pashtun candidate to Karzai could also split the vote in the south and east and, were it not for the deep divisions among the minority groups, could lead to an upset.

"An Uzbek, a Hazara or Tajik winning would destabilise the country," Mojdah said. "It's unlikely this would happen, but if it does it will lead to many problems in Afghanistan ... the Taliban do not want a U.S.-style democracy here." Low voter registration in the south might not necessarily mean a low turnout in the election as those who still have voting cards from the 2004 poll can use them instead and officials admit it is impossible to know how many have kept their old cards. Tight security then only needs to be imposed on election day itself, diplomats say.

If close to 100,000 foreign troops and some 140,000 Afghan security forces cannot secure the country for "just one goddamn day", a senior Western diplomat said, then "what the hell are we doing here?" (Additional reporting by Hamid Shalizi and Jon Hemming in Kabul and David Morgan in Washington; Editing by Dean Yates) Read the full story

Australia's No2 with people-smugglers

Saturday 0 comments

TheAUS PAKISTANI people-smugglers recommend Australia as the second-best destination for seeking asylum after Canada, according to one of the 134 Asian and Middle Eastern asylum-seekers intercepted off the Australian coast since October.>

Sadiq Bahram, an ethnic Hazara from Afghanistan who has reached Australian waters twice from Indonesia since 1999, said known in Pakistan were former police officers who charged $US15,000 ($21,000) for passage to Canada, $US10,000 to Australia and $US9000 to Europe.

In the first interview with any member of the seven boatloads of asylum-seekers now living or being detained on Christmas Island, Mr Bahram said: "They tell me Canada is the best, second is Australia and third is Europe but I tell them I want Australia, I love Australia and its people ...

it (is) the best paradise in the world because it is peaceful and beautiful."

Mr Bahram and his 13-year-old daughter, Arzoo, were intercepted at Ashmore Reef with 12 others on a small boat - the second detected in Australian waters since the Rudd Government was elected in November 2007.

They were brought to Christmas Island on October 10.

Everyone aboard, except the crew, and everyone aboard the first boat to arrive last year have had their hopes boosted by the Rudd Government's decision last month to permit all 26 to apply for protection visas.

Mr Bahram said he had paid a Pakistani people-smuggler $12,000. He received a special discount on his daughter's fare after giving the smuggler all his savings.

He said they were issued with false passports and flew unaccompanied from Islamabad to Singapore. He said they then joined others in a 12-day boat trip from Malaysia to Kupang, in West Timor, where they got into another smaller boat for the trip to Australia.

The trip was scary, he said, because the boat was in terrible condition and Arzoo could not swim.

None of the three Indonesian crew, including a teenage boy, seemed to know where they were.

"I asked him, 'Are we in Australia?' and the captain said, 'Yes'. But when I asked him later, 'Are we in Indonesia?' he said 'Yes'," Mr Bahram said. "We were lost."

Mr Bahram first sought asylum here in 1999. He was working as a camera operator for the Wahdat party in Afghanistan and coming under increasing pressure for his involvement in a social and cultural group called Machid Art, in which he met friends on Friday nights to write plays, film dramas and play music.

Mr Bahram tells a harrowing story of being pursued by mullahs over a film he made with Machid about the plight of Hazaras in Afghanistan, Broken Night, and a drama he helped write urging better leadership in Afghanistan entitled Gamshuda.

Local young men were warned by mujaheddin not to associate with them, and soon a leaflet was being distributed describing their activities as "not Muslim", Mr Bahram said.

"It said this group is not Muslim because they are watching a movie, making a movie, showing a movie," hesaid.

He fled to Pakistan after receiving threatening letters from a local leader, who was in the Taliban.

There, he paid a Pakistani people-smuggler $6000 for a journey to Australia that included two days locked in a basement in Bali.

He spent a year at Woomera, which he said he prefers not to speak about, and was living on a temporary protection visa when he learned that his friend from Machid Art, Qais, had been murdered.

He said the death of his brother and sister in a bomb blast from US troops put him under pressure to return, and he accepted $1800 from the International Organisation for Migration to help get home. "I thought things might be different with the new leaders but it was not," Mr Bahram said.

He knew he would be killed when he saw a "night notice" on a mosque wall referring to him and his former activities. "It said I had ins Read the full story

Sympathy for the devil: Fighting to release John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban

Thursday 0 comments

telegraph Seven years after John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban, was jailed for fighting for the enemy in Afghanistan, his parents are still battling a tide of public hatred, convinced their son was harshly treated

Bright stems of grass surround the ancient fortress of Qala-i-Jangi, its pale walls rising like a natural feature north of Mazar-i-Sharif, the medieval city at the northern tip of Afghanistan. Known as the Noble Shrine, it is a place where Shia and Sunni Muslims come to pay their respects at the tomb of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Mohammed’s son-in-law. This is Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek country, forever hostile to the Pashtun Taliban who once ruled this ruined state. It is spring now and the snows have fled. But there was one terrible winter just over seven years ago when all sense of nobility was lost.

It was here that the world had its first glimpse of John Walker Lindh as he emerged on December 1, 2001, from the basement of the Qala-i-Jangi fortress, bedraggled and wounded, after one of the bloodiest episodes of the so-called war on terror. America was stunned – not that Lindh had survived, but that one of their countrymen had been fighting for the enemy.

