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Afghanistan: Women's lives worse than ever

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The Independent, February 25, 2008
By Terri Judd
Violent attacks against females, usually domestic, are at epidemic proportions with 87 per cent of females complaining of such abuse – half of it sexual.
Grinding poverty and the escalating war is driving an increasing number of Afghan families to sell their daughters into forced marriages.

Girls as young as six are being married into a life of slavery and rape, often by multiple members of their new relatives. Banned from seeing their own parents or siblings, they are also prohibited from going to school. With little recognition of the illegality of the situation or any effective recourse, many of the victims are driven to self-immolation – burning themselves to death – or severe self-harm.Six years after the US and Britain "freed" Afghan women from the oppressive Taliban regime, a new report proves that life is just as bad for most, and worse in some cases.

Projects started in the optimistic days of 2002 have begun to wane as the UK and its Nato allies fail to treat women's rights as a priority, workers in the country insist.

The statistics in the report from Womankind, Afghan Women and Girls Seven Years On, make shocking reading. Violent attacks against females, usually domestic, are at epidemic proportions with 87 per cent of females complaining of such abuse – half of it sexual. More than 60 per cent of marriages are forced.

Despite a new law banning the practice, 57 per cent of brides are under the age of 16. The illiteracy rate among women is 88 per cent with just 5 per cent of girls attending secondary school.

Maternal mortality rates – one in nine women dies in childbirth – are the highest in the world alongside Sierra Leone. And 30 years of conflict have left more than one million widows with no enforceable rights, left to beg on the streets alongside an increasing number of orphans. Afghanistan is the only country in the world with a higher suicide rate among women than men.

Campaigners say these are nationwide figures but in war-torn provinces, such as Helmand, the British area of responsibility, oppression is often worse, though the dangers make it impossible for them to monitor it accurately.

The banned practice of offering money for a girl is still rampant – along with exchanging her as restitution for crime, debt or dispute. With the going price for a child bride at £800 to £2,000 – as much as three years salary for a labourer – many grooms are forced to take loans or swap their sisters instead, explained Partawmina Hashemee, the director of the Afghan Women Resource Centre.

Mrs Hashemee, who has fought for the rights of her fellow Afghan women, initially for refugees in Pakistan, for almost 20 years, said: "For me the issue that breaks my heart is the forced marriages because of poverty – even girls as young as eight. They don't get to go to school or to go out. They are told 'you are not allowed to visit your family, we paid, now you have to work'."

In 2007 a law was passed banning marriage under 16, but Mrs Hashemee said: "The majority of people are not even aware of it. Early age marriages are increasing."

The vast majority of international aid goes directly to the Afghan government rather than non-governmental organisations. Activists are calling on the British to ring-fence some of the funding for human rights issues – such as gender-based projects – and to ensure the money reaches appropriate beneficiaries.

Mrs Hashemee said, in Kabul at least, there had been greater recognition of women's rights over the past seven years as well as major civil and political gains since the fall of the Taliban. But it remains a dangerous environment and female MPs, activists and journalists still live under constant threat of death.Womankind is calling for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which says women in conflict zones should be offered protection and recognition of their role in the peace process as well as their human rights. Across Afghanistan women's organisations, such as Mrs Hashemee's, are now turning their attention from providing basic needs to empowering females, teaching them their rights and urging them to vote.

Often illiterate women are instructed on how Islam views women as equal. Training is offered to young men in why sexual abuse is wrong. Communities are being "mobilised" to fight for and monitor women's rights – encouraging mullahs to promote the equality that the Koran teaches.

But there are no women's rights associations in Helmand. The closest is one courageous group working in another southern province, Kandahar. Yet Mrs Hashemee is positive. She said: "I don't want to be disappointed. We will struggle on and hopefully the government and international community will help."

In a report this month the chairman of the International Development Committee, Malcolm Bruce MP, said: "There is a dangerous tendency to accept in Afghanistan practices which would not be countenanced elsewhere, because of 'cultural' differences and local traditions.

"We believe that the rights of women should be upheld equally in all countries. The government of Afghanistan has a vital role to play in this by ensuring that the international human rights commitments which it has made are fully honoured and given greater priority."
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Russian state TV suggests USA involved in drug-trafficking from Afghanistan

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Sott.net, February 17, 2008

TV has broadcast a report containing allegations that US forces are involved in drug-trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe. It also highlighted the problem of drug abuse in the British army.

Russian state-controlled Channel One TV has broadcast a report containing allegations that US forces are involved in drug-trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe. It also highlighted the problem of drug abuse in the British army.The channel's weekly news roundup "Voskresnoye Vremya" on 10 February noted that, according to the UN, the amount of opium being produced in Afghanistan has more than doubled since the coalition troops entered the country.The report went on to show former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair visiting the country at an unspecified time. It said that he had met almost 800 British troops during the visit. "This is either a coincidence or the working of cruel fate, but this is the exact number of soldiers that the British army loses each year because of drug abuse. This is more than the total combat losses of the royal army in Iraq and Afghanistan," the correspondent noted.

The report then featured an extract from a BBC news website story saying that the British army loses a whole battalion of troops a year because of drug abuse (Research revealed that the story was published on 14 December 2007).

The report went on to look at the wider problem of how to reverse the trend of increasing opium production in Afghanistan.

My knowledge of all this comes from my time as British Ambassador in Uzbekistan. I ... watched the Jeeps ... bringing the heroin through from Afghanistan, en route to Europe. I watched the tankers of chemicals roaring into Afghanistan.
The four largest players in the heroin business are all senior members of the Afghan government – the government that our soldiers are fighting and dying to protect.
Craig Murray / The Mail, , July 21, 2007


Aleksandr Mikhaylov, the head of the department of interdepartmental and informational activity at the Russian Drugs Control Agency, was shown saying that economic measures to tackle the problem are foundering on local corruption. "The local authorities draw up seriously forged lists in which an amount is recorded for the amount destroyed and, in fact, the crop has not been destroyed at all. The theft of the money to combat narcotics is going on and is flourishing," he said.

The accusation that US forces are involved in drug-trafficking came from Geydar Dzhemal, chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia. "Without the control and connivance on the part of the special services none of these things are possible. For example in Afghanistan, the CIA and the special services are quite brazen. Under the protection of the American army they meet the necessary people. They collect the stuff, go to the Bagram airbase and they hand in a large consignment of narcotics, which is then taken away," he said. The report went on to say that heroin reached the Balkans via Turkey, which "has been a member of NATO since 1952 and is the USA's closest ally in the region". It said it is "another amazing coincidence" that Kosovo hosts the largest NATO base in Europe. The correspondent added that there is a "secret Interpol post" next to this base. "Here they speak almost openly about Afghan heroin in American planes," he noted.

A man captioned as Marko Nicovic, Interpol employee, explained that 90 per cent of heroin goes through the Albanian mafia, which is now more powerful than the Sicilian mafia. He also alleged that members of this mafia bribe European parliamentarians to support the independence of Kosovo.

In 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, an increase of 17% over last year. The amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined). Favourable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than last year (37.0 kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan produced anextraordinary 8,200 tons of opium (34% more than in 2006) becoming practically the exclusive supplier of the world's deadliest drug (93% of the global opiates market)
Council on Foreign Relations, September 19, 2007


The report went on to link high levels of drug crime in Russia with the US invasion of Afghanistan. "Since the Americans unleashed war on the Taleban, Russian crime labs have been working non-stop," the correspondent observed over footage of a drugs raid and packages of drugs being opened.

Aleksandr Mikhaylov, the head of the department of interdepartmental and informational activity at the Russian Drugs Control Agency, was shown saying that the production of narcotics in Afghanistan is getting more professional and that drugs have taken a real stranglehold on the Afghan economy. "The situation today is that narcotics have become a substance used for barter in Afghanistan," he observed.

"For as long as heroin remains the only hard currency in the country and until NATO and its military coalition do not resolve their own issues, the agricultural proclivities here will hardly change," the correspondent concluded. Read the full story

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Massacre in Mazar-e Sharif 1998

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This report documents the massacre of civilians and other serious breaches of international humanitarian law committed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in August, 1998. The incident, which occurred in Mazar-i Sharif, a city in northern Afghanistan, represents one of the single worst examples of civilian killings in Afghanistan's twenty-year war where At least 8000 Hazaras were singled out and massacred by the Taliban regime. No foreigners or press were allowed in the city or its environs at the time. Human Rights Watch was the first international human rights organization to interview survivors who have reached Pakistan in the weeks following the massacre.Human Rights Watch conducted the interviews for this report in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta, Pakistan. The eyewitnesses they spoke to included residents of Mazar-i Sharif who were Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara. The witnesses had lived in different neighborhoods of the city. Some had stayed in the city for several weeks after the Taliban takeover; others had left within a few days. Most had arrived in Pakistan after several weeks of travel inside Afghanistan.

Their testimonies about the events in Mazar-i Sharif from August 8 through early September are consistent in the depiction of the patterns of attack by the advancing Taliban troops, the systematic nature of the search operations, the sorting of prisoners at the jail, and the transport of prisoners. All of those who remained in the city after the first day separately witnessed summary executions of men and boys as they were being taken from their homes or while being transported to the jail. All of them also heard one or more of Governor Niazi's speeches that, while they varied somewhat in content, reflected consistent themes of anti-Shi'ism and revenge for the 1997 killings.

Human Rights Watch also interviewed sources in nongovernmental organizations and in the diplomatic community who have monitored and documented the events in Mazar. Information provided by these sources is consistent with the patterns described by eyewitnesses

Abductions and Rape of Women:

Human Rights Watch has also received persistent reports that women and girls, particularly in certain Hazara neighborhoods of Mazar-i Sharif, including Saidabad, Karte Ariana, and Ali Chopan were raped and abducted during the Taliban takeover of the city and that their whereabouts remain unknown.

A witness living in Kamaz camp stated that some of the Taliban took young women from the camp at the same time that they were arresting men. She knew of four or five girls who were taken from the camp, all in their early twenties. A witness from the neighborhood of Karte Ariana told Human Rights Watch that she had seen teen-age girls in the area being pushed into the Taliban's Pijaro cars and taken to an unknown destination.

A male medical student who worked and lived in one of the city hospitals for twenty days straight after the takeover stated that he saw one rape case during that time. A Hazara woman, who was a nurse, and her sister had walked to the hospital from Ali Chopan.

"The nurse was in a very bad shape, she had sharp stomach pains. I could not examine her because the hospital was full of Talibs. This was a day before they segregated the hospital and put women in the children's building. I just asked a few questions and finally she said that she was raped by the Talibs. She did not say which ones. We could not talk long with the Talibs watching. I could not do much, I just gave her analgesics."

Another witness tells this story, "An acquaintance of ours came to our house seven or eight days after the takeover. She became ill in our house because she had taken over twenty pills to kill herself, I don't know what kind. We called doctors from the neighborhood who gave her something to wash out her stomach. She lived in Ali Chopan, but her family was staying elsewhere, and she had gone back to check on the house when she was picked up by the Taliban. At first she did not want to tell us anything, but then she said that when she went to their house, the Talibs abducted her and locked her up in a house with twenty to twenty-five other young girls and women. They were raped every night. They were all Hazaras. She was the only one released. One Talib told her that now they are halal [sanctified], and she should go to his parents in Qandahar and wait for him to come and marry her. He gave her a pass and his own identity card and told her to go to the Taliban's headquarters and from there to Qandahar, but instead she escaped."

The difficulties inherent in documenting such attacks on women are many. The refugees from Mazar-i Sharif are scattered throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. The where abouts of abducted women and girls remain unknown. Rape victims are unlikely to seek medical attention unless their injuries are severe. They are often reluctant to report their assaults because of the shame and stigma that they may bear as a result, and Afghan women coping with upheaval and the loss of family members in particular may fear the added worry of being identified as rape victims. Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch received consistent and reliable reports of abuses against women and thus underscored the need for an investigation that is prepared to examine the full range of reported violations, including sexual violence.

Attacks on Civilians fleeing Mazar:

A source interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that there were most likely BM-21 Grad (Hail) multiplerocket launchers, commonly known as Katyushas used in the taking of Mazar. An unknown number of civilians on the road were also killed when they were bombed by Taliban airplanes; witnesses stated that the bombs scattered hundreds of grenade-sized munitions over a wide area on the road.

In one such incident, witnesses said that rockets hit an area called Tangi Shadyan on the southern outskirts of the city at about 12:00 p.m., killing at least fifty. Cars and trucks carrying people were struck, and one witness stated that "people were in pieces" along the road. A witness who left immediately when the Taliban arrived told Human Rights Watch that he and his family carried with them nine bodies of a family that had been killed in a rocket attack on the road, including two women, three men, and four small children, and buried them in farmland on the way to the mountains.

Eye Witness Testimonies : [2]

A witness whose testimony is described as "extremely reliable" by aid officials said most of the victims had been shot in the head, the chest and the testicles. Others had been slaughtered in what he called "the halal way" - by having their throats slit.

One housewife, who has since fled to Pakistan, said the Taliban entered her house and shot her husband and her two brothers dead. Then they cut the men's throats in front of the woman and her children.

Another piece of testimony explained why one Taliban was "very worried he might be excluded from heaven". He had personally shot people in nearly 30 houses, opting to kill them as soon as they opened the door. After killing the men in two homes, he learnt that they were not Hazara but Pashtun. "That he had killed people in 28 Hazara households seemed not to cause him any concern at all," the witness said.

The Human Rights Watch report and other statements identify three Taliban leaders who appear to be guilty of incitement to kill victims purely because of their ethnic origin. They are:

Mullah Manon Niazi, the new Taliban governor of Mazar-e-Sharif - Numerous witnesses heard him make speeches at mosques and on radio inciting hatred of Hazaras. "Wherever you go we will catch you," he said. "If you go up, we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below we will pull you up by your hair." One witness testified that Niazi personally selected prisoners to be consigned to the death containers.

Mullah Musa, the so-called director of public health - A witness said Musa toured a public hospital looking for Hazara patients to mark out for death. Later that day, the witness heard from a doctor that Musa had taken a group of gunmen to the army hospital, where they had murdered all 20 or so patients, and relatives who had been visiting them.

Maulawi Mohammed Hanif - a Taliban commander who announced to a crowd of 300 people summoned to a mosque that the policy of the Taliban was to "exterminate" the Hazaras.

International aid workers fear the killings are continuing following the recent fall of the central Afghan town of Bamiyan. They have said thousands of people remain unaccounted for
.
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Afshar and Kartehsahe Massacre1993

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February 1993
Location: Afshar and Karteh Sahe, West Kabul. Majority of Hazara residents. (central Afghanistan - Hazarajat).

Victims: Innocent Hazara residents of Afshar and Karteh Sahe and members of the Hezb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party) who defended the Hazara people and fought for equal rights.

Perpetrators: Then former President Rabbani, his chief military commander and son-in-law, the so-called "lion of Panjshir" Ahmad Shah Massoud (both from Jamiat-i-Islami political group who participated in the murders) and Abdul Rasul with his political party, Ittehad-i-Islami.

* "...hundreds of its Hazara residents were massacred by government forces, under the direct order of President Rabbani and his cheif commander, Massoud.""At one o'clock on the morning of 11 February, while the inhabitants of Afshar lay asleep in their beds, the Institute of Social Sciences was attacked from three sides: from the west by Sayyaf's Ittehad-e-Islami forces, and from the north and south, by Rabbani's forces, helped by traitors within the Party, who had already been bought off."

"Following this withdrawal, forces loyal to Sayyaf and Ahmad Shah Massoud raided the area. For the next 24 hours they killed, raped, set fire to homes, and took young boys and girls as captives. By the time the news was broadcast in Kabul and internationally the following day, some 700 people were estimated to have been killed or to have di
sappeared. One year later, when parts of the district were retaken by Hezb-e-Wahdat forces, several mass graves were unearthed containing a further 58 bodies..."
(S.A. Mousavi: The Hazaras of Afghanistan )

Hence, Human Rights Watch reported that civilians had their throats slit and leg or arm cut off. More than 1,000 were killed and/or disappeared.


Leaders of the Massacre
"Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a current U.S. ally, was among the mujahedeen leaders in power in Afghanistan- the ones who welcomed Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996 from Sudan, where he had been forced to leave under U.S. pressure. Sayyaf, whose men carried out brutal atrocities during the mujahedeen’s rule, was a close ally of Ahmed Shah Massoud, on the rights in this photograph, whose men also carried out brutal acts."



An Afghan woman recounts how her husband was killed in Afshar, west of Kabul. Hundreds of innocent people from Hazara minority were massacred by forces of Sayyaf and Ahmad Shah Massoud in this area in 1993


Headline:

* According to The Guardian, November 16, 2001:

On February 11, 1993, Massoud and Sayyaf's forces entered the Hazara suburb of Afshar, killing - by local accounts - "up to 1,000 civilians", beheading old men, women, children and even their dogs, stuffing their
bodies down the wells.
* According to Los Angeles Times (Apr.26,1999) "In one terrible incident in 1993, documented by the State Department, Masoud's troops rampaged through a rival neighborhood, raping, looting and killing as many as a thousand people."

* "nternational responsibility for human rights disaster", (AI, 1995) In March 1995 Shura-e-Nezar forces reportedly carried out raids on hundreds of civilian homes in Kabul's south-western district of Karte She, killing or beating whole families, looting property and raping Hazara women. One family, interviewed by a foreign journalist in Kabul, said President Rabbani's soldiers had told them they wanted to "drink the blood of the Hazaras". Medical workers in the area confirmed at the time at least six incidents of rape and two attempted rapes, but believed the actual number was much higher.

* Human Rights Watch, (October 10, 2001)"In March 1995, Massoud [Defence Minister at that time] forces were responsible for rape and looting after they seized control of Kabul's predominantly Hazara neighborhood of Karte Seh.
On the night of Feb. 11, 1993, the Massoud and Sayyaf forces conducted a raid in west Kabul, killing Hazara civilians and committing widespread rape. Estimates of fatalities range from 70 to more than 100.
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Cold snap kills 760 in Afghanistan: authority

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AFP, February 8, 2008

Nearly half the villages in the poverty-stricken country were still cut off from major cities
KABUL — More than 750 people have died in the harshest winter to have hit Afghanistan in decades, the disaster authority said Saturday.