Less than two months after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, the US military operation in Afghanistan that was a response to the 9/11 attacks, two CIA men, Mike Spann and Dave Tyson, had appeared in the prison courtyard to interrogate the inmates over possible links with al-Qaeda. The prisoners had concealed weapons; someone grabbed a grenade, then all hell broke loose. The prisoners quickly overpowered their guards and then executed Spann, who became the first American to die in this latest war for Afghanistan. By the time the shooting died down, scores of soldiers from both the Taliban and their traditional enemies, the Northern Alliance, were lying dead and the surviving prisoners had retreated to a basement. The alliance soldiers dropped artillery rockets into the basement, poured in oil and fired bullets. When they flooded it with icy water, scores were drowned. It took the Northern Alliance fighters, along with their British and American special forces allies, a week to quell the uprising, leaving only 86 prisoners alive out of the original 300.

Few can forget the iconic image of John Walker Lindh, hidden behind dirt, a beard and wild hair ripped free of his turban. The media dubbed him the 'American Taliban’. A volunteer for the Taliban army, he was an eager convert to Islam who had strayed from his studies in Yemen and Pakistan. Like thousands of others he fled the American advance into Afghanistan. His Taliban commander had bartered with the Northern Alliance to allow safe passage back towards Pakistan in return for surrender. Instead, the Northern Alliance had taken them prisoner.

Yaser Hamdi, a Saudi-American national who was captured with Lindh, and held for almost three years without charge before being released back to his homeland, offers an alternative view of the battle of Mazar-i-Sharif: 'They called it an uprising, and it was not – it was some kind of massacre. It was 24 hours of asking Allah for help. Men crying out, men who were wounded, men who were sick, men who were dying. The Koran tells you how to pray in all situations. People there who couldn’t move and couldn’t turn to face Mecca still prayed. They prayed until they died.’

Within a day Lindh was strapped naked to a stretcher inside – according to his lawyers at his later trial – a freezing shipping container, in handcuffs so tight they cut off circulation, and the word 'Shithead’ scrawled on his blindfold. The lawyers also contended that it was two weeks before medics even treated the bullet wound in his thigh, and that for almost six weeks Lindh was held incommunicado, despite repeated attempts by them and the Red Cross to reach him, while he was interrogated. Prosecutors maintained that Lindh was properly looked after. Today he sits in the Federal Correctional Complex at Terre Haute, Indiana, serving a 20-year prison sentence for 'supplying services’ to the Taliban.

Born in Washington, DC, in 1981, John Lindh was an intelligent child, good at languages and music. His parents – Frank, a social worker turned lawyer, and Marilyn, a photographer (they are now separated) – encouraged his interests. But he was a shy, solitary boy, who was home-schooled for a time because of chronic diarrhoea, most likely caused by a parasite. For a man who would later go to fight for the misogynistic Taliban, John was surrounded by strong women. In addition to having a close bond with his mother and his paternal grandmother, Kate, he was also very close to his sister, Naomi, eight years his junior.

'One of my favourite games I used to play with John was with this huge world map we had,’ Naomi, now 20, says. 'John would say the name of a country and I would have to find it on the map. He made it pretty difficult; he would mention countries I’d never heard of, like Kyrgyzstan. What 16-year-old boy knows where Kyrgyzstan is?’

Marilyn stayed at home with John and his older brother, Connell, while her husband was finishing law school. A short time later, his father landed a job in San Francisco. John became reclusive; he wouldn’t hang out with other children his age. The major turning point of his young life came when he went to see the film Malcolm X. The movie’s scene at the Hajj – showing all Muslims coming together – prompted John, then 12, to begin exploring Islam. He decided to convert (or 'revert’ as Muslims call it) when he turned 16. He went to the Islamic Centre in nearby Mill Valley in late 1997 and took the shahada (conversion ritual).

His parents didn’t find out until sometime later when a friend from the mosque called asking for 'Suleyman’, his new Arabic name. It was a surprise, but his parents tolerated this decision and, according to his father, even welcomed it. 'He was very moved by that image of people coming together very peacefully,’ Frank Lindh says. 'When John converted to Islam, I did not regard it as a negative thing at all.’

'I don’t remember thinking it was weird,’ Naomi adds. 'I was too young to know what it was. I wasn’t even fazed when he began to dress traditionally. Kids at school thought it was bizarre, though.’

Lindh’s journey towards Afghanistan began in earnest when he joined the San Francisco branch of the global missionary Islamic group Tablighi Jama’at, which means 'a group that propagates the faith’. Lindh asked his parents to let him attend the Yemeni Language Centre in Sana’a, Yemen, so he could learn Arabic. It would be the only way, he told them, that he could become a teacher-scholar in the tradition of Islam. At that time Yemen wasn’t associated with terrorism.

He left America in July 1998, came home for 10 months, and then returned to continue his studies. The Yemen Language Centre was full of foreign students who had travelled just so they could party, so he decided to look for another school where studies were taken more seriously. He transferred to the Al-Imam Islamic University of Sana’a for a total Arabic-immersion programme.

By the autumn of 2000, Lindh’s Arabic was good enough to allow him to take the next step: memorisation of the 30 chapters of the Koran, which is a goal for many Muslims (making them a hafiz). For that, he decided, he needed to go to a madrassa (Islamic school) in Pakistan. He travelled around Pakistan for a couple of months and then attended a conference of the Tablighi Jama’at in Lahore before his Koran classes began. During late-night conversations, the other students told Lindh that if he really wanted to be a good Muslim he should go and fight in Kashmir. By standing alongside Muslim brothers fighting for an Islamic homeland, he would achieve religious peace.