More than 500 homes, mostly traditional mud brick houses, have been destroyed and tens of thousands damaged by the heaviest snowfalls in 30 years, said Ahmad Shkeb Hamraz, an official at the National Disaster Management Authority.Nearly half the villages in the poverty-stricken country were still cut off from major cities, he told AFP.

"According to the latest figures, about 760 people have died since the start of the winter across the country," Hamraz said. "The figures are likely to increase as more information and data are being collected," he added.

Thousands of livestock have also died of the cold, Hamraz said, adding the western region bordering Iran was hardest hit.

According to AP: "Weather-related incidents have also left 84 people injured and killed at least 100,000 cattle, said Abdul Matin Edrak, head of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Commission."
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The Hazara Uprisings 1888-1893 / 3

Following this success, exorbitant taxes, and general oppression were once again the rule in Hazaristan. Added to this, the area became a center for the slave trade, and for the first time, the government introduced special taxes for slave trading. Hazara slaves were being offered so cheaply, that a slave could bought for 10 seers of wheat or barley (Faiz, 1912 vol.3:863). Furthermore, the inability to pay exorbitant government fines and taxes soon forced many Hazaras to sell their own wives and children as slavesBribery and looting of Hazara property by Pashtun officials had become regular and expected, and had reached a point where the government in Kabul decided to take steps to curb these excesses. In certain instances, such as the case of Mir Ata Khan, who had received 163,260 rupees in bribes and had stolen its equivalent in animas and goods, the charged official was forced to pay the major portion of that into the state treasury. Mir Ata Khan was in turn allowed to keep 11,280 rupees, some land and 18 and 18 female slaves (ibid:853-855). Massacres, slavery, heavy taxes amid general destruction had reached such a level in Hazaristan that the very existence of the Hazara peoples were endangered, a threat acknowledged even by one of the government’s own high ranking officials (ibid:855)

In January 1893, Abdur Rahman ordered all his Afghan commanders in Hazaristan to collect and dispatch to Kabul, the names of all Hazara Mirs, Sayids, Khans, Begs, and religious and non-religious leaders, along with the names of members of their families, regardless of whether they had taken part in the uprisings or not (ibid:862). This aroused once again the anger and hatred of the Hazaras towards the pasthuns. Disobeying orders, Pashtun officials instead either dispatched number of Hazaras to Kabul or tortured and executed them.

This upsurge in violence once again incited and ignited the flames of rebellion. Although the grounds for the uprising of 1893 had already been laid in the autumn of 1892, the events of early 1893 mobilized rebellion. The rebellion first began amongst the Day Zangi, Behsud, and Day Kundi people and soon spread to most parts of Hazaristan, finally reaching Kabul from where it spread to Daulat Yar, Bamiyan, Ghour, Ajaristan and Mazar-e Sharif.

The reasons for this second rebellion are clearly stated in a letter to Abdur Rahman by the leader of the rebellion: the unjust treatment of the Hazaras by Afghan commanders and soldiers; exorbitant and numerous unwarranted taxes; assaults on Hazara women; the massacre of innocent Hazaras; the looting and pillaging of homes; enslavement of Hazara children, women and men; abuses of religious and social leaders, and the accusation against Shi’a Hazaras of godlessness, and the replacement of Shi’a Mullahs by their Sunni counterparts. The letter also clearly maintains that even those Hazaras who surrendered without resistance and others who fought as loyal soldiers on the side of the regime, such as many of the Behsud, Day Zangi, Day Kundi, and Gouri clans, were not spared this treatment either. The letter concludes that, in order to survive and free themselves from slavery, the Hazara people were forced to take up armed rebellion and resistance against the government (ibid:891). The letter clearly demonstrates that despite all the massacres and oppression of their people in 1892, the Hazaras remained resistant to slavery and oppression.

The Amir of Kabul, taken by surprise at the response of the Hazaras, showed no initial reaction. Consequently, the rebel Hazaras were soon able to expand their territory and to gain ever-increasing control over Hazaristan through successive and successful offensives on government garrisons and the recovery of needed arms. The emergency forces sent from Bamiyan were also soon defeated. Once again government officials were forced to abandon their posts in Hazaristan and take refuge in Kabul. Soon, all strategic roads to Kabul fell under the control of the rebels, who dug trenches all along the route and prepared to launch their assault on Kabul. The rebellion had once again spread throughout Hazaristan.

In response, Abdur Rahman published a notice, entitled “A call to the Hazara People”, with which he intended to drive a rift between the leaders of the rebellion. This he succeeded in achieving; soon disagreement arose over whether or not armed rebellion was the right course of action. Some leaders, such as Mohammad Riza Beg, believed that armed rebellion risked total annihilation of their tribe and so was dangerous. He subsequently changed sides and fought alongside government forces against the rebels. (Temirkhanov, 1980:160).

Using this weakness in the enemy camp, Abdur Rahman began his offensive in April 1893. After suffering heavy losses, government forces finally broke through the rebel blockade of road and valleys and entered Hazaristan. The Hazaras resisted fiercely and totally destroyed some government battalions, while others, such as the battalion from Herat, lost as much as 85 percent of its men (ibid:163). Fresh government reinforcements, however, were soon brought in and the war and its atrocities heightened. According to Faiz Mohammad, hundreds of decapitated Hazara heads were sent to Bamyan and other cities daily (Faiz, 1912, Vol.3.898).

The war continued in this manner for months, during which time the Hazaras fought determinedly and fiercely, and succeeded in inflicting enormous damage on Abdur Rahman’s forces. The end came in the summer of 1893, when Abdur Rahman recalled his forces from Hazaristan and was forced to concede to the rebel’s demands, and grant Hazaristan special privileges (Temirkhanov, 1980:166). At the same time, faced with shortages of food and the prospect of famine, poverty, and the cost of and losses of the war, the Hazaras also began considering negotiation. After a long meeting, representatives were dispatched to Kabul to negotiate with Abdur Rahman; members of several Pashtun families were kept as hostages should Abdur Rahman stop negotiation and detain the representatives. After much discussion, and recognition on the part of the government of the rights of the Hazaras, the latter pledged allegiance to the Amir. thus the final Hazara uprising was settled.

"Those captured I had blown from the guns. The total number punished in this way, during three years of the rebellion, amounted to 5,000. Those killed by my army were about 10,000" (Abdur Rahman, in his biography. )

According to Temirkhanov, after the end of the war, the Hazaras divided into 3 groups:

1. Mirs who accepted the conditions of the Amir of Kabul, numbering some 10,000 families.
2. Hazaras who had no faith in the Amir’s promises and did not trust him, but who were not strong enough to resist. These numbered some 15,000 families, and they chose to migrate to neighboring countries, such as Iran and British India, Pakistan today.
3. Hazaras who neither trusted the Amir nor wanted to leave and so carried on their resistance to the Amir(ibid:167)

As a result of the stand taken by this third group, fighting continued until November 1893. The outcome, however, had long ago become clear. Finally, as those rebels who had continued their resistance laid down their arms at the end of 1893, the uprising came to a conclusive end.
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The Hazara Uprisings 1888-1893 / 2

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In order protect themselves and to gain promotion, the Amirs commanders committed ever more and worse atrocities. They openly abused Hazara religious leaders and tortured or incarcerated Hazara Mirs and elders; even those Hazara leaders who supported the government were not spared, but sent to Kabul or imprisoned under false pretexts (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:733,740). At the height of this policy, Abdul Qodos was commanded from Kabul to gather and send to Kabul all Sayyeds, Mullahs, and Mirs from the newly-conquered areas. From amongst these, those known for their support and loyalty to the Amir were placed in positions of power; those who were considered neutral were sent in to exile in other parts of Afghanistan, and those under suspicion were kept in Kabul in order to prevent any chances of an uprising (Ibid:761)In order to speed up the depopulation of Hazaristan and its repopulation by Pashtun nomads, Abdul Qodos arrested and sent to Kabul the Mirs of the Day Kundi, Day Zangi and other clans, where they were tried for obstructing the law. Arable Hazara land was retaxed:

“There were no laws and regulations regarding the amount and method of collection of taxes. Land tax would be collected in wheat [100 kherwar=100 seer, seer=7.066 kg] from one family one day...The next day oil would be added on, then 100 sheep, then straw, followed by barley and so on. Government officials would take all this on a whim and by force as they pleased” (Orazgani, 1913:81)

Those who refused to pay these taxes, such as members of the Day Chopan clan, were massacred by the hundred, including women and children. The rest of the population was totally disarmed, a process accompanied by random looting, destruction and assault on Hazara women (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:733).