In the summer of 2001, all his parents knew was that their son was escaping the heat by going up to the mountains for a couple of months. He told them not to worry. 'In Bannu, it’s starting to heat up,’ he wrote in an email. 'And Indian heat is not like Californian heat. I haven’t decided 100 per cent where I’ll go, but this should be worked out in the next two weeks. I’ll try to keep in touch, but in the mountains I may not have email access so I could end up sending you a letter or calling you before I go, then keep in contact by way of postal mail until the end of the summer.’ To his parents, this sounded like a reasonable plan.

'John was missing for seven months,’ says Frank Lindh, a tall, dignified man. We are sitting at the boardroom table of a swish San Franciscan lawyer’s office; to his right is Marilyn, John’s mother. 'We got an email in April [2001] saying he was going up into the mountains of Pakistan. He didn’t tell us he was going into Afghanistan. And from that time until he came to our attention via the media, we had no contact with him, and no idea where he was.’

Marilyn, a pale, elfin figure, says that a cousin saw a blurred image on a news website and asked her, 'Do you think this is John?’'That was Saturday, December 1,’ Frank says. 'And that’s when I started to contact people. If they had called him a child rapist, it couldn’t have been worse. He was a traitor, a traitor to them. Something about John’s journey, his conversion to Islam, the fact it was so close to 9/11, there was this kind of hysteria really.’

On learning of his capture, Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, personally ordered John Lindh’s interrogators to 'take the gloves off’, according to government documents later released during the Abu Ghraib investigations. The country’s highest legal officer, Attorney General John Ashcroft, repeatedly called him a 'terrorist’ during press conferences. Rumsfeld also claimed (falsely) that he had been taken with an AK-47 in his hands. Senator John McCain said he should be taken to the site of the 9/11 attacks 'to see how he felt’. New York’s mayor Rudolf Giuliani said Lindh should get the death penalty. All this before Lindh had even stepped inside a courtroom.

'He was facing several life sentences,’ Marilyn says. 'And a jury pool that was completely biased against him,’ Frank interjects. The judge had decided to hold the trial on the first anniversary of 9/11, in a courthouse five miles from the site of the attack on the Pentagon.

The media camped outside the family’s home in Marin County, California, where John had spent most of his teenage years and where they had all lived together until Frank announced his homosexuality in 1997. The family were still close, however, and Frank and Marilyn watched events unfold with disbelief. 'My life came apart and my family was under siege,’ Marilyn says. 'Everyone keeps trying to find out what was wrong with John. Nothing was wrong with John. Everyone tried to blame us. Nothing is wrong with our family. Instead this was the most striking example I have ever seen of demonising someone who doesn’t see things the same way as other people.’

Frank says the support of friends, colleagues at the state’s energy company where he worked as a corporate lawyer, was vital in keeping him sane. It was harder for Marilyn. 'I was like a vampire, only going out at night, because I was crying all the time,’ she says. 'It was just too hard to be in public and also because, after we had been in the media, we were recognised…’ she trails off.

Were they worried for their safety?

'I was,’ Marilyn says. 'For a period of time in the early days I was getting lots of phone calls and hate mail. One said, “You should be shot with the same gun they use to shoot your son.”’

They sought access, repeatedly denied, to their captured son. Meanwhile the father of Mike Spann was campaigning for Lindh’s death.

Mike Spann was a family man, a former Marine, a hero who would stop at nothing in his quest to guarantee freedom. He was shot in the head, overpowered as he tried to interrogate Taliban prisoners, including John Lindh, at Qala-i-Jangi.

Spann’s father became a fixture at the courthouse, demanding justice. At one point Frank Lindh approached him at the close of a pre-trial hearing, held out his hand 'as one father to another’, and said something to the effect of 'John had nothing to do with Mike’s death.’ Spann Sr bristled and walked away. 'I should have taken out some of my revenge on him,’ he said later.

At the trial in Virginia in September 2002, it was specifically mentioned during the judge’s summing up that John Walker Lindh did not shoot Mike Spann. In his court statement, Lindh apologised for his actions, and attempted to offer the explanation that Frank even to this day finds comforting: he was a traveller, a voyager in search of a deeper understanding of his religion, who was naive or tricked into joining a despotic regime.

'I went to Afghanistan because I believed it was my religious duty to assist my fellow Muslims militarily in their jihad against the Northern Alliance,’ Lindh said in a statement to the court as he was sentenced in October 2002. 'I felt that I had an obligation to assist what I perceived to be an Islamic liberation movement against the warlords who were occupying several provinces in Northern Afghanistan. I had heard reports of massacres, child rape, torture and castration… I went to Afghanistan with the intention of fighting against terrorism and oppression, not to support it.’

Details of Lindh’s adventures emerged during the trial. In the mountainous border stretching between Pakistan and Afghanistan, he had passed through the old smuggling town of Peshawar, where in May 2001 he showed up at a recruiting centre for the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), a Kashmiri separatist group considered a terrorist organisation by the US. At the end of June 2001 he left the HUM camp and crossed into Afghanistan. At Kandahar, he was directed to al-Farooq, a training camp funded by Osama bin Laden.

There Lindh had met bin Laden, but he said he had not realised who bin Laden was and that he found his speeches 'boring’. He was offered martyrdom operations, but had rejected becoming a terrorist and instead wanted to fight for the Taliban army – just like other Americans had done, for other powers in other wars, in the past. And so Lindh ended up in al-Ansar, the foreign section of the Taliban army, hoping to fight against the equally brutal warlords of the Northern Alliance. He was with them when the bombs began to fall from US planes on Qala-i-Jangi.

As the defence was getting ready to call Lindh’s captors to give evidence, there was a last-minute offer of a plea bargain from the government’s lawyers. If Lindh withdrew claims that he had been mistreated or tortured by US military personnel in Afghanistan and aboard two military ships during December 2001 and January 2002, he would face only two charges. 'The government dropped all terrorism charges, all charges of conspiracy to murder,’ Jim Brosnahan, Lindh’s lawyer, says. 'What was left was the charge that he had violated the trade sanctions imposed on the Taliban by the American government. And for violating those trade sanctions, and for carrying a weapon, because he was a soldier in the army of Afghanistan, he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment.’ In addition, special administrative measures were imposed: no talking to the media, no selling his book, no seeing friends, only limited contact with his family, no speaking Arabic, no letters to or from the outside.

Rohan Gunaratna, a terrorism scholar from Sri Lanka based at the University of St Andrews, interviewed Lindh for more than eight hours at the request of his defence team. He warned them that he believed that Lindh was almost certainly a member of al-Qaeda. The defence, undeterred, pressed him to meet Lindh. The encounter surprised him. 'I have interviewed maybe 200 terrorists over the past few years,’ he told the New Yorker magazine in 2003, 'and I am certain that John Walker Lindh has never been a terrorist, and never intended to be one. A terrorist is a person who conducts attacks against civilian targets. John Walker Lindh never did that. He trained to fight in the Afghan army, against other soldiers. He was not a member of al-Qaeda. Dozens of others whom I’ve met who went to train and fight in Afghanistan also were not part of al-Qaeda.’ Gunaratna believes that Lindh 'presents no national-security threat. He’s been completely misrepresented to the American people.’

Today John Lindh – or Hamza Lindh as he likes to call himself – sits in a medium-security jail in Terre Haute. Last year, he was shunted from Victorville jail in California to Colorado’s Supermax prison, and from there to the mid-west. No journalist has spoken to him since his capture in 2001. Under the special administrative measures, the FBI can read his letters and bug his cell, or his conversations with other inmates. Whenever he spoke Arabic, even a greeting to another prisoner, he was sent to solitary confinement (that restriction has now been lifted).

According to those who have seen him, he has become increasingly devout and spiritual. He helps other Muslim inmates with their understanding of the religion. And he withdraws into himself, to help steel himself to the long years ahead.

Frank Lindh admits that his son 'had the zealous qualities of the recent convert. Of course, like many 20-year-olds, he was very naive about the world: who are the good guys, who are the bad guys. But he’s not a terrorist, nor a terrorist sympathiser.’ He refuses to give up in his quest – he is a one-man campaigner, tirelessly pushing his son’s case.

Yaser Hamdi, who was captured alongside Lindh, was released in October 2004. In December 2007 David Hicks, the so-called 'Australian Taliban’, was freed from Guantanamo Bay. In a deal with the US authorities, Hicks pleaded guilty to the charge of providing material support to a designated terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda). Hicks is now at home with his family, after serving nine months in an Australian prison.

The former chief prosecutor of the Guantanamo Bay trials, Colonel Morris Davis, has given evidence that he faced political pressure to prosecute Hicks, even though he did not want to proceed against him because the charges were not serious enough. The Australian public has proved generally sympathetic to Hicks’s predicament.

Meanwhile, it has been a lonely battle for Frank and Marilyn Lindh. Many Muslim groups have been silent. Although there is now a slow trickle of media support calling for John Lindh’s release, the years stretch ahead. Every year at Christmas, John Lindh’s lawyer, Jim Brosnahan, helps John file a petition for commutation of sentence to the President. Each year it is turned down.

Leaked reports in the US media suggest furious lobbying going on behind the scenes this time around, as George Bush prepares to leave office, with departing Presidents traditionally issuing several pardons on their last day in power.

Speaking just before Christmas, Frank Lindh said, 'When John was first picked up, President Bush was actually the only public official in the United States who spoke in a sympathetic way about John. There was something about John’s situation, his religious conversion and so forth that I think really did touch him… We think that this is the time when the President will revisit those original feelings that he had – the feelings of sympathy – and find it in his heart to release John from prison.’

Marilyn was more circumspect when we last talked. With a fatalistic sigh, she said, 'I just don’t know if anyone will ever be able to tell the true story of John. I don’t think he would anyway. Who’s going to believe him?’

Read the full story

In Kabul, rituals highlight progress

TheN As religious chanting filled the air and cars carrying huge green flags trawled through the muddy streets, Qayum took a moment to think about the future.

“I hear from the people that the Taliban are close to Kabul and they will soon be here,” he said. “If they come and they are very strict like before, then we will fight them.”

The 20-year-old man – who gave only one name – together with the rest of Afghanistan’s minority Shiite community were preparing to commemorate Ashura yesterday with a freedom that may yet again be under threat.

Portraits showing Imam Hussein Ali and banners praising him have dominated the Kabul landscape this past week. At makeshift stalls, volunteers dressed in black have given out tea, hot milk and dates to the public.

Not so long ago such scenes were unthinkable. Under the Sunni-fundamentalist Taliban government, iconic imagery was outlawed and, in a number of provinces, Shiites were slaughtered.

On the surface then, the change has been remarkable, but over it all looms the shadow of a growing insurgency. One recent report by an international think tank claimed the Taliban now have a permanent presence in 72 per cent of Afghanistan, up from 54 per cent in 2007.

Last year was the bloodiest since the US-led invasion, with 151 US soldiers among the dead. According to the Associated Press, at least 850 Afghan police and 1,160 civilians were also killed. Similar or higher levels of violence are expected during the next 12 months.

Mohammed Baqir is from Behsud, an area of Maidan Wardak province where the Shia Hazara community has been involved in fierce land disputes with Pashtun nomads, who some claim are members of the Taliban. For him, even that unrest is a clear sign of the rebels’ spreading influence.