Thousands of documents can be produced and hundreds of pages written, on the inhuman policies and activities of Abdur Rahman. the aim of giving these examples here is to provide a background to the period preceding the uprisings. it was the culmination of these conditions which provided the basis for the major uprising by the Hazaras. The actual trigger for the first rebellion was the assault by 33 Pashtun soldiers on the wife of a Pahlawan Hazara. The soldiers, who had entered the house under the pretext of searching for arms, tied the man up and assaulted his wife in front of him. The families of both the man and his wife, deciding that death was one hundred times better than such humiliation, killed the soldiers involved and attacked the local garrison, from whence they recovered their confiscated arms.

And so the major Hazara uprisings of April 1892 began in the occupied Hazaristan. Interestingly, the rebellion first began in parts of Hazaristan where the Amir enjoyed much support. Following the success of the above mentioned attack on government forces, the Orazgani Hazaras also took arms and joined the uprising. Of all the Afghan forces in the area., only Muhammadullah Khan and his men were able to flee and defend themselves. As the uprising spread and neared Kabul, the rebels were joined by Kabuli Hazaras and even some dissatisfied government officials.

"...The top half of his head was covered with dough shaped like a bowl and boiling oil poured into it. This was done until the hot oil pierced through and the soldier lost consciousness ...until he eventually died" method for getting a soldier to confess

Although the uprising had begun as a popular rebellion by ordinary Hazaras, it was soon joined by prominent Hazara leaders, the first of whom was Mohammad Azim Beg, the Day Zangi Mir. Muhammad Azim Beg had been amongst the first Mirs to pledge allegiance to the Amir in Kabul in 1887 and so had been given the title of Sardar by Abdur Rahman. Indeed, according to Orazgani, it had been Muhammad Azim Beg who had planned Abdur Rahman’s invasion of the originally unoccupied Hazaras such as Orazgan, Chorah, and Arjistan (Orazgani,1913:76), and had consequently been made Viceroy of Hazaristan (sultan, 1980, vol.1:280). However, when the time came, Azim Beg joined the Hazara uprising and attempted to organize and to give it clear direction. In order to do this wrote all Hazara Mirs and invited them all to a general meeting. It was this meeting, which was to be known as the famous Jirga-e Au Qool, that the Hazaras officially declared war on Abdur Rahman (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:800).

The major difference between this uprising and the Sheikh Ali uprising (1888-1890) was that, while the latter had had specific aims such as reduction of taxes, etc., the Jirga-e Au Qool had as its declared intention, the overthrow of the Amir of Kabul. It was also for this reason that the uprising attracted a number of Maimana Uzbaks, along with government and Afghan officials (Temirkhanov, 1980:1370). Thus, the rebellion spread throughout Hazaristan, attracting Hazara officers and soldiers in the service of the Amir. Soon the rebels took over government food stores in Hazaristan and closed off strategic roads into the region (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:800).

To begin with, Abdur Rahman did not view the matter as particularly serious and attempted to quash the rebellion by dispatching small forces to assist Abdul Qodos. Soon, however, Abdul Qodos was defeated by Mir Azim Beg, as was General Shir Mohammad Khan, leader of Abdur Rahman’s dispatched force. As well as victory over these forces, the Hazaras also gained access to a supply of arms and ammunitions.

It was at this point that Abdur Rahman became aware of the extent and seriousness of the uprising, and called upon Sunni religious leaders to conduct a ‘religious crusade’ against the ‘godless’ Shi’a Hazaras, promising those who took part in the crusade, Hazara land, wealth, women and children as reward. An enormous force was put together: some 30,000-40,000 government troops, 10,000 mounted government troops, and some 100,000 civilians (Faiz, 1912,vol.3:781-2,809,812; sultan 1980, vol.1:283). Also volunteering to join the crusade Pashtun nomads(kochi’s) who had long pleaded with the Amir to fight the Hazaras (sultan 1980, vol.1:283). A state of emergency was declared in all cities. Even the British government offered the assistance of British military advisers to Abdur Rahman (Temirkhanov, 1980:143).

Government and voluntary forces, along with the Afghan nomads, led by Abdul Qodos, General Gholam Heydar Khan and General Shir Mohammad Khan, surrounded all the areas where the rebellion was taking place. The first resistance came from the Day Zangi area where, despite a valiant effort, the Day Zangi were defeated and their leaders killed or captured. By June 1892, all out bloody war reigned throughout Hazaristan.

Despite impressive successes, by August 1892, the major forces of rebellion had been defeated, and Azim Beg, the principal leader of the rebellion was captured and later executed in Kabul. Soon, Orazgan, the main center of the fighting was captured and totally destroyed; thousands of Hazara men, women, and children were sold as slaves in the markets of Kabul and Qandahar, while numerous towers of human heads were made from the defeated rebels as a warning to others who might challenge the rule of the Amir
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The Hazara Uprisings 1888-1893 / 1

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After coming to power in 1880 and taking the throne as the Amir of Kabul, Abdur Rahman enjoyed the support of Hazara Mirs, even in his struggle against his Pashtun challengers. Indeed, the Mirs of Ghazni, Jaghouri, Shiekh Ali, Behsud, Malistan, and Day Zangi all proclaimed support for the new Amir (Temirkhanov, 1980:116). They expected to have the same cooperative relationship with the new Amir as they had had with past Amirs: they would pay their taxes, and be allowed to carry on as beforeHowever, Abdur Rahman and other plans. He intended to gain control over the previously independent areas of the Hazaristan (Orazgani, 1913:7). At the same time he had little tolerance for the powerful Hazara Mirs. Thus, once he had defeated his Afghan challengers, he set about strengthening his control over Hazaristan. His first step was to increase taxes. According to Ghobar, some sixteen different categories of taxes were levied (ghobar, 1980: 646-662). And this was only with respect to those Hazaras who supported the government and so paid the extra taxes willingly. However, soon after these increases, which themselves had caused great unrest and dissatisfaction, Abdur Rahman began incarcerating Hazara tribal and religious leaders. Abdur Rahman, whose aim was the weakening and thus the unconditional surrender of the Hazaras, began his assaults on the Sheikh Ali Hazaras. He chose them with the intention of exploiting the existing division between Shi’a and Sunni Sheikh Ali’s.

As mentioned before the Hazara uprisings of this period can be divided into three phases. Below are analysis of phase one and two are discussed. Phase three shall not be discussed as the uprisings of this period were on the whole on a much smaller scale and of the little consequence.

Phase one (1999-1890)

In 1881-82, Abdur Rahman took as hostage and later exiled to Mazar-e Sharif, the leader of the Sheikh Ali Hazaras in Daray-e Ghorband, Sayid Ja’far, and replaced with a Pashtun ruler (Faiz, 1912, Vol.3.391-2). This unprovoked step understandably caused great unrest amongst the Sheikh Ali leaders. In 1888, when Ishaq Khan, one of Abdur Rahman’s cousins and the other ruler of Mazar-e Sharif, rebelled against Abdur Rahman, member families of the Sheikh Ali tribe, such as Panj Qool and Ali Jam, seized the opportunity and joined the rebellion. However, the rebellion was soon crushed and 23 of its leaders were arrested and put on trial (Temirkhanov, 1980:124).

As mentioned before, the Sheikh Ali Hazaras were divided into Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. It was by using this difference that Abdur Rahman incited the Sunni Hazaras to fight their Shi’a brothers, who had joined in the rebellion. By 1889-90, these differences had heightened, resulting in conflicts between the two sects. Abdullah Khan, the Afghan ruler of the Sheikh Ali area, took advantage of the situation and fined both sects 100,000 Rupees. Since neither side was able to pay such a heavy fine, when the government tax collectors arrived, in January 1890, they were assaulted by government forces to flee (Faiz, 1912, vol.3:683).

The Sheikh Ali rebellion gathered momentum when Abdur Rahman called their leaders to Kabul. Although the rebels, led by Mohammad Sarwar Khan and Sayid Jafar Khan, succeeded in defeating government forces, they were eventually defeated. Those who had fought against were executed en masse. Those who had surrendered were either imprisoned or sent into exile in northern and southern Afghanistan. In their place, Pashtun speaking nomads from Eastern Afghanistan were brought in to populate the area and were given land by the government (Ibid:734,953).

Although the Sheikh Ali rebellion was crushed and failed to develop into a wider movement, it nevertheless acted as an inspiration, for it was the first organized and well-led Hazara rebellion against Abdur Rahman. The demands, set out very clearly by the leadership and sent to Kabul, were the following:

“...decrease in taxes, the ending of violence, the liberation of their religious leaders and Mirs, and freedom to exercise and safeguard local traditions in local administration” (Temirkhanov, 1980:122)

"All those who have rebelled against me, 'Amir of Islam' must be annihilated. Their heads shall be mine; you may have their fortunes and children." (Abdur Rahman, as he called upon the Pashtuns. )


Phase two (1890-1893)

During the years 1880-91, Abdur Rahman succeeded in subjugating new areas of Hazaristan, inhabited by over 50 different Hazara clans, such as: Orazgan, Sultan Ahmad, Looni, Haidar, Mir Qadam, Daya, Fuladi, Donkah, Khajah, Qarliq, Muhammad Dabah, Nihal, Basah, Daulat Khan, Nic Muhammad, Aziz, Aska, Taghlog, Temoor, Qutina, Khiyal, Chopanak, Mir Qoli, Daro, Barlas, Pajpa, Mir Adinah, Shadi, Tajik, Nor Beg, Haji khan, Khordak Zaida, Maliki, Moridi, Makanak, Gholam, Zawoli(zabuli), Morad, Enayat Khan, Se Pai, and Khoshnoo (Temirkhanov, 1980:116).