“If we have anything in our hands, we will fight them in Kabul. If the Taliban get here, first of all they will attack us and kill our women and children,” he said.

Ashura comes at the end of a 10-day mourning period that Shiites around the world observe. Accompanied by public displays of self-flagellation, it is held to remember the martyrdom of the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, Imam Hussein.

Mr Baqir, 50, was sitting in front of a cobbler’s in the west of Kabul city while elderly men made their way along the road to a sprawling graveyard on a snow-covered hillside.

“During the Taliban, we were not allowed to hang these posters or put up these flags. The people had to celebrate quietly and the women were not allowed to go to the mosques. Now all the Shias can celebrate in the street, but then it was impossible,” he said.

The discrimination is not only confined to one period in Afghanistan’s history. Hazaras in particular have traditionally been regarded as best suited for the more menial jobs this impoverished society has to offer, working as cleaners and servants.

Now they have representatives in parliament and if a presidential election takes place this year, they will inevitably field a candidate who will receive a significant proportion of the national vote.

Not everyone, though, is happy with the amount of progress that has been made under the government of Hamid Karzai, the president.

Sher Mohammed took a break from handing out tea to list his complaints.

“Life has changed by about 50 per cent. If you go farther into this area you will see there is no electricity for the Shia people. And lots of organisations have promised to give us wood to build our houses, but they haven’t done that yet,” he said.

These concerns stretch across any ethnic and religious lines that remain, with high unemployment and a lack of basic infrastructure adding to the fears all Afghans have about the future. In a country where everyday survival is a struggle, optimism does not last long.

“It’s not important for us who is in the government or how many of its members are Shia,” Mr Mohammed said. “We just need peace and security. If we are alive and in good health, that is enough for us.” Read the full story

How to stabilise Afghanistan

While opposing the war in Iraq during the US presidential campaign, Barack Obama underlined his determination to pursue the war in Afghanistan with greater vigour. His argument was that the US intervention in Afghanistan was a case of self-defence while Iraq represented an example of pre-emptive war.

It is, therefore, no surprise that as Obama prepares to enter the White House, Afghanistan jumps up the US foreign policy agenda.
However, a case could be argued that Afghanistan no longer deserves the kind of attention that Obama claims he would bestow on it. Any further escalation of US intervention could prove to be counter productive to both American and Afghan interests.

In intervening in Afghanistan in 2001, the US had three key interests. The first was to show that it could not be attacked with impunity. The US had a second interest in invading Afghanistan: destroying the bases from which terror had been exported to the US and, where possible, capturing or killing the masterminds.

The US' third interest was to help Afghans create a government of their choice in the hope that it would prevent the re-emergence of terrorist bases. By 2005, all those objectives had been achieved.
By the end of 2005, the US would have been able to declare victory in Afghanistan and start reducing its military footprint in preparation for full disengagement. However, American policy pursued several illusions.

The first was that Afghanistan could develop a system of highly centralised government headed by a US-style president and a strong executive. The system developed in Afghanistan since 2002 has gone in the opposite direction.
The Afghan president today has powers that no Afghan king ever dreamt of. The problem is that these powers cannot be used without provoking violent resistance from a majority of Afghans.

In Afghanistan, the US and its allies have been dragged into a multi-layered civil war in which the new elite led by Hamid Karzai is fighting to preserve its power against a variety of rivals from the Pushtun community that, accounting for some 40 per cent of the population, constitutes the country's largest ethnic component.

A majority of the Tajiks, some 32 per cent of the population, and the Uzbeks, some 10 per cent of the population, and the Hazara Shiites, another 10 per cent, have decided to stay on the sidelines if only because they have no dog in this race.

They see no reason why they should fight for the Karzai regime that, using US power, has marginalised them.
The trouble is that the new ruling elite, including the bloated and corrupt bureaucracy and the slick-looking but inefficient military is also reluctant to do the dirty work necessary, leaving all that to the Americans and their Western allies.
The new elite has developed a room-service mentality, persuaded that all it needs to do is to ring the bell for the Americans to do the job.
The backbone of the current insurgency in Afghanistan consists of Pushtun tribes, especially in the southwestern provinces that have been excluded from power. These tribes would have fought any central government that ignored their voice.
Thus their campaign should not be seen as part of an anti-American resistance. The US and its allies cannot win this war because the Karzai clan lacks the tribal support needed to defeat the insurgency.

While the Taliban provide leadership for part of the insurgency in some sectors of the Pushtun heartland, it would be wrong to ignore other groups and clans involved in this power struggle.

Ethnic revolt
The Pushtun ethnic revolt and its ideological manifestation through the Taliban is only part of the insurgency. Iran is also using a number of Pushtun groups under the umbrella of Hizb Islami (The Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to divide the Pushtuns and weaken Karzai's US-backed administration.

The Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI, is also running a number of armed Pushtun tribes in the hope that, once the Americans have left, Islamabad will not be left without a lever to influence Afghan politics.
To complicate matters further, we also have a number of freelance Mujahedeen, such as the group led by Mullah Jalaluddin Haqqani, now ill and believed to be dying.

A third strand to the insurgency is represented by a dozen or so armed gangs recruited and financed by the drug barons in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Often, these groups use the label of Taliban to secure tribal and/or religious legitimacy. It is obvious that the US, or indeed any other outside power, cannot win a clear-cut victory against groups capable of waging low intensity war on small budgets for decades.
The US has been dragged into yet another war, this time with an international dimension. In 2001 Afghanistan sheltered scores of Islamist terror organisations from more than 40 countries across the globe. These had no specifically anti-US agendas but ended up targeted by the American-led coalition in Afghanistan.

To be sure, the US cannot just pull the plug and walk away. But it can make its continued presence conditional to the implementation of a political strategy. This should include constitutional changes to decentralise power in Afghanistan, perhaps by developing a loose parliamentary system similar to the one that has succeeded in Iraq.
That would enable the Pushtun malcontents, including segments of the Taliban, to receive a share of power. Pakistan should also be reassured that it will not be excluded from the Afghan scene and that old Afghan chauvinism will not be used against it.
All the nations that have benefited from the destruction of terror groups in Afghanistan should be asked to make proper contributions backed by the assertion that the US is not prepared to fight their wars forever.

Amir Taheri's new book 'The Persian Night' will be published next week.

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North-south security divide could sway Afghan vote

REUTERS A troubling north-south security divide could affect the outcome of Afghanistan's presidential election this year, a poll official warned on Monday, with voters still to be registered in some of the most dangerous provinces.

Voter registration in southern Afghanistan, where NATO-led and Afghan forces are struggling against a resurgent Taliban, will start in two weeks. If security does not improve, fewer people in the south would be expected to vote than in the north.

"Because security is better in the central and northern part of the country, turnout most probably will be higher, and turnout in the south, if the security situation has not changed, will be lower," Zekria Barakzai, deputy chief electoral officer at the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, told Reuters.

An exact date for the poll has not yet been set.

The geographic spread of voters could be a deciding factor in the outcome of the vote in Afghanistan, where long-standing and complex ethnic, tribal and local rivalries often pit one village or tribe against another.

The relatively secure north is home to a mainly Tajik population, as well as significant numbers of Hazara, a Shi'ite minority who were persecuted under the Sunni Muslim Taliban.

The south and east, on the frontline of the fight against Islamist insurgents, are predominantly Pashtun, one of Afghanistan's largest ethnic groups.

"The big challenge of the election will be security. The north-south divide will be an issue, and we want to avoid that, we want to provide equal opportunity to every citizen of Afghanistan," Barakzai said.

"We are in a traditional country. In Afghanistan, things will not change overnight and it will take time for people to choose personalities and not by their ethnicity," he said.

SO FAR, SO GOOD

The fourth and final round of voter registration, which starts in two weeks, covers the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Oruzgan and Nimroz, where more than 18,000 foreign troops are battling Taliban insurgents.

"Our concerns are security-affected areas in the east and south, but we will do everything possible to make universal elections," Barakzai said

He said 650,000 people, 34 percent of them women, had registered so far in phase three which is underway in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan's lawless tribal areas.

"Phase three is going very well and beyond our expectations," Barakzai said.

Five electoral workers were kidnapped during the third phase of registration. All were released with the help of the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army, Barakzai said.

He attributed the relatively smooth process in the east to "community outreach" and engagement with local elders and religious leaders. He said he wanted to follow the same pattern

in phase four in the southern provinces.

Turnout was high for Afghanistan's last presidential election in 2004, when President Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun who was born in Kandahar, faced the ballot for the first time.

However Barakzai said he did not expect a similar high turnout for this year's election. He said its success would also depend on the credibility of Karzai's opponents.

"The turnout will not be like 2004 but we will try our best to encourage people to participate in the process ... if the competition is tough then turnout will be higher," he said.

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Fighting in Afghanistan, the wrong war

TPM One of the clichés of Obama's presidential election campaign was that the invasion of Iraq was the wrong war, but that the war in Afghanistan is the right one. After all, Afghanistan served as a haven for terrorists. Indeed, Obama and Biden call for a surge of troops in Afghanistan, as the Taliban is making a comeback. However, the attempt to impose a regime change on Afghanistan is failing and very likely to continue to fail, all the while causing more and more Afghan, American, and other casualties.

The main reason is that a conventional army is no match for guerrilla forces, especially when they can rely on a safe haven right across the border. The Taliban dress like civilians, are supplied by civilians, and are housed in civilian homes. When the US attacks them -- using the means of modern warfare -- it inevitably ends up killing civilians, including women and children. The notion that if the US used more ground forces and less planes and artillery there would be fewer casualties is a valid one--as far as the Afghans are concerned. But many more Americans, Britons and French are going to be lost this way. Using airpower undermines the support of the war by the Afghans; using ground troops undermines the support of the war by America's allies, and soon--by Americans.

Moreover, given that the forces of the Pakistani government seem unable to control the tribal areas that border Afghanistan and provide a haven for the Taliban, the United States is increasingly embroiled in a third war in Pakistan. This engagement causes still more civilian causalities. It further antagonizes the Pakistani people, the citizens of a nation -- one must never forget -- that has nuclear bombs which can be acquired by terrorists, a combination that is our number one security nightmare.

What must be done? The number one lesson from Iraq is that what worked was not the surge but (a) working with local tribes and their militias, especially the Sunnis and the Kurds, but also various Shia groups. This involved dealing directly with the tribal chiefs or sheiks, and not some elected official in Bagdad who was handpicked by Americans. (b) The relative success also entailed allowing the Iraqi forces to carry more of the burden, whether they were fully prepared or not, and granting them various kinds of American help - in communications, transportation, intelligence, and even fire power -when asked for.

In Afghanistan, the United States has been trying to impose a national government and ignore or remove tribal chiefs, who command strong and sizable local militias. Noah Feldman, one of the savviest observers of the Middle East, recently pointed out that the tribes are not a "natural vehicle" for building loyalty to the central gonvment. Surprisingly, he concluded from this valid obervation that we should throw our lot in with the central govenemnt, which is teereing. Richard Holbrooke--still in the running for a job in the Obama administration--is chiding Karzai for not getting out of his bunker in Kabul and for not arresting the tribal chiefs. This is like chiding a new kid on the block for not taking down the street gangs.