This area in fact constituted about half of the entire Hazaristan. As Orazgani writes : “The whole of Hazaristan was inhabited by approximately 500,000 families, of which some 300,000 were under the control of government rule” (1913:73)

By 1892 Abdur Rahman had succeeded in subjugating virtually all of Hazaristan, without facing any serious resistance. The Hazaras had accepted the taxes imposed on them, and had sent many of their men to be soldiers in the army.

However, this did not appear to be enough in the eyes of Abdur Rahman. He continued to view the Hazaras as a great threat and so set out to completely destroy and disband them as a force in Afghanistan. In order to do this, he first summoned to Kabul and then imprisoned or exiled, Hazara Mirs and religious leaders. In their place, he dispatched Afghan governors and commanders and accompanied by battalions of soldiers.

These new governors and commanders, amongst whom numbered many of Abdur Rahman’s cousins, were free to do as they pleased in their new domains. The most of these was Abdul Qodos, who according to Kakhar “was the first to enjoy the company of Hazara women” (1973:5). According to one of Abdur Rahman’s spies, who had been sent to the Hazaristan:
“Afghan officers and commanders, headed by Abdul Qodus khan, married daughters of Hazara leaders by force, each taking more than one wife, and generally spent their time drunk and enjoying themselves” (Faiz, 1912, vol. 3:740,745,761).

Government soldiers were free to fine people as they pleased, or to capture and torture men under the pretext of disarming them. Orazgani gives numerous accounts of the different torture methods used. Farhad khan, one of Abdur Rahman’s commanders slew 6 people and then hanged their bodies from a tree; on another occasion he tied four people up and had them dragged by their horses until their flesh had begun falling off. On yet another occasion, two Hazaras were told to swear at Imam Ali(as). When they refused to do so they were thrown in front of a pack of hungry dogs to be devoured. A heated stone, red as fire, was thrown a man’s shirt while his hands and legs were tied up; or a cat would be placed inside a man’s trousers and kicked and beaten until the animal would become fierce and scratch and trip the man’s legs and genitals (Orazgani, 1913:79-80)
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Talibans are the enemy

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The Talibans and Hazaras

By Michael Semple*
HIMAL

They issued me the last ticket to see the Great Buddha. Then they collected the stubs and the visitor’s books and bundled them into the sacks of documents to be buried. The remaining staff of the Department for Preservation of Historical Monuments had orders to hide even some things as innocuous as the books that recorded the impressions of visitors from six continents about the monuments of Bamian. A potato patch will be the resting place for the archives documenting 20 years of warI was pleased to have a chance to wander round the Buddhas again. The rock-cut Buddhas of Bamian are cultural sites of great significance, and were once the centre of Afghanistan’s mass tourist trade. In historical times, these Buddhas were targeted by zealots. Their survival (including several friezes of original paint work) through the two decades of war is amazing. Once again, there is fear that zealous conquerors might just try to prove their anti-idolatry credentials by further destroying them.

At night there was an air of the Day of Judgement in Bamian, as the local people, the Hazaras, tried to guess how long it would be before the Taliban arrived. The sound of haunting nocturnal congregational prayers carried across the valley. The faithful feared that the Taliban would wreak revenge for 20 years of defiance and for their share of casualties in previous Hazara-Pushtoon fighting. This fighting had seen some of the civil war’s bitterest encounters, and the locals prayed for deliverance. The threat to the Bamian Buddhas is symbolic of the one hanging over much of the population of central Afghanistan.

I emptied my camera reel and headed for the security of Islamabad. My host, the head of the Department for Preservation of Historical Monuments, was busy closing up his office, loading his gelims (the famous rough-woven Afghani rugs) and a few personal belongings into his jeep. He had done what he could to preserve central Afghanistan’s share of the world’s heritage. It was now time for Haji Sahib to return to his wife to share the agonising worry at the disappearance of their son, a lecturer in journalism at the University of Balkh in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, which had been overrun by the Taliban a week before. Haji Sahib’s agony is shared by thousands of families, who fear that relatives in Mazar-e-Sharif may face a slaughter. As the Taliban close in, the statelet of the Hazaras, built up in central Afghanistan over the past 20 years, totters on the brink of collapse.

Tang amad, dar jang amad
Bamian town lies at the centre of Afghanistan’s vast, mountainous Hazarajat region. It covers about 100,000 sq km and is home to the Hazara tribe, which claims anything between 1.5 and 4 million people. The Hazaras were prominent in the Northern Alliance that has been battling the Pushtoon-dominated Taliban of the south. The Alliance has been plagued by factional fighting and misrule and collapsed militarily in the face of a string of Taliban victories in July and August. Iran has been supporting the Northern Alliance and considers itself a natural ally of the Shia Hazaras, but Iran has been reluctant to commit the scale of assistance that might alter the turn of events. The rapid developments of the last few months left Hazarajat, with the pockets controlled by Ahmed Shah Masood in the northeast, alone in resisting the drive of the Taliban to conquer all of Afghanistan. The region is already crippled by an economic blockade which has led to near-famine conditions.

The Taliban capture of Mazar-e-Sharif in August had meant that Hazarajat was surrounded. It put the Taliban in control of the last remaining supply routes to the mountains and in a position to impose further hunger. The poorest of the area had survived by eating wild rhubarb, selling off their animals and entering into debt. A continued blockade meant they could not buy food to tide them over the upcoming winter; the starvation could only get worse.

In the face of such overwhelming odds, the natural thing to do would have been to surrender. Personally, I had expected a rapid surrender once the fate of Mazar-e-Sharif was decided, and had hoped that this would at least serve to quickly bring down the price of grain. The Hazaras’ sense of desperation, however, is summed up in their proverb: Tang amad, dar jang amad (He who is cornered must fight). What must have made Hazarajat contemplate such defiance?

If the Taliban achieve a military victory in Central Afghanistan, and if the Hazaras’ main party, the Hizb Wahadat, melts away in front of them (as Afghan groups often do when confronted by certain defeat), then it will signal the end of a 20-year experiment in de facto regional autonomy. Whether the ultimate outcome is restoration of order and national integration (the optimistic view, at times communicated by the Taliban) or a new phase of civil strife (the catastrophic view espoused by many of the Hazaras in Bamian), the restoration of rule by Kabul in this part of Afghanistan will be of major historical significance.

Often the long period of civil war in Afghanistan has been depicted as a period of anarchy. This has hardly been the case in Central Afghanistan. There have been three phases to the conflict here. In the 1978-1983 period (i.e. immediately after the communist coup in Kabul and the subsequent Soviet intervention), popular local uprisings rapidly forced the communist government to abandon all district headquarters and retreat to the regional headquarters in Bamian. Meanwhile, a new Hazara political movement, Shura Ittefaq, emerged in the wake of the uprisings. It was headed by Agha Behishti of Waras and backed by the traditional religious leadership of the area.

The Shura was remarkably successful in quickly establishing a presence throughout Hazarajat and putting itself forward as the new regional government. However, during the 1983-1989 period, as the US and Pakistan, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, poured money into the anti-Soviet jehad, there was a proliferation of armed groups operating in Hazarajat. They challenged the Shura Ittefaq’s hegemony and a bitter civil war ensued that is still remembered in Bamian as the bloodiest phase of the conflict. The third phase (1989-1998) came as Iran put its authority behind a merger of the Hazara military and political groups under the banner of Hizb Wahadat (Party of Unity). Wahadat was able to take over the autonomy project that Shura had started.

After securing military and political allegiance of the numerous groups operating in the vast territory, Wahadat set about developing its regional government. It established district and regional level councils, with specialist departments for justice, security, communications, commerce, women’s affairs, social welfare, health and education. When a coalition of mujahideen groups finally pushed the central forces of Najibullah out of Bamian, Wahadat built the headquarters for its regional government here, fast by the standing Buddhas.

Although the early popular risings had often targeted primary schools for their association with the communists, the expansion of access to education was an important part of the autonomy project. Official education departments were established at the district level and they began to reactivate old schools and open new ones, depending on the resources raised, primarily from local taxation. The Hazaras had a strong sense that lack of access to education was what had previously left them politically marginalised and fit only to be porters in the Kabul markets. Education was part of the national revival that was planned.

In contrast to the Taliban areas, there was a significant expansion of female education under the Wahadat, helped in part by the recruitment of teachers from the refugees returning from Iran and from the educated Hazaras displaced from Kabul. Although the main focus was primary education, Wahadat also set up a university in Bamian. Until September, a team of lecturers from Balkh University was working on secondment at Bamian’s fledgling university.