The opposite course is much more likely to work. The time has come to realize that Afghanistan, even more than Iraq, is a tribal society composed of different ethnic groups, each dominating one part of the country. These groups and their troops were the forces that liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban in the first place, not the American ones. (Remember the Northern Alliance? It was an alliance of five different ethnic and religious groups, mostly Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara). These same tribes are best now called upon to take responsibility for various parts of the country--with American support when asked for. (To the extent that the United States finally chose a tribe to work with, it chose the wrong one. It is siding with the Hazaras, who are Shia and tied to Iran, and are a small minority--against the largest tribe, the Pashtuns, who are Sunnis with ties to Paksitan, the lesser of two evils.)

The result will not be the picture perfect prosperous democracy that neocons have been dreaming about. It is not in the cards anyhow. Indeed, as it is, the Afghan government is becoming ever more corrupt, increasingly controlled by opium exporting mafias, a new nacro-terrorism state. However, a coalition of the major tribes--each represented by their chiefs, chosen the way these tribes have chosen leaders for centuries--would go a long way toward stabilizing the country. Casualties would decline, especially among civilians, as it is much easier for the locals to tell who is who. And these tribes will understand that if their country again provides a haven for terrorists, they will face more rounds of bombing and missile attacks. The rest they will have to duke out with each other, as they have been doing since the beginning of history.

All this may seem like a minimalist agenda, but if one recalls the alternatives--especially in terms of the number of killed children and women, as well as some of our own youngsters--one realizes that this is about as good as it is going to get for now.

Amitai Etzioni is a professor of international relations at The George Washington University. For more discussion, see Security First (Yale 2007). To contact him, write icps@gwu.edu. www.securityfirstbook.com

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Afghan Shiites Embrace New Acceptance

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For the past week, caravans of cars have raced triumphantly around the Afghan capital, trailing huge green and red banners. Overpasses are draped with black cloth, and loudspeakers blare hypnotic religious chants punctuated with the slow rhythm of clanking chains.

This is Muharram, the 10-day period of ritual mourning -- including emotional bouts of chest-beating and self-flagellation -- observed by Shiites throughout the world in remembrance of Imam Hussein and other Shiite martyrs who died defending their faith in the 7th century.
But in Afghanistan, a Sunni-dominated country where Shiites have been a despised and oppressed minority during many periods of history, this Muharram is being observed with new boldness and political acceptance. It is a dramatic sign of the rapid emergence of Shiism under democratic rule in the seven years since the overthrow of the ultraconservative Sunni Taliban

"I think the current situation is the best Shiites in Afghanistan have ever had. We not only have more freedom, but our rights to worship are specified in the constitution," said Syed Hussein Alemi Balkhi, a Shiite cleric and member of parliament. Moreover, Sunnis are now coordinating with Shiites in observing Muharram. "They celebrate it a little differently than we do, but we respect each other," he said.

Shiites still make up less than 25 percent of the Afghan populace, which is nearly all Muslim. Many Shiites, especially the ethnic Hazaras, remain isolated in some of the most impoverished regions of the country, such as Daikundi and Bamian provinces. Here in the capital, many Hazaras are still relegated by tradition to such menial jobs as domestic servants or handcart pullers, who strain like animals under loads of furniture or commercial cargo.

But since the departure of the Taliban, which forcibly suppressed Shiism as un-Islamic, tens of thousands of Shiites have returned from exile in next-door Iran, many bringing professional skills and modernized civic views. Young Shiite women are generally more emancipated than Sunni women here, and female voter turnout in the 2004 national elections was highest by far in Shiite districts.

Shiites have now been elected to parliament from numerous provinces and appointed to various government posts. One of the most prominent young Shiite leaders of the post-Taliban era was former commerce minister Sayed Mustafa Kazemi, who was killed in a suicide bombing last year while visiting a factory in Baghlan province, north of Kabul.

During the current Muharram celebrations, portraits of Kazemi have appeared among the posters of Imam Hussein, his martyred relatives and Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini in the markets and mosques of West Kabul's Shiite district. So have images of the late Abdul Ali Mazari, an Islamist Afghan militia leader who fought the Soviets and the Taliban. Revered by Afghan Shiites, Mazari was also known as an exceptionally cruel and ruthless commander.

The Shiite emergence here has been openly aided by the government of Iran, which has built mosques, gymnasiums and a brand-new university in Kabul, a complex of soaring blue-tiled domes and towers. This boon is viewed as a worrisome development by some Afghans, who mistrust Iran's intentions and fear that its Shiite theocracy seeks to gain undue influence over Afghanistan and weaken its government.

Local Shiite leaders, however, say they have no intention of allowing that to happen. They say that they have more open, democratic political views than their counterparts in Iran and that they have few illusions about Iran's motives toward its poorer neighbor that is being protected by U.S. troops and rebuilt with Western aid.

"There is no doubt that people are concerned about Iran's influence here," said Balkhi, who received his religious education in Iran but brought his family home shortly after the Taliban fell. "We know Iran does not want to see Afghanistan develop socially, economically or militarily, but our officials tell us they have not seen any evidence that Iran is trying to disturb our peace and stability. What we want is to be good neighbors."

This Muharram will mark the third year in a row that Afghan officials, including senior Sunni leaders, will worship with Shiites on the climactic 10th day, called Ashura. And although many Sunnis disapprove of the Shiite chest-beating known as matam, some Sunni leaders have fasted and offered meals to the poor this week.