Another practical task for the regional administration was to service the region’s infrastructure, conscripting thousands of men every spring to reopen the roads after the snow-melt. New routes were developed, in particular the road to Mazar-e-Sharif which traverses through one of the world’s highest altitudes and most inhospitable terrains. The regional government was also busy developing landing strips, and levelling a mountain-top plateau as an international airport. The Department for Preservation of Historical Monuments was part of this forward-looking agenda of the Bamian government, a recognition that Hazarajat had numerous heritage sites of international significance. (Apart from the Gandhara Buddhist archaeological sites, Bamian Valley is the location of two famous citadels ransacked by Genghis Khan.)

Alongside the building up of regional civilian institutions, Wahadat also began developing its war machine. Initially, it was composed of a patchwork of local commanders who had emerged over the years fighting other communities of Afghanistan and the communists. Since the fall of the Najibullah government, Wahadat gradually tried to fashion a conventional army, with commanders receiving commissions from the movement’s leadership and conscripts from the districts. However, the army remained poor in resources, weak in command and control, and lacking in professional officers of proven quality. It would be safe to say that what victories it achieved were probably due more to desperation than military effectiveness or discipline.

Hazara vs Kochi
Underlying the Hazaras’ regional autonomy project was a long history of conflict in the area. Hazaras, thrown into a state of urgent activity by the news of the Taliban advances northwards, were mindful not just of the track record of the Taliban movement itself but also of the [ethnic Pushtoon] conquerors that had come long before. Hazarajat was only fully assimilated into Afghanistan in the 1890s by Kabul’s Amir Abdur Rahman (r. 1880-1901) in a series of military campaigns. Hazara resistance to this integration was ruthlessly put down, and folklore abounds with tales of towers of skulls erected by the victorious Amir. After the fighting was over, hundreds of members of the Hazara ruling castes, the mirs and the syeds were picked up by the Kabul forces and ‘disappeared’.

Following the annexation, much of the fertile valley land at the base of the mountainous region was confiscated in favour of the Pushtoon tribes. Most significantly, in 1894, Abdur Rahman issued an edict granting rights over the pasture lands in the region to the Pushtoon nomad tribe, the Kochis, who had helped the Amir to conquer the area. For 90 years the Kochis exercised these rights in their annual migration.

If there is sectarian bitterness in Hazarajat, it is largely directed at the Kochis. In a classic case of agriculturalist-pastoralist rivalry, the Kochis are remembered for terrorising the peasants (backed by the Pushtoon administration), for strong-arm tactics in petty trade and money-lending, and for forcibly acquiring land. Ultimately some of them set themselves up as landlords and their Pushtoon-style mud fortresses, now in ruins, still dot the Hazarajat countryside.

The reality of the civil war in Hazarajat is that it was directed against communism only momentarily. The Hazaras’ first and most significant acts in their autonomy project were to bar entry to the nomads, restore the arable land that they had bought or grabbed, and repeal the edicts of Abdur Rahman and Sardar Mohammed Daoud (president of Afghanistan, 1973-1978) granting the Kochis control of the rangelands. For 20 years, therefore, the Hazaras have controlled these natural resources. The panic in Hazarajat now is the fear that history will repeat itself and that the Taliban advance means nothing more than a Pushtoon reconquest. The Hazaras fully expect their region to be pillaged in the days ahead, as during the conquest by Abdur Rahman.

The mood was sum-med up by one of the woman hoteliers met in Bamian (yes, Hazarajat has its share of roadside chai khanas managed by enterprising women returned from Iran or Kabul). She roars defiance, claims to have killed eight looters in the war for West Kabul, and promises to again shoulder her Kalashnikov if the old rulers try to return. Elsewhere, people were immersed in deep depression at the prospect of becoming serfs again. In Pushte Ghorgurey, former tenants now graze their animals on pastures once reserved for the Kochis, and they are now able to plant rainfed wheat and barley on the hillsides. They point to a single decaying wall, all that is left of their old lord’s fort, and tremble at the thought of how they will be punished for their audacity.

In Waras, despairing tenants of one of the big Pushtoon landlords contemplate what their returning master would demand in lieu of 20 years’ of back rent. In Panjao, I met Sohaila, a woman educated in Kabul who, as a literacy instructor, is the only earning member of two families. Her work at an NGO winter school last year saved her relations from starvation. She is terrified that the United Nations will be forced to abandon the education project for which she now works. But most impressive is Haji Sahib himself. He discreetly lets it be known that he has little hope of surviving a Taliban purge. But he repeatedly quotes Arnold Toynbee and laments that the coming changes defy "the spirit of the people"; he warns that peace cannot be achieved in this way. Military pacification, which does not address the old enmities underlying the struggle for the resources of the mountains, cannot be the way to enduring peace.

It is striking that the international assistance groups, which in July decided to make Hazarajat a showpiece for the United Nations’ new "Common Programming" approach, could do nothing to allay the civilian population’s fears of an impending massacre. All international staff from the UN and most of the NGOs, plus most of the national staff, were pulled out of the area at the first sign of the Taliban advance. The Bin Laden affair has made them even more cautious about returning. The agencies’ concern to take no risks with their own staff’s security means that they are unable to play the kind of witness role that many in the civilian population expected them to. The international aid agencies are confined to a peripheral role while the Hazaras take their chances with their new rulers.

*M. Semple is a community development worker based in Islamabad. He visited Bamian in August 1998.
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Afghanistan and the Anglo-Russian Dispute

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THROUGH THE GATES OF ASIA.
by Theo. F. Rodenbough


In universal history there is no more interesting subject for the consideration of the political student than the record of Russian progress through Central Asia.
In one sense this advance is a practical reestablishment or extension of the influence of the Aryan race in countries long dominated by peoples of Turki or Mongolian origin; in another sense it has resulted in a transition from the barbarism or rude forms of Asiatic life to the enlightenment and higher moral development of a European age. In a religious sense it embodies a crusade against Oriental fanaticism; and it is a curious feature of the Anglo-Russian dispute, that upon a question of temporal gain, the greatest Christian nation finds itself allied with the followers of Buddha and Mahomet against Russia under the Banner of the Cross.
The descendants of the great Peter have opened up in Central Asia a new region which, if as yet it has not been "made to blossom as the rose," has nevertheless profited by the introduction of law, order, and a certain amount of industrial prosperityRussia commenced her relations with Central Asia as early as the sixteenth century. Not only through embassies sent, but by military expeditions; these, however, at that time were private ventures by roving Cossacks and other inhabitants of Southern Russia. Authorized government expeditions commenced with Peter the Great, who in 1716-17 sent two exploring parties into the Central Asian deserts-- Bekovitch to Khiva, and Likhareff to the Black Irtish. These expeditions were undertaken in search of gold, supposed to exist in those regions, but failed in their object; the detachment under Bekovitch being entirely destroyed after reaching Khiva. Peter next turned his attention to the country bordering upon the southern shores of the Caspian Sea; taking advantage of Persian embarrassments, with the consent of the Shah and of the Sultan he acquired, in 1722-3, the provinces of Gilan, Mazanderan, and Asterabad; but the great expense of maintaining a large garrison so remote from Russia, and the unhealthiness of the locality, induced the Russian Government, in 1732, to restore the districts to Persia. In the same year Abul-Khair, the Khan of the Little Kirghiz Horde, voluntarily submitted to Russia. Twenty years later a small strip of the kingdom of Djungaria, on the Irtish, was absorbed, and toward the commencement of the reign of Catharine II., Russian authority was asserted and maintained over the broad tract from the Altai to the Caspian. This occupation was limited to a line of outposts along the Ural, the Irtish, and in the intervening district. During Catharine's reign the frontier nomads became reduced in numbers, by the departure from the steppe between the Ural and Volga of the Calmucks, who fled into Djungaria, and were nearly destroyed on the road, by the Kirghiz.
The connection between Russia and Central Asia at this time assumed another character, that of complete tranquillity, in consequence of the development of trade through Orenburg and to some extent through Troitsk and Petropaulovsk. The lines along the Ural and Irtish gradually acquired strength; the robber-raids into European Russia and Western Siberia almost entirely ceasing. The allegiance of the Kirghiz of the Little and Central Hordes was expressed in the fact that their Khans were always selected under Russian influence and from time to time appeared at St. Petersburg to render homage. With the Central Asian khanates there was no connection except that of trade, but as regarded the Turcomans, who, it is said, had frequently asked for Russian protection, intercourse was discouraged, as they could not be trusted "within the lines," being simply bandits.
The Emperor Paul imagined that the steppes offered a good road to Southern Asia, and desiring to expel the English from India, in the year 1800 he despatched a large number of Don Cossacks, under Orloff, through the districts of the Little Horde. At the time a treaty was concluded with Napoleon, then First Consul, by virtue of which a combined Russo-French army was to disembark at Asterabad and march from thence into India by way of Khorassan and Afghanistan. The death of the Emperor of Russia put an end to this plan.
During the reign of Alexander I., Central Asia was suffered to rest, and even the Chinese made raids into Russian territory without interruption. In the third decade of the present century, however, several advanced military settlements of Cossacks were founded. "Thus," says M. Veniukoff, "was inaugurated the policy which afterward guided us in the steppe, the foundation of advanced settlements and towns (at first forts, afterwards stanitsas [Footnote: Cossack settlements.]) until the most advanced of them touches some natural barrier."
About 1840, it was discovered that the system of military colonization was more effectual in preserving order in the Orenburg district than by flying detachments sent, as occasion required, from Southern Russia; and in 1845-6 the Orenburg and Ural (or Targai and Irgiz) forts were established. In 1846 the Great Kirghiz Horde acknowledged its subjection to Russia on the farther side of the Balkash, while at the same time a fort was constructed on the lower Yaxartes.
In 1847 the encroachments of Russia in Central Asia had brought her upon the borders of the important khanates of Khiva and Khokand, and, like some huge boa-constrictor, she prepared to swallow them. In 1852 the inevitable military expedition was followed by the customary permanent post. Another row of forts was planted on the Lower Yaxartes, and in 1854 far to the eastward, in the midst of the Great Horde, was built Fort Vernoye--the foundation of a new line, more or less contiguous to natural boundaries (mountains and rivers), but not a close line. Between Perovsky and Vernoye there were upwards of four hundred and fifty miles of desert open to the incursions of brigands, and between the Aral and Caspian seas there was a gap, two hundred miles in width, favorable for raids into the Orenburg Steppe from the side of Khiva. Finally, under the pretext of closing this gap, a general convergent movement of the Siberian and Orenburg forces commenced, culminating under General Tchernayeff in the capture of Aulieata and Chemkent in 1864, and of Tashkent in 1865.
Here, M. Veniukoff says: "The Government intended to halt in its conquests, and, limiting itself to forming a closed line on the south of the Kirghiz steppes, left it to the sedentary inhabitants of Tashkent to form a separate khanate from the Khokand so hostile to us." And this historian tells us that the Tashkendees declined the honor of becoming the Czar's policemen in this way, evidently foreseeing the end, and, to cut the matter short, chose the Russian general, Tchernayeff, as their Khan. The few Central Asian rulers whose necks had so far escaped the Muscovite heel, made an ineffectual resistance, and in 1866 Hodjeni and Jizakh were duly "annexed," thus separating Bokhara and Khokand.
Here we may glance at the method by which Russia took firmer root on the shores of the Caspian, and established a commercial link with the Khivan region. In 1869 a military post and seaport was planted at Krasnovodsk, on that point of the east shore of the Caspian, which presents the greatest facilities for shipping, and as a base of operations against the Turcomans, who were at that time very troublesome. Several military expeditions set out from this point, and every year detachments of troops were despatched to keep the roads open toward Khiva, the Kepet Dagh, or the banks of the Attrek. Within five years (1870-'75) the nomads living within the routes named had become "good Turcomans," carried the Czar's mails to Khiva, and furnished the Krasnovodsk-Khivan caravans with camels and drivers. But the colonization scheme on the lower Caspian had once more brought the Russians to the Persian boundary. In 1869 the Shah had been rather officiously assured that Russia would not think of going below the line of the Attrek; yet, as Colonel Veniukoff shows, she now regrets having committed herself, and urges "geographical ignorance" of the locality when the assurance was given, and the fact that part of her restless subjects, on the Attrek, pass eight months of the year in Russian territory and four in "so-called" Persia; it is therefore not difficult to imagine the probable change on the map of that quarter.
The march continued toward Khiva, and after the usual iron-hand-in- velvet-glove introduction, General Kaufmann in 1873 pounced upon that important khanate, and thus added another to the jewels of the Empire. Nominally, Khiva is independent, but nevertheless collects and pays to Russia a considerable contribution annually.
In 1868 Russia seized Samarcand, and established over the khanate of Bokhara a similar supervision to that in Khiva. As the distinguished Russian already quoted remarks: "The programme of the political existence of Bokhara as a separate sovereignty was accorded to her by us in the shape of two treaties, in 1868 and 1873, which defined her subordinate relation to Russia. But no one looks at these acts as the treaties of an equal with an equal. They are instructions in a polite form, or programmes given by the civilized conqueror to the conquered barbarians, and the execution of which is guaranteed by the immediate presence of a military force."
The district of Khokand, whose ruler, Khudoyar Khan, submitted himself to Russia in 1867, was for a number of years nominally independent, but becoming disturbed by domestic dissensions, was ultimately annexed under the name of the Fergana Province.
To this point we have followed Colonel Veniukoff's account of the Russian advance. It will doubtless interest the reader to continue the narrative from an English view, exceptionally accurate and dispassionate in its nature.
In a lecture before the Royal United Service Institution in London, May 16, 1884, Lieut.-General Sir Edward Hamley, of the British Army, discussed the Central Asian question before an audience comprising such Indian experts as Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Napier of Magdala, and Mr. Charles Marvin, and many distinguished officers, including Lord Chelmsford, Sir F. Haines, and Colonel Malleson. Among other things, General Hamley said:
"Probably England has never been quite free, during the present century, from some degree of anxiety caused by the steady, gradual approaches of Russia through Central Asia toward India. It was seen that where her foot was planted it never went back. It was seen that with forces comparatively small she never failed to effect any conquest she was bent on, and that the conquest, once effected, was final. This security in possession was owing in great measure to the fact that the governments she displaced were bad governments, and that she substituted one far better in itself and of a simplicity which was well adapted to the people with whom she was dealing. She aimed mainly at three things--the establishment of order and of confidence and the obtaining of some return for her own heavy expenses. From the establishment of order and of confidence sprang a prosperity which enabled her to obtain a certain revenue, though entirely inadequate to her expenditure. Thus we beheld her pressing solidly on, and we knew not where she might stop. Pretexts, such as it was difficult to find a flaw in, were never wanting on which to ground a fresh absorption of territory. And seeing behind this advance a vast country--almost a continent--which was not merely a great Asiatic Power, but a great European State, under autocratic, irresponsible rule, with interests touching ours at many points, it is not to be wondered at that we watched with anxiety her progress as she bore steadily down toward our Indian frontier."
General Hamley says that England became particularly suspicious of Russia in 1867 when she absorbed Turkestan, and this feeling was intensified in 1878, while the Treaty of Berlin was still pending. General Kaufmann assembled a small army of about 12,000 men and thirty-two guns on the frontier of Bokhara, and although upon the signing of the treaty all threatening movements ceased, yet the British commander then operating in Afghanistan knew that Kaufmann had proposed to march in the direction of Kabul, and menace the British frontier.
It has ever been the practice of Russia, in her schemes of aggrandizement, to combine her diplomatic with her military machinery; but, unlike other nations, the ambassador has generally been subordinate to the general.
At the time that General Kaufmann sheathed his sword under the influence of the Treaty of Berlin, in 1878, there remained another representative of Russia--General Stolietoff--who had been quietly negotiating with the Ameer of Afghanistan, Shere Ali, the terms of a "Russian treaty," whose characteristics have already been described. Hearing of this, the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg questioned the Russian Minister, who answered him "that no mission had been, nor was intended to be, sent to Kabul, either by the Imperial Government or by General Kaufmann." This denial was given on July 3d, the day after Stolietoff and his mission had started from Samarcand. After the envoy's arrival at Kabul, another remonstrance met with the reply that the mission was "of a professional nature and one of simple courtesy," and was not, therefore, inconsistent with the pacific assurances already given. The real nature of this mission became known from papers found by General Roberts at Kabul in 1879. These showed that Shere Ali had been invited to form a close alliance with the Russian Government. General Kaufmann had advised Shere Ali to try and stir up disaffection among the Queen's Indian subjects, promising to aid him, eventually, with troops. Finding that this scheme was impracticable at the moment, Russia dropped the Ameer, who fled from the scene of his misfortunes, and died soon after.
For the moment England breathed more freely. There were still great natural obstacles between the empires of Russia and of India. Not only the friendly state of Afghanistan, but on its northwestern border the neutral territory of Merv, hitherto an independent province, and inhabited by warlike tribes of Turcomans difficult to reach through their deserts and likely to harass a Russian advance to Herat to an embarrassing extent. It was seen that the possession of this territory would at once free Russia from much difficulty in case of an advance and give her the means of threatening Herat as well as Kabul from her base in Turkestan, and even to some extent to carry forward that base beyond the Oxus.
On the part of Russia, the success of General Skobeleff in capturing the fortified position of Geok Tepé, January 24, 1880, marked the beginning of negotiations with the Turcomans for the acquisition of Merv. For a long while these were unsuccessful, but early in 1884 it was cabled to London, that "The Queen of the World" had accepted the White Czar as her future liege lord.
The immediate cause of this event was the effect produced upon the minds of the Turcoman deputation to Moscow by the spectacle of the Czar's coronation. The impression created by the gorgeous ceremonial was heightened by the presence of so many Asiatic chiefs and kinglets at the ancient and historic capital of Russia. The tales they brought back were well calculated to influence the minds of a wild and primitive people; and when the Khan of Khiva proffered his services for the settlement of their relations with Russia, that section of the Tekke tribe in favor of peace accepted them. The chiefs tendered their formal submission to the Czar, and promised to allow Russian merchants to reside among them, and pledged themselves to maintain the security of the routes from the Oxus to the Tejend; also accepting the responsibilities of Russian subjects by rendering tribute either in money or by military service. To all intents and purposes it is equivalent to the establishment of a Russian garrison in Merv.
The thorough way in which Russia seeks to bind her Asiatic subjects is shown in the fact that in 1884, at the request of the Khan of Khiva, a Russian tutor was selected to instruct his children.
Soon after it was reported that the Russians had established themselves at Sarakhs on the direct road to Herat and just over the Persian boundary of Afghanistan. These later movements again aroused the distrust of England, and a joint commission of Russian and English officials was appointed early in the year 1885.
While the English members of the commission under Sir Peter Lumsden were awaiting the convenience of their foreign colleagues, the presence of Russian troops was reported on the disputed territory in the vicinity of Herat.
This action alarmed the Afghans, and a collision seemed imminent. The English Government considered M. de Giers' explanation of this encroachment unsatisfactory. Pending an adjustment of the new complication both nations prepared for the worst.
Here we will leave the subject of the Russian advance through the Gates of Asia and pass to the consideration of the present neutral ground of Afghanistan
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Hazara stars in Australian film