There are fears that Taliban insurgents may attempt to sabotage these rites with a suicide bombing or other attack, and police protection has been heavy this week around Shiite mosques in Kabul where men and boys gather to pray, chant, weep and beat their chests in a ritual fervor of grief that is expected to build to a climax by Ashura.
But many of the Shiite faithful, feeling newly empowered this week as they displayed their faith with flags hoisted high above the snow- and mud-choked capital, said nothing can deter them now.

"We feel more free and proud than ever before," said Ghulam Hazrat, 32, a laborer in shabby clothes who was preparing to enter a Shiite shrine Saturday and participate in the chest-beating ritual. "During Taliban time, the only place we could celebrate Muharram was in our basements. Now we are out on the streets for everyone to see."

Washington Post Foreign Service Read the full story

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Wilkins: The voice of silence

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ICT As we enter the deep cold of winter (especially if you live in Minnesota!), it is a good time to pause and reflect.

If the goal of life for a native person is maturity, as Vine Deloria once said, what are some of the steps we might take to help us achieve a measure of maturity before we attain elder status, assuming we make it to that exalted period in our lives?

A liberal education is often cited as a key pathway to maturity, especially if by liberal education we mean “fitness for the world,” as J. H. Newman put it. Of course, educational standards throughout Indian country – since the boarding school period forward – and in the United States more broadly, have never been much to brag about. Education today is mired in a “teaching to the test” mentality that is certainly not conducive to true maturity, where it should be focused on nurturing the unique personality of every individual student.

A person who faithfully adheres to religious/spiritual traditions is also sometimes considered a more mature individual, although this assertion is more easily challenged than the educational dimension when one witnesses how constraining, discriminatory, and downright deadly many religious fundamentalists have been throughout history and still are today (e.g., Salem Witchcraft trials and executions in the 1600s; the cultural genocide imposed by federal law and carried out by federally-funded Christian missionaries in Indian country in the 19th and early 20th centuries; or the Taliban of Afghanistan who violently abuse the rights of Afghan women and have committed genocidal acts against the Hazaras, a Shia Muslim ethnic group in the late 20th century.)

Being part of a strong family unit, preferably with an extended family network that emphasizes such values as generosity, compassion, respect, and love, is certainly a contributing factor in the development of a mature individual and a mature society, for that matter. And when such a family unit, however large or small, is wedded to a particular sacred place where one’s native language (assuming it has survived) is relied on to transmit core values, conduct ceremonies, and produce the songs that link us with the spirits and our ancestors, this, too, surely contributes to a deeper maturity – at both the individual, family, clan and national level.

Quiet pauses enable us to fuse our thoughts, however momentarily, in a way that aids in healing and deep reflection.


Language and orality are vital cogs in the development of our individual and collective identities. When we are singing songs, telling stories, or simply conversing with one another, we are developing skills, creating and negotiating relationships, and carrying on and exercising values that contribute to our maturity.
There is an even more impressive language force – silence – that contributes or could contribute, even more to our maturation. This is a dimension our ancestors relied on and trusted in far more than we do in our ever more helter-skelter lives.

But what is silence? Is it the mere absence of words or sound? Or is it a sound itself? Simon and Garfunkel in their early 1960s hit, “The Sound of Silence,” focused on a meaning that seems to predominate in our society – that silence implies apathy, or a lack of communication. They sang: “Silence like a cancer grows. Hear my words that I might teach you, Take my arms that I might reach you. But my words like silent raindrops fell, and echoed in the wells of silence.”

Language and orality are vital cogs in the development of our individual and collective identities.


For Native peoples, silence historically was understood as a means to convey often profound understandings or revelations. For example, in Frank Waters’ classic work, “The Man Who Killed the Deer,” a brilliant novel about Pueblo life, there is a telling passage that reminded me of the power of silence and of the exquisite role that it once played in Native deliberations, reflecting a heightened degree of maturity. He said, “A Council meeting is one-half talk and one-half silence. The silence has more weight, more meanings, more intonations than the talk. It is angry, impatient, cheerful, but masked by calmness, patience, dignity. Thus the members move evenly together.”

And in another passage he more grippingly described the silence that embraced the Council just after someone had spoken.

“And when the guttural Indian voice finally stops there is silence. A silence so heavy and profound that it squashes the kernel of truth out of his words, and leaves the meaningless husks mercilessly exposed. And still no man speaks. Each waits courteously for another. And the silence grows round the walls, handed from one to another, until all the silence is one silence, and that silence has the meaning of all. So the individuals vanish. It is all one heart. It is the soul of the tribe. A soul that is linked by that other silence with all the souls of all the tribal councils which have sat here in the memory of man.”

Silence, then, is not so much a cancer, as it is enrichment, a unifier, a connector. Certainly, words and oral language are profoundly important, but I wonder whether it might behoove us to practice more moments in family, clan and government that draw from and rely upon silence as much, if not more, than words.

We see evidence of this in commemorative silences where after certain devastating tragedies, like Sept. 11, 2001, we are asked to collectively observe a “moment of silence.” Such quiet pauses enable us to fuse our thoughts, however momentarily, in a way that aids in healing and deep reflection.

Reconnecting with the power of silence will not be easy, living as we do in one of the loudest, most boisterous societies in the world, a society where it is difficult to find a space that is not already inundated by noise. But as Waters’ stunning language shows, silence is indeed a voice of deep profundity and has a power that if rigorously exercised could help us as Native nations and individuals to reclaim aspects of our sacred knowledges and histories that will more comfortably guide us forward.

By
David E. Wilkins, Lumbee, is professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Minnesota. Read the full story

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