(Documentary Australia Foundation)

Molly And Mobarak
Molly and Mobarak is the story of Mobarak Tahiri, a young Hazara refugee, who is living in the town of Young, in rural NSW. Categorized as an illegal immigrant by the Australian government, Mobarak was initially detained in the Curtin Detention Centre near Derby, WA, before being granted a Temporary Protection Visa
(TPV) that allowed him to live and work in the general Australian community and then return home once the visa expiresMobarak and a small group of other Hazaras are working at the Burrangong abattoirs. They are paid slightly above award wages and their English skills are improving rapidly—largely due to the efforts of volunteer English teachers organized by Ann Bell, an instructor at the local TAFE. Despite several racist incidents, Mobarak has begun to feel a part of the local community and has become especially close to Lyn Rule and her daughter Molly. Like a number of other local people, they have befriended the Hazara refugees and offered them support.

Mobarak’s life becomes even more complicated when he falls in love with Molly, a teacher at the local high school. However Molly insists that she has a boyfriend in another town and Lyn tells Mobarak that he and Molly cannot be together. The documentary creates a delicate tension as the hopes and uncertainty of the relationship between Molly and Mobarak run parallel to the hopes and uncertainties Mobarak feels as he waits to know whether he will be allowed to stay permanently in Australia.

When the film starts there are ninety Hazara refugees in Young. However by the conclusion of the documentary their number has dropped to about thirty-three of a population of 9000 residents in the town. The publicity they generated has made them visible in the community. In cities they just meld in with multicultural Australia and no-one notices them, whereas in Young they stand out. People know who they are. They are conspicuous in the community Mobarak is one of the Hazaras who leaves the town after the Bali Bombing causes more racial incidents in the town.

However, in Mobarak’s case the main motivating factor is the realisation that his relationship with Molly is not going to produce the results he wanted. On top of that his Temporary Protection Visa is running out. Mobarak goes to see his lawyer in Sydney to prepare his case to why he should remain in Australia. The film ends with the case unresolved and Mobarak only having 6 months left on his visa.
Impact
The Director's Statement

I set out to begin making this film in 2002 with the aim of putting ‘a human face on the refugee situation in Australia’. I wanted to pursue the themes of human rights, refugees, racism and rural communities in a compassionate and thought-provoking way. The Government at the time had a tendency to vilify the asylum seekers, calling them “illegals, boat people, queue jumpers” and other derogatory terms, I felt the film I was going to make would play a significant role in humanising refugees and asylum seekers.

The film deals with what it means to be a refugee and confront loss and separation, but in particular with the confronting issue of racism in Australia. Racism exists in all country towns and cities in Australia, but so do generous, out-going and compassionate Australians who supply a psychological shelter for strangers in their midst’. The film projects ‘the possibility of a “future Australia” that’s built on the idea of hope and caring, rather than fear’.

There are many towns across Australia where Afghans are employed – in Abattoirs, as fruit and vegetable pickers, farm labourers etc. Temporary Protection Visa holders provide a cheap and reliable labour pool for towns and country areas railing against population drift to the city. Initial hostility and suspicion has largely given way to respect and genuine affection for the newcomers. Small towns would like to keep their temporary refugees. Strong representations have been made to the Federal Government by Coalition MP’s and local government bodies.

The film has been seen by hundreds of thousands of people in Australia and overseas, in the US, Canada and Europe. Most people saw it on television, but others would have seen it at film festivals, in cinemas or in small group discussion screenings. The film had it’s premiere at the Sydney Film Festival in 2003. and was then distributed to refugee support networks throughout the country. These groups, in particular Amnesty and Rural Australians for Refugees, organised screenings in country halls and cinemas across Australia. I attended many of these screenings - from Glebe in Sydney, to Perth Adelaide, Brisbane and Melbourne, to big towns like Mildura and small towns like Gerringong on the NSW South Coast. At all screenings the film resonated powerfully with audiences, especially in evoking strong sympathy for the plight of refugees. The film had a cinema season in Sydney and Melbourne and generated a lot of publicity in the media, especially in the national press. Articles were written about the film and also about the general plight of Afghani Hazaras on Temporary Protection Visas.

I believe the publicity surrounding the film fuelled a general concern already present within the community about the government’s unsympathetic and heavy-handed treatment of the refugees. Criticism was coming from both sides of the political spectrum. It ranged from political activists on the left of the Labor Party including Democrats like Andrew Bartlett, to National Party MP’s concerned about what would happen to rural industries like meat processing and fruit-picking that were so heavily reliant on refugee labour for their on-going viability.

The fact that the film had a critical part to play in this debate was confirmed for me when a request that it be screened by Tanya Plibersek, a Labor back-bencher, in Parliament House, Canberra was initially turned down. The screening was refused on the grounds that the film was “critical of the Government’s policy, selectively quotes the Prime Minister and promotes the theme of widespread resistance to government policy,” according to Joint House Department executive leader Bob Wedgwood w on the advice of Speaker Neil Andrew. After the letter of refusal was leaked to the press, the ban was immediately overturned “Molly & Mobarak” is not a shrill political advocacy film, but by being a love story, it allows for the issues to emerge in a much more subtle way. The honesty, directness and intimacy produces an emotional affect on audiences which effects change in small and personal ways
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Discrimination against Hazaras overseas

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Racial and religous tensions rife in Afghan community
(The Age)

Religious and racial hatred dividing Afghans has been transferred to Melbourne, with one group of refugees saying they are being persecuted by other ethnic Afghans.

Some Hazara Afghans living in Melbourne on temporary protection visas fear that other members of the Afghan community will tell immigration authorities they are not genuine refugees.

Fahim Fayazi, a Hazara refugee, said he had heard of people who feared talking with non-Hazara Afghans in case they tried to detect a suspect accent that could be taped and reported to the Immigration Department
"The discrimination (against us) from the non-Hazara community happens because we are different," Mr Fayazi said. "We are Shia (Muslims). They are Sunni (Muslims). We look more like south-east Asians. They look more like Indian people."

Hazara refugee Mohammed Arif Fayazi, who has lived in Melbourne on a temporary protection visa for two years, discussed the issue with caution for fear of creating further tensions, but agreed that Afghan tribal frictions based on religion and race had surfaced here.

"There are good people and bad people in both communities," he said.

The Hazaras, the third-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, are the only Shia Muslims in a country of Sunnis and have historically been subjected to massacres, most recently by the Pashtun-controlled Taliban.

Afghanistan expert William Maley, from the University of New South Wales, talks of a traditional hatred of the Hazara by other Afghans that has had "all the ferocity (with which) Hitler despised the Jews".

One Afghan community leader admitted to The Age that he had dobbed in Hazaras to the Immigration Department, telling authorities the newcomers did not speak the local dialect, did not know anything about Afghan culture, and urging that they be expelled to free up more places for "real" Afghans.

While many in the wider Afghan community are said to help new arrivals, regardless of their ethnic background, some see the Hazaras as illegals taking visas at the expense of their own relatives and friends.

One non-Hazara Afghan leader told The Age this did not go down well in the non-Hazara community, particularly as they believe many of the Hazaras now being released from detention centres on temporary protection visas were really Pakistanis.

But community leader Wadir Fafi, a Pashtun, who is also a director of the South East Migrant Centre in Dandenong, denied there was discrimination against Hazaras.

He said he knew of nobody who had dobbed in suspect Hazaras. However, he described those who had arrived in Australia by boat in the past two years as illegals and believed the majority were from Pakistan.

"I, as a Pashtun, am proud to offer my service to the Hazara Afghani," Mr Fafi said. "It is the same with other Pashtuns in Melbourne."

The hand of friendship, however, does not extend to those found to be Pakistani. Mr Fafi said perceptions of friction within the wider Afghan community arose from a general tendency among Afghans to disagree.

He said there were 14 Afghan associations in Melbourne, five of them for Pashtuns.

There are estimated to be 800 Hazara Afghans living in Victoria, out of a total Afghan population of almost 3500. They live largely around Dandenong and work in factories, and on building sites and farms.

But the Immigration Department, which believes many could be Pakistani, is now investigating to determine how many may have fraudulently gained visas.
